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ABSTRACT
THE COLONIAL AND POST-COLONIAL ORIGINS OF AGRARIAN
DEVELOPMENT: A CASE OF TWO PUNJABS
SEPTEMBER, 2016
B.Sc (Hons), LAHORE UNIVERSITY OF MANAGEMENT SCIENCES
M.Sc, UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Associate Professor Mwangi wa Gĩthĩnji

This study explores the colonial and post-colonial origins of agrarian development by
looking at the role of historical institutions, class formations and the state (ICS) in shaping the
process. It contributes to the “divergence debates” in economics, which make an attempt to
explain the ‘fundamental causes’ of divergence between countries. While one strand of the
divergence literature presents the process as being functional to ‘geography’, a second strand
focuses on the institutional legacies of colonialism; what is common to both sets of explanations,
however, is the view that future outcomes are completely pre-determined by one or another timeinvariant factor, leading implicitly to the view that third-world countries are in fact prisoners of
birth. This study challenges this assumption by pointing to the crucial role that is played by a
third factor--- the agency of the post-colonial state and agrarian public policy---in mitigating the
negative impact of inheriting a particularly bad geography or the misfortune of being colonized
at a point in history.
To do this, the study utilizes the natural experiment of the partition of the Punjab region
in South Asia between India and Pakistan in 1947. While the two sides inherited relatively
vii

similar initial conditions---and hence must have converged given the ‘geography’ or ‘colonial
institutions’ models of economic development---yet, a reversal of economic fortunes has taken
place, so that the districts assigned to Indian Punjab systematically outperform the districts that
were assigned to Pakistan at the time of partition. What explains this divergence? The study
provides an answer to this conundrum by examining the evolution of institutional structures in
each Punjab during the two qualitatively distinct periods, and in particular paying attention to the
differential paths of post-colonial public policy across the two sides.
The two-dimensional framework---with two distinct time periods (pre and post
independence) and two states (Indian and Pakistani Punjab)--- allows me to build a much more
holistic understanding of ICS and their colonial and post-colonial origins than is possible by
looking at individual social formations without a counterfactual. Specifically, the study borrows
an analogy from the empirical behavioral sciences where “twin studies” are often employed to
differentiate between the impacts of “nature versus nurture”. Here, I employ a similar technique
to separate out the impact of ‘historical’ and ‘geographical’ factors, from the role played by
‘post-colonial state policy’ in shaping current agricultural outcomes in the two Punjabs.
Using this research design and original archival research on colonial records and
statistical manuals, I design an exceptionally long panel data set on district-wise agricultural
production and acreage, along with data on colonial transformation, infrastructural development,
market formations and property rights, to show how colonial institutions shaped class structures
in the twin states, and how these react back on the economy and the post-colonial state by
shaping the investment choices (and yield achieved per unit land) of farmers in each Punjab. I
pay specific attention to the institutional structure as being shaped by a “colonial entitlement
system”: a complex product of class (as the organization of surplus in an economy) and power
(organization of power) relations distributed by the colonial state.
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The study points to two ‘critical junctures’ in institutional history that shaped the
evolution of the entitlement system during and after the colonial period. The first, beginning with
the American Civil War in 1861 led to a severing of the existing global supply chain of cotton,
which in turn, led to the emergence of Punjab as an alternative feeder of raw cotton to the
empire. An ‘institutional apparatus’ was required to achieve this aim. The evolution of this
apparatus came about, I argue, as a result of the contradictory goals of economic transformation
(in infrastructure) and the maintenance of political order. The second period begins in 1947,
where the Indian side of Punjab was exposed to a series of land reforms while the Pakistani side
was not. In addition, the political structure across the two states varied substantially, with the
Indian side having a much more democratic structure than its Pakistani twin. As a result of these
differences, the two sides can essentially be seen as being divided into two ‘institutional islands’
with the people on each side having access to the institutions of just one of the two states.
This produced two qualitatively different ‘class controls’ over the post-colonial states in
each case, and its economic impact is assessed in the study by devising a Difference-inDifference strategy to ask: To what extent are differences in the post-independence agricultural
yield per unit land of districts assigned to one of the two Punjabs by the Boundary Commission
of 1947 shaped by 1) their colonial history, specifically the institutional structures and classformations inherited due to colonial transformation and 2) the set of post-colonial developments,
respectively, that these districts were exposed to as a result of them being assigned to one of the
two states, while holding the effects of agroclimatic variables and geography constant. The study
concludes that it is a combination of ‘institutional’ reform and the ‘class essence’ of that reform
that determines agrarian performance in post-colonial societies.
Keywords: Economic divergence, Institutional Development, South Asian Economic
History, Colonial Institutions, Post-Colonial Development
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SECTION I

THE REVERSAL OF FORTUNES IN PUNJAB

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCING THE STUDY
1.1 The Conundrum
1.1.1 The Setting and Overview of Study
The boundary line that divides the South Asian region of Punjab represents a natural
experiment in economic history. Two states that were a part of the same country for
centuries, prior to being partitioned by the Radcliffe1 Line of 1947, lie on either side of
this wall: on the eastern side lies the state of Punjab, India; to the west, its Pakistani
namesake.
Figure 1.1 Map of Punjab

Source: Punjab Social and Economic Indicators Report
Government of India, 2015

1

Named after the colonial administrator Sir Cyril Radcliffe who was assigned the
task of coming up with a ‘partition plan’ for India in barely the two weeks that he spent in
the country. For a recent historical exposition of ‘partition’ see Gandhi (2013)
2

Partitioned economies, such as the two Punjabs, provide researchers with an ideal
setting to examine competing theoretical claims about economic development. Their
proximity and similarity to one another--- a shared historical past, similar geographical,
and cultural legacies---on the one hand, and their subsequent subdivision and assignment
to different political environments after independence on the other, allows for an
engagement with many questions that are central to the current debates in the
development literature: what matters---geography, institutions, or culture---for long-term
economic development? How do historical colonial institutions impact the development
prospects of peripheral economies? What are the determinants of state structure and
policy in post-colonial economies and how does it impact economic growth? Partitioned
economies are interesting because they allow us to answer these questions with the aid of
a counter-factual.
There are many examples of such ‘partitioned’ economies in history. They
include countries in the Middle East that were formerly a part of the Ottoman Empire and
were divided after World War I by the victorious Allied powers. Other notable examples
include the “Scramble for Africa”, which led to its partition between 1881 and 1914 into
various countries, the partition of Korea in 1949, the partition of Bengal in 1905/1947,
and Punjab in 1947 to name just a few.
In this study I conduct a comparative analysis of the two sub-regions of Punjab
during the colonial and post-colonial period. I seek to build a framework that allows us to
understand the ‘colonial’, as well as the ‘post-colonial’ institutional origins of long-run
comparative development in peripheral agriculture. I explore the process of colonial
institutional formations, following the work of Sen (1981), as being derived from the
colonial “entitlement system”; a system legitimized by what Mamdani (2012) describes
as a discursive distinction between “Natives” and “Settlers” via a policy of ‘indirectrule’. I show how the changes brought about in the ‘entitlement’ system that each side
inherited after independence impacted comparative development in the two regions.

3

I examine this process of institutional change and its impact on agrarian
outcomes2 in the two sub-economies of Punjab across a century of data, and explore the
set of political and economic interests that underlie their differences. Using recently
mined colonial archival datasets on ‘infrastructural development’, ‘land-revenue tenures’,
‘institutional structures’, ‘commodity-flows’, ‘agrarian class structures’, and ‘agricultural
productivity’, I seek to develop an understanding of: a) how colonial infrastructural
transformation reflects the state’s response to specific capitalist economic crises in the
‘center’, leading to ‘uneven development’ (as in Baran, 1957; Frank, 1966) in the
‘periphery’; b) how this ‘uneven development’ across sub-regions within the same
administrative framework shapes peculiar kinds of political and economic institutional
structures in each sub-region; c) how these initial institutional structures interact with
new political formations and coalitions after independence, and how the variation in these
‘political settlements’ (as in Olson, 1998) in turn impacts policy, and as a result, real
economic outcomes in the periphery.
The study is situated in, and seeks to make a contribution to, the ‘New’
Divergence Debates in economics. The debates deal with the question of long-run
comparative development and seek to understand the set of factors that separate success
stories from failures. As Roy (2013) points out, while a greater part of the debate
revolves around explaining differences between rich and poor countries, to ask why for
example, European countries and ‘settler’ colonies perform better than others, a subset of
the studies also deals with comparisons between peripheral economies. These consist on
the one hand of inter-country comparisons such as Chang (2002, 2010) who examines the
case of East Asian economies, Sen (1981) who looks at case studies from Bengal,
Ethiopia, and the Sahel region of Africa, and Mamdani (1978) who compares the case of
Uganda and Tanzania; or smaller units of analysis, such as inter-regional comparisons
within a large peripheral entity such as India (Banerjee and Iyyer, 2005; Roy, 2013;

2

I explain the reasons for focusing on the agrarian sector in Section 1.1.5 of this

chapter.
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Bayly, 1976). The present study engages with this sub-strand of the research and extends
it by providing a framework to approximate partitioned economies as a ‘twin-study’ (a
‘two-state’ model), using the case study of the two Punjabs.
As Acemoglu (2002) points out, the New Divergence Debates offer three
competing “fundamental” channels to explain differences in long-run comparative
development: 1) Colonial Institutions, 2) Geography, and 3) Culture. As many scholars
who study inter-regional differences in the Sub-Continent point out, there is deep
heterogeneity in all three senses within India. These differences are so significant that
"the question why India stayed poor while Europe became rich cannot have a single
answer"; the answer depends "on which part of India one considers" (Roy, 2013, p.2). As
a result, as one reviewer points out, “social and agricultural regions both smaller and
larger than provinces have increasingly seemed appropriate units to scholars" (Bayly,
1985; page 584). Roy also points towards recent work in the economic historiography of
India, which similarly notes that "South Asia possessed" not one or two, but in fact
“multiple regional economies" (Washbrook, 2001, page 373). The seminal contribution
by Banerjee and Iyyer (BI, 2005) ---explained in greater detail below--- exploits these
regional dissimilarities and designs a framework that empirically explores the impact of
differential legacies of colonial land-revenue institutions on regional inequality in India,
today.
The case study of Punjab is an intriguing point of entry (and extension of the BI
model) into the New Divergence Debates. Its two halves seem to share all three
‘fundamental’ features that have been identified by the divergence literature: a similar
‘geography’, an almost identical ‘language’ and ‘culture’, and a qualitatively similar
‘historical legacy of colonial institutions’. In this precise sense, West Punjab (in Pakistan)
is a better counter-factual for East Punjab (in India), than Kerala, or West Bengal for the
latter, or Sindh or Baluchistan, for the former. Given these desiderata, the comparative
evolution of these economies not only allows us to assess the relative importance of the
three existing ‘fundamental’ channels but also allows for a new understanding of the
process, in pointing towards the possibility of a fourth and possibly crucial ‘fundamental’
channel that has been under-theorized in the New Divergence literature: the agency of the
5

post-colonial state. As we will see, a ‘one-region’ and ‘two-state’ model reveals that the
manner in which colonial institutions impact current outcomes is neither pre-determined,
nor static, but is rather completely contingent on the post-colonial political and state
structure.
The New Divergence literature, in positing a set of ‘time-invariant’,
‘unchangeable’, ‘exogenous’ factors as the final arbitrators in separating success stories
from failures negates human agency and presents third-world countries as ‘prisoners of
birth’. This is because future outcomes are completely pre-determined in these models by
‘inherited factors’ (geography or colonial institutions) As Chang and Evans (2005) argue:
“In mainstream theory of institutional change, there is no ‘real’ human agency”.
Since “material interests”---which result in institutional change or persistence--are shaped by ‘structural’ factors, the long-run development outcome is already
structurally determined” and hence there is “no meaningful choice” (Chang and
Evans, 2005; p. 9).

Thus, if one were to predict the fate of the two Punjabs on the basis of the existing
models in 1947, given the similar colonial institutions and geographies, one would have
predicted long-run convergence in economic outcomes. But does this theoretical
prediction explain the actual economic history of the two Punjabs?
1.1.2 The Puzzle: Divergence in Economic Fortunes
Even a cursory comparative examination of development outcomes across the two
Punjabs today reveals an intriguing paradox. Consider the fact that the two Punjabs are
sub-regions of two countries. One would (quite reasonably) expect ‘sample’ (i.e. statelevel) comparisons to reflect the broader differential in ‘population’ (i.e. country-level)
economic trends, especially given the similarity of the two Punjabs. If one were to
extrapolate about comparative development fortunes in the two Punjabs one would
expect that these probably mirror the general, inter-country differences that have
prevailed between the two states since independence.
This seemingly reasonable approach, however, simply does not work. According
to the World Bank Development Indicators dataset India and Pakistan are both classified
as ‘lower middle income’ countries. Pakistan’s GDP per capita has historically
outstripped India’s for most of the seven decades that have elapsed since independence
6

(Figure 1.1) In fact, incomes per capita in India have only overtaken Pakistan as recently
as 2006 and even now, the average income per person in India (as a whole) at $1581 is
just over two hundred dollars higher than Pakistan, which stands at $1316 per person.
Figure 1.2: GDP per capita comparison India and Pakistan

Source: World Development Indicators
Extrapolating on the basis of this inter-country comparison one would expect the
Pakistani side of Punjab to have historically performed much better than its Indian
counterpart, or at the very least, similar levels of economic development to have
prevailed across the two Punjabs; it is fairly well-known that in both countries Punjab is
one of the better developed regions: in terms of per capita incomes, Punjab is the richest
‘province’3 of Pakistan while being the fourteenth richest ‘state’ in India. Yet, when we
compare the two Punjabs with one another we see a puzzling level of economic disparity:
the income of an average Punjabi in India is approximately 400 dollars higher than his

Pakistan continues to hold onto the colonial administrative term of “provinces”
while India has changed the classification to ‘states’.
3
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neighbors in Pakistan. This is twice the difference that would be predicted by a simple,
inter-country comparison.
The divergence in other development indicators is even more perplexing: infant
and maternal mortality rates are 50% lower, and literacy rates are 18% higher on the
Indian side of Punjab. While just over 8% of the population is below the poverty line on
the Indian side, the rate is twice as higher (measured at $1.25 a day), at 19% on the
Pakistani side of Punjab (Table 1.1).4 While barely half the adult females on the Pakistani
side can read or write, in contrast, the female literacy rate on the Indian side of Punjab
stands at 70%. The life-expectancy on the Indian side is also five years longer. Thus, by
any measure of economic development, there has been a radical divergence in economic
fortunes: the exact opposite of what existing theories---premised on ‘geography’,
‘colonial institutions’, and ‘culture’--- should have predicted.

4

The national percentages for poverty rates are approximately the same, at 21%
in both countries.
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Table 1.1 Comparison of Selected Development Indicators
Punjab, India

Punjab, Pakistan

Area (sq km)

50,362

205,345

Population

27 million

101 million

GDP per Capita (current $)

2178

1682

Overall Literacy Rate

77%

61%

Male Literacy Rate

80.44%

71%

Female Literacy Rate

70.73%

52%

Infant Mortality Rate (per
1000)

26

77

Maternal Mortality Rate
(per 1000)

155

300

Metaled Roads (KM)

47,605

38,000

Life Expectancy

69

64

Poverty Rate
(% living below $2)

8.02%

19%

Sources: Punjab Development Indicators Report, Government of Pakistan (2015)
Vital Statistics of Punjab, Government of India (2015)

The question is: how could two sub-regions of the same region become so
different from one another, despite having identical historical and agro-climatic
conditions? A neoclassical model with agricultural output on the one hand and ‘factors of
production’ on the other would have predicted---much like the new divergence debates
literature---convergence. Yet, in practice there has been a radical divergence. What
explains it? This is the conundrum that motivates the present study.
Before we move on to present the central hypotheses and claims of the study, its
position and contribution to the broader literature, the methodological tools employed,
and the diversity and range of the rich new datasets constructed using colonial archives to
conduct the study, let us briefly explore some of the ‘plausible’ explanations that emanate
from the existing literature and could potentially present an answer to the puzzle. While
these explanations do not work, this brief detour helps unearth further layers of the
9

problem. It reveals why it is important for us to look at this problem from a long-term
perspective; that is, to not only look at the set of post-colonial differences but also the
features that planted the seeds of subsequent divergence between the two parts during the
colonial period.
1.1.3 Search for an Explanation
One explanation for the divergence could be sought in the ‘initial’ conditions that were
inherited by each side at the time of independence (North, 1990). The differences today
may just be reflections of an ‘earlier’ advantage. It may be the case, for example, that the
districts that were assigned to the Indian Punjab were already more prosperous than the
ones that became a part of Pakistan.
Unfortunately however, this line of reasoning not only leads to a dead-end, it
confounds the problem even further. The Pakistani Punjab not only inherited the larger
area of the British province in 1947 it also inherited the more ‘developed’ part. For
example, literacy rates, according to the Census of 19315, were 16 and 19 percent
respectively in the eastern and western districts respectively. The western part of Punjab
had been, since the American Civil War of 1860, a ‘favored child’ of the British state (as
we will see in the historical section of Chapter Four). State-led investments had
developed an infrastructural apparatus that gave agricultural producers in the western part
of the province privileged access to canal-irrigated water and global markets via railway
lines directly connected to the nearest port (Chapter Four). An examination of trends in
agricultural performance shows that in fact, ‘initial conditions’---as captured by yields
per hectare--- were favorable to the part of Punjab that was assigned to Pakistan in 1947
(Chapter Three). Thus, a discussion of ‘initial’ conditions does not provide an
explanation. In fact, it complicates matters further: what we have then, is not just a

5

The census of 1941, which was technically the last census of India before independence,
was held at a time of war time exigencies and hence does not accurately give a good snapshot of
social conditions.
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divergence in comparative development outcomes; rather, what we are dealing with is a
reversal of fortunes: the formerly more prosperous part is now lagging behind.
But perhaps the agro-climatic environment is so different that it could explain the
difference in long-term development? As some scholars have noted, differences in the
climate and/or the disease environment can contribute to comparative differences in
outcomes (as in Sachs and Warner, 2004; Sachs, 1998; Diamond, 2007) Unfortunately,
this line of reasoning too, does not go too far either for two very important reasons. First,
as noted above, what we are dealing with is not just a case of divergence but a case of
economic ‘reversal’, which is mortal to any story premised on geography: if geography
were at the heart of the explanation it would have behaved similarly, regardless of which
period (colonial or post-colonial) was under consideration (Acemoglu, 2002). Second, the
climate and disease environment across the two Punjabs is very similar. While there are
minor differences in soil quality and precipitation (mm), as we will see, these differences
are not significant enough to explain the wide gap in agricultural productivities that we
see in practice. While we examine the evolution of agricultural productivities in each
region in greater detail in Chapter Three, a simple illustration here from the border
districts of Amritsar and Lahore (that have practically identical climatic and soil
conditions) should make the point vividly clear: at the eve of partition in 1947 an acre of
land produced exactly the same amount of wheat and rice---the two major food crops--in the border districts. Today, the yield per acre of food crops6 in Amritsar, India is twice
that in Lahore, Pakistan. Suffice it to say that when two identical pieces of land become
so different in terms of their productive abilities, an explanation premised solely on a
‘geography story’ seems far-fetched and as a result, cannot be very convincing.

As we will see in Chapter Three, ‘cotton’ behaves differently, and the Pakistani Punjab
equalized and even outcompeted for some years its Indian counterpart; I call this the ‘foodcotton’ paradox. The irony consists in the fact that food production lowers poverty while cotton
production increases it (Chapter Three Appendix).
6

11

Perhaps there is a ‘cultural explanation’. What about the people who inhabit the
two sub-regions, who may somehow, be culturally very different from one another? As
we know, many studies have pointed towards ‘cultural’ and ‘religious’ differences as
being the source of long-term divergence via its impact on worker’s productivity (Weber,
1930; Barro and McClearly, 2003; Campante & Drott, 2014). This explanation too,
however, does not provide a convincing answer. As a matter of fact the people who live
on either side of Punjab are linguistically and culturally very similar. Obviously, the two
sides have a very different religious composition ---with the Pakistani side composed
almost exclusively of Muslims and the Indian side of Sikhs and Hindus---but this is
hardly surprising given the communal basis of Punjab’s partition in 1947. The ‘monoreligious’ demographic makeup of each Punjab is a product of partition and the
associated forced migrations that ensued at the time rather than a historical fact that
would inhibit cultural intercourse between people of different religious communities over
the millennia that predate colonialism. The Muslims (53.2%), Hindus (29.1%) and Sikhs
(14.9%) that made up the population of Punjab share common ancestors and have similar
sociocultural norms and practices (Census of 1941, Punjab report vol. I, p.57-58). As the
colonial administrator Sir Denzil Ibbetson noted in his Manual of Punjab Castes (1902),
“conversions to Islam had little or no impact on the social or family system in Punjab,
which remained largely identical before and after the rise of Islam in Punjab” (Ibbetson
1902, p. 174). These cultural similarities have also been surprisingly resistant to the
partition of the two parts in 1947.7 Thus, cultural differences cannot account for the
economic reversal of fortunes described above either.
Maybe an explanation for the divergence can be sought in the relative strength
and importance of each Punjab within the two countries? It may be the case, for example,

7

For example, the caste system, which is an even stronger social identity marker in
Punjabi society than religion, is very similar across the two sides. Even today, there is ‘caste’
solidarity across and beyond religious and national boundaries. The “prominent” castes in
Punjab---“Jutts” for example---still hold annual conferences where participants from both
countries participate enthusiastically and celebrate their similarities.
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that the Indian Punjab---by some peculiar circumstance---was able to exhibit greater
control over the ‘center’ while the same set of opportunities may not have been available
to the Pakistani province in its own political context. But this line of reasoning too leads
to a problem: Punjab is 52% of the entire population of Pakistan. A large part of the
Pakistani civil-military elite comes from a Punjabi background. As a result, the ‘center’ is
synonymous with ‘Punjab’ in the Pakistani context (Alavi, 1986; Jalal, 1995). In
comparison, the Punjabi population in India is just 2.3% of the total population of the
country. Unlike its Pakistani counterpart, the Indian Punjab has been---as at least one
observer of the field notes--- “subservient to the center”, which has had an interest in
maintaining Punjab as an ‘agricultural’ feeder for the rest of the country; in this sense, the
federal center has played an active role in ‘curtailing’ the growth opportunities of Punjab
(Singh; 2010). In relative terms therefore, the Pakistani Punjab exhibits greater political
control over the ‘center’ than its Indian counterpart. Since the former enjoys a greater
confluence of elite interests, these should have translated into the political ‘will’ that is
necessary for pro-growth reforms in developing economies (Acemoglu, 2015; Chang,
2001). Thus, it seems that state-center relations were also comparatively more favorable
to the Pakistani Punjab than its Indian neighbor and an explanation for the divergence
cannot be sought here either.
To reiterate then: explanations premised on geographic factors, cultural
differences, ‘initial’ conditions, or post-independence state-center relations do not
provide a convincing answer to the economic divergence. In fact, they further complicate
an explanation. The conundrum we find then, has two layers: it is not just restricted to the
better performance of the Indian Punjab after independence; rather, an explanation must
account for both, the better performance of the western part during the colonial period as
well as the subsequent reversal of fortunes after independence. It must account for why
the Pakistani Punjab was outcompeted despite being dealt the better hand: superior
infrastructural development, better access to markets, and a greater confluence of statecenter interests.
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1.1.4 Research Questions
The broad research question that motivates the study, as has been identified earlier, is to
provide an explanation for the reversal of fortunes in Punjab. To answer this broader
conundrum I examine, in separate sections, the ‘colonial’ as well as the post-colonial
origins of the differences. I seek to disentangle the independent effects of political and
economic factors in each of the two periods, to see how the dialectic between them has
contributed towards shaping the divergence in the long-run. We connect the process to
the colonial transformation of Punjab in the late nineteenth century, its impact on early
institutional formations, and how these in turn interacted with post-colonial politics and
state formations in each sub-region to react back on the real economy.
To do this, we ask nine inter-related questions, each answered in subsequent
chapters, in the following order: 1) what set of historical, economic imperatives in the
capitalist core led to the colonial infrastructural development of Punjab? (Chapter Four)
2) what were the patterns of infrastructural development that emerged as a consequence
of those economic objectives and how did they impact the articulation of agrarian
production emanating from sub-regions in Punjab with internal and external markets?
(Chapter Four) 3) what was the Punjab ‘system of rights’ via which the colonial state
‘distributed’ economic and political power in the agrarian society to achieve its
imperialist economic objectives? (Chapter Five) 4) what kinds of political and economic
institutions were established by the colonial state to achieve these objectives in the two
sub-regions of Punjab? (Chapter Five) 5) what impact did these institutional variations
have on the agrarian social structures of the two sub-regions at the time of independence?
(Chapter Five) 6) how did these colonial institutional structures impact real agrarian
outcomes---yields per hectare---in each of the two economies, during the colonial period
itself (i.e. contemporaneously), and how do they impact outcomes today? (Chapter Six)
7) how did colonial social structures interact with the colonial administrative and political
system to produce the complex political coalitions that acquired state power at the time of
independence in each state? (Chapter Seven) 8) how did these political coalitions and
structures contest and use state power to change (or maintain) the institutional
apparatuses that they inherited, and further advance their economic interests via the
newly won control over state policy? (Chapter Seven) 9) to what extent is the economic
14

divergence a result of inherited factors (such as geographic and historical institutional
differences) versus endogenous factors (state policy after independence), respectively?
(Chapter Eight)
We examine these questions (which have implications for economic development
and economic history) from the standpoint of political economy; that is, by conducting an
economic analysis of political decisions and then assessing their impact on the economy,
in turn. Using colonial archival datasets on infrastructure and land-revenue institutions,
we first assess the political basis and impact of colonial transformation on the
institutional reorganization of the agrarian economy of Punjab in the late nineteenth
century. Following the tradition of Baran (1957), Frank (1963) and Mamdani (1978), and
combining these frameworks to the new economic history frameworks presented by
Beckert (2014) and Banerjee and Iyyer (2005), we connect the colonial transformative
process to the objectives of British capital and its political constraints in the aftermath of
the American Civil War. These, the study shows led to peculiar patterns of ‘underdevelopment’ in the Punjab region and to the formation of “extractive”8 institutional
structures in the agrarian economy. In the concluding part of the study we show how
these initial institutional structures interacted with different kinds of post-colonial politics
in each state, leading to differences in the kinds of ‘political settlements’ (following
Olson, 1998) that emerged in each state after independence. Finally, we assess the impact
of these different kinds of ‘political settlements’ on the agrarian policies that emerged in
each state; specifically, we compare policies pertaining to the ‘promotion of food crops’
(as opposed to cash crops), ‘land-ceilings’, ‘consolidation of holdings’, ‘changes in
tenure and tenancy relations’, and ‘state-led input-support’ (water, electricity, fertilizers).
Differences in these policies led to the radical divergence in comparative development
outcomes, despite similar ‘geography’, ‘institutions’, and ‘culture’, in the long-run.

8

Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2002
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1.1.5 Focus on Agrarian Sector
We explore the divergence puzzle by focusing on one sector: the agrarian sector of the
economy. There are three important reasons for this choice:
First, like most developing economies, over 60% of the population in both
Punjabs derives its sustenance from the agricultural sector. As a result, whatever goes on
in this sector has a deep impact on overall development. Recent scholarship has provided
incontrovertible evidence for the causal empirical relationships that exist between
agrarian development--- in particular food productivity--- and poverty reduction in
developing countries (Mellor, 1999; Thirtle et al, 2003; Datt and Ravallion, 1998;
Anriquez & Stamoulis, 2007;Schneider and Gugerty, 2011). The consensus in these
papers has been to show that agriculture is still the key to poverty reduction in the thirdworld (Anriquez & Stamoulis, 2007). These scholars point out that in problematizing the
factors that influence agricultural productivity---output produced per unit land---we have
a simple and potent instrument for enhancing the size of the total pie available to society.
Moreover, since any conversation of poverty in third-world countries is incomplete
without a discussion of food poverty, the factors that influence the productivity of food
crops (wheat and rice for example) as opposed to non-food commercial crops (for
example cotton, tobacco etc.) are central to the agenda of poverty alleviation, and hence
overall development.9 As a result, differences in public policies’ commitment to the
former as opposed to the latter may reveal fascinating insights about the nature of the
political elite that dominates a peripheral, agrarian state.
Second, the focus on the agrarian sector is particularly crucial for the specific
objectives of this study, premised as it is on an examination of the long-term impact of
colonialism on comparative development outcomes. Since over 90% of the population of
Punjab was engaged in agriculture during the colonial period10, an understanding of the

9

This issue is taken up in Chapter Three, in what is called the “Foot Cotton Paradox” of

Punjab.
10

Census of Punjab, 1931
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initial institutional structures that emerged in different sub-regions must be sought in this
sector. These colonial institutional formations structured the subsequent political
economy of the two Punjabs in peculiar ways and it is thus the site of the ‘original sin’.
Third, an important reason to focus on this sector is the sheer size of the two
agrarian economies. In both countries, Punjab is known as the “Granary of India
(Pakistan)” or equivalently, its “bread-basket”. The Punjab11 produces 45 to 75 percent of
the total agricultural production of wheat and rice despite being 1.5% of the total
geographical area of India; similarly, on the Pakistani side, Punjab accounts for 60
percent of the total agricultural production of the country while it constitutes 23% of the
country’s landmass (Governments of Punjab; ‘Agricultural Profiles, 2015’). The two
Punjabs jointly represent one of the largest agrarian economies in the world, accounting
collectively for 7% of the world’s cotton, 5% of the wheat, and 3% of rice production. A
discussion of the determinants of agricultural productivity in Punjab, therefore, is not
only relevant for South Asia but has greater implications as well.

1.2 Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
1.2.1 Theoretical Framework
In Chapter Two, I conduct an extensive review of the literature and develop a theoretical
framework by combining the New Institutional approach with earlier work by Marxian
and post-Marxian theorists. The framework is then used to examine the historical
conundrum. The theoretical framework can be briefly summarized as follows:
Political institutions shape the balance of power within a society and via this
control, shape economic institutions (Acemoglu et al, 2000; Baran, 1954; Olson, 1998).
Since ‘economic institutions’ have an impact on the distribution of economic gains, there
is no ‘neutral’ way of setting up these institutions, such that they benefit all competing

11

Punjab is derived from the words Punj=Five and Aab=Rivers; thus ‘five rivers’.
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classes within a society. There is a political struggle over economic institutions precisely
because of their impact on economic distribution (Marx, 1867; Acemoglu et al, 2000). As
Marx says: “Between two equal rights force is the arbitrator”.
Thus, the balance of power in a society shapes the political structure and
institutions of the state and hence economic policies. These policies in turn, react back on
political institutions, further strengthening the economic victors of the earlier political
process. It is this dialectical relationship between political and economic institutions that
lies at the heart of the explanation that follows in the subsequent chapters. The ‘balance’
of political and economic power is not static or pre-determined. It is altered and
rearranged at ‘critical junctures’.
1.2.2 Hypothesis- Institutional Change Before and After Two Critical Junctures
The explanation presented in the chapters that follow can be traced to the set of changes
before and after two such “critical junctures”12: 1861 and 1947. The first juncture begins
with the American Civil War (1861) which led to a severing of British textile’s supply of
raw cotton. In response, the colonial state reshaped its global ‘empire of cotton’ (Beckert,
2014). Punjab was to play a crucial new role in the empire as a feeder of raw “American”
cotton. This new role, however, could not be performed without a restructuring of the
agrarian sub-economies of Punjab, which would require infrastructural development
(railways and canals). This called for state investments, and the political security of these
investments was to dictate the kinds of institutional structures that would emerge in the
agrarian economy. To protect its investments, the colonial state distributed power via
‘entitlement systems’ (the terminology was originally employed by Sen, 1981) to create
political and economic institutions that consolidated power in the hands of their
traditional allies--- the landlords--- in areas with high infrastructural development. The
two parts witnessed varying levels of infrastructural development and consequently, there
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The terminology has been used by Acemoglu et al (2005, 2011) to understand
other case studies in a number of papers.
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were differences in the kinds of institutional structures that emerged in each sub-region
during the colonial period.
The second juncture begins in 1947, and deals with the manner in which politics
and institutions at the end of the colonial period led to peculiar forms of state control in
each part at the time of independence: military-landlord control on the Pakistani side
versus ‘independent’ (self-cultivating) and rich-peasants control on the Indian side. Using
research in South Asian history, in particular the work of Jalal & Bose (2004) and Alavi
(1978), I argue that this led to political differences between the two states in three major
dimensions: 1) the degree of development of democracy, 2) the relative strength of
independent subaltern peasant movements, and 3) degree of state autonomy in the
determination of agrarian policy. These political differences, in turn, led to a distinct set
of economic policies that would differentiate the agrarian structures and outcomes in the
two Punjabs in the long-run.
Thus, the very border that divides--- and ‘defines’---the two Punjabs, lies at the
root of the economic divergence. The people who live on either side of this border have
access to a very different set of political, and as a result, economic institutions as a
consequence of being assigned to different countries for the past seven decades. The
differences in economic outcomes are a result of the fact that the two halves were split in
1947 into two different ‘institutional islands’, with the choice of assignment being onceand-for-all, with no possibility of movement between the two islands after a certain point
in time.13
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By way of example compare just one concrete political institution: democracy. The
Pakistani Punjab has been exposed to some kind of non-democratic regime for forty-four out of
the sixty-eight years of independence since 1947. In contrast, the inhabitants of the Indian Punjab
have had access to a stable democracy with a wide social net in which the army plays no major
political role.
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To sum up then, the study hypothesizes divergence between the two Punjabs can
be explained by the combined effect of two sets of institutional reforms that took place
before and after these two critical junctures. While the greater infrastructural
development in west Punjab gave it a developmental ‘premium’ during the early period,
the same colonial ‘development’ came at the cost of an institutional apparatus in which
economic and political power was consolidated in the hands of a small agrarian elite with
authoritarian forms of control, patronage, and power in its hands. It is these ‘political’
features that while being successful during the short-term (the colonial period itself),
eventually led to a reversal of fortunes after independence.

1.3 Position in the Literature
1.3.1 Inter-Disciplinary Approach
The study adopts an inter-disciplinary approach, taking the New Institutional literature in
the divergence debates (in particular, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2005, 2012;
Banerjee and Iyyer, 2005) as the point of entry, as well as departure. The departure lies in
two main dimensions. First, (as I explain in some detail below) in extending the BI
(2005) framework to a two-state model (i.e. India and Pakistan) it derives an appreciation
of how the impact of ‘initial institutions’ on current outcomes is completely contingent
on ‘post-colonial’ state structures and policies. Second, in the attempt to synthesize the
ideas presented in the New Institutional frameworks with the work of Marxian political
economists, most notably, the work of Baran (1954), Frank (1966), and Mamdani (1978,
2012), we try to go beyond the narrow understanding of institutions as “security of
property rights” that is prevalent in the recent institutional literature. While recent models
such as Olson (1998) and Acemoglu et al (2000, 2005) understand power contestations
over institutions in the purely ‘domestic’ sense as being products of group struggles
within the same society, Marxian models build a much more realistic understanding by
pointing towards the role played by ‘external agency’ (or imperialist power) in shaping
institutions in peripheral economies, in addition to domestic interactions.
Two other important streams of the literature that the study interacts with are from
economic history, and the anthropology of colonial development. Most crucially the work
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of Beckert (2014) and Austin (2010, 2008) informs the historical framework that is used
to examine colonial infrastructural development in Punjab in Chapter Four. The
analytical frameworks of Mamdani (1978, 2012) , Sen (1981), and Bardhan (2010) are
utilized to build an understanding of peripheral institutional structures as being a set of
“legitimizing” or “enabling” systems of rights in Chapter Five, and not just a “system of
property-rights” as has been the pervasive assumption in the recent institutional literature.
The historical work of Blyn, (1967), Jalal and Bose, (1999), Jalal (1995), Alavi (1978),
and Talbot (1988, 2005) are used to examine the concrete colonial economic history of
the Indian Sub-Continent in general, and Punjab in particular. Finally, the work of Chang
(2005, 2010) and Bagchi (1988) allows us to build a theoretical framework that explores
the role of the state---which is another invisible in New Institutional literature--- in
institutional formation and economic development in Chapter Seven and Eight.
1.3.2 Point of Entry: The BI Model and its Critiques
A new line of research has reopened the discussion on Indian economic
historiography via archival datasets and unique identification strategies using cliometric
techniques. These studies seek to empirically test the channels that have been proposed
by the ‘new divergence debates’ to see how well they explain inter-regional inequality
within India.
This line of research has been introduced by a series of papers authored by
Banerjee and Iyyer (BI, 2005; 2008; 2010) who test the relationship between the
disparate institutional legacies of colonialism in different regions of India and the
variation in economic outcomes today. One key contribution uses data for over 400
districts in India to show that regions that were exposed to ‘non-landlord’ revenue
institutions as opposed to landlord (‘zamindari’) institutions during the colonial period
have a higher agricultural productivity in the post-independence period (BI, 2005).
Another contribution, BI (2010), uses the difference between districts that were formerly
‘princely states’---that is states that were not directly under British rule---and directly
colonized districts to show that the provision of public goods was lower in the latter
(directly ruled) as compared to the former (indirectly ruled). Thus, the crux of the BI
studies is to show how colonial institutions---particularly those pertaining to land21

revenue---created institutional islands in different regional economies and how these
initial differences persist till today. Other scholars have used the BI framework and
applied it to different settings. For example, a recent study by Cheema et al (2012) uses
village-level data from a primary survey to compare villages exposed to different colonial
institutions in district Sargodha, Pakistan, and finds confirmation for the BI framework.
Other studies have been less confirmatory. Two studies from the geography camp
present critiques of the BI study. The first critique, by Iverson et al (2012) argues that the
“formal institutional type” described by a land-revenue institution may not correspond
with the “substantive institutional” form in a region. They show for example that the
Central Provinces---coded as ‘landlord’ areas in the BI study---were actually mixtures of
landlord and non-landlord institutions (known as Malguzari system. See Chapter Four)
when seen in terms of the relationship of the producers with the land and its produce.
Using an alternative specification to measure the substantive institutional form, and
recoding the values for these districts to accord with these, significantly reduces the
predictive power of the BI model. Geographical factors gain in importance (Iverson et al,
2012).
At the heart of Iverson’s argument is the idea of ‘non-comparability’ of landrevenue institutions across different regions of India. As I also argue in Chapter Five,
these institutions were not just quantitatively different but were also qualitatively so, thus
rendering inter-institutional comparisons essentially invalid. Take the example of the
term “zamindari” which has been translated as “landlord” in the BI paper. As many
scholars know, while this translation may be correct for the case of Bengal, the term
means something radically different in other contexts. It could refer for instance to an
independent or family farmer who works on his own land in North-West India.
Another recent study by Tithankar Roy (2013) challenges the BI (2005) model
and argues that it systematically “understates” the effect of geography on economic
outcomes. He points out that BI fail to distinguish between the contemporaneous
‘impact’ of institutions (i.e. during the “colonial period itself”) versus the ‘long-term’,
post-colonial impact. The question ‘how colonial institutions impact long-term
outcomes’, Roy argues, should be preceded by an understanding of whether or not, and
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how, these institutions impact outcomes during the colonial period itself’. He postulates,
and confirms using spatial analysis, that ‘geographic environments’ may behave
differently in different time periods, owing to the impact of changes in global trade
regimes and prices during the last century. In Chapter Six, we extend Roy’s critique to
distinguish between the contemporaneous and long-run impact of colonial institutions to
show how the nature and magnitude of their impact varies substantially across the two
periods.

1.4 The Contribution of the Study
The methodological and empirical design of the study enables it to contribute to the new
divergence debates in five ways:
1. Extension of the BI framework to look at partitioned economies
The first contribution of the study stems from an intriguing extension of the BI (2005)
model to evaluate the impact of colonial institutions on long-run outcomes using a
counter-factual design, which is only possible with partitioned economies such as
Punjab, or Bengal. This is to point to the possibility of examining regional economies in
colonial India---or by extension in other post-colonial countries --- that were partitioned
between different states at independence, using the BI framework as a control for ‘initial
institutions’, to see how they have fared after independence.
As pointed out earlier, partitioned economies were exposed to similar colonial
histories while being under different post-colonial institutional regimes after
independence. This can allow researchers in the area to create a two-dimensional
framework---as I do with the two Punjabs in this study--- with two states in two
qualitatively distinct time periods (colonial and post-colonial). While another intriguing
possibility could have been to look at the case of Bengal which was partitioned between
India and Pakistan in 1947, I focus on the Punjab region in this study, leaving the much
more complicated case of Bengal (which was further partitioned between Pakistan and
Bangladesh in 1971) for a later study. This two-dimensional framework allows us to
build a much more general understanding of the relationship between class, institutions
and state in developing countries, and the impact that these have on economic outcomes
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in the agricultural sector than is possible by looking at individual social formations
without a counter-factual.
2. Agency of the Post-Colonial State
A second contribution lies in having given theoretical as well as empirical visibility to an
important channel that has been undertheorized by the recent institutional literature: the
agency of the post-colonial state. The Punjab is a particularly interesting case to examine
the divergence debates since the two sub-regions share all three features that have been
identified by the recent literature (a common colonial history, a similar geography, and an
identical culture) A deterministic reading of any of the three strands of the theoretical
debate should therefore have implied long-term convergence. Yet, we see the opposite
result in practice. This discord between what the theoretical literature should have
predicted (convergence) and what actually happened (divergence) points towards a larger
problem within the debates: while many studies (referred to above) have firmly
established the impact of colonial institutions on long-term economic development, what
is generally missing---and this is one of the gaps that this study seeks to fulfil---is an
answer to the question: what is to be done? This would require an understanding of the
extent to, and the processes via, which the ill-effects of colonial institutions can be
mitigated by the post-colonial state; to somehow separate the effect of ‘inherited’ factors
(such as colonial history and institutions)---which cannot be changed---from the impact
of the post-colonial ‘state’, which has the ability to conduct institutional ‘reforms’ and
change.
As Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002) also confess in the concluding
remarks of their seminal paper:
“There are many questions that our analysis does not address. Institutions are
treated largely as a "black box": The results indicate that… improving the
"cluster of institutions" would result in significant gains in income per capita, but
do not point out what concrete steps would lead to an improvement in these
institutions” (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2002; page 1395, emphasis
added)
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Such an analysis of the “concrete steps” cannot escape a discussion of the
independent agency of the post-colonial state, which is repressed in existing frameworks.
Separating the effect of ‘initial institutions’ (and ‘geography’) from the independent
effect of the post-colonial state allows us to answer these questions.14 We do this, in
Chapter Eight, by borrowing an analogy from the empirical behavioral sciences and
approximating a ‘twin-study’ design that separates the effects of ‘inherited factors’
(geography, institutions) from ‘environmental factors’ (state policy in this case) using a
‘difference-in-difference’ (DID) strategy.
3. Incorporating Critiques of the Banerjee-Iyyer Model
A third contribution of the study to the debates lies in its incorporation of the two
critiques of the BI (2005) story that were briefly discussed above. To briefly reiterate,
critics have argued that the BI analysis suffers from the following problems: a) issues of
‘non-comparability of qualitatively distinct institutions’ (Iverson et al, 2011), b) the
‘inability to address relationship between colonial institutions and colonial outcomes’,
and c) it ‘ignores the relationship between formal and substantive institutional-type’
(Roy, 2013).
I make an attempt to incorporate both of these critiques in my analysis:
a)

Incorporating Roy’s (2013) Critique

In the literature---and this is the crux of Roy’s (2013) critique of BI (2005)--- an issue
that has been altogether avoided is the implicit assumption that if colonial institutions
can be shown to impact post-colonial (i.e. current) outcomes in a certain way then it
must be equally true that they influence outcomes during the colonial period similarly.
Yet, an examination of ‘initial conditions’ is central to the institutional story and/or
any argument based on ‘path dependency’. Using the limited data points available for

14

I use a difference-in-difference strategy in Chapter Seven to isolate the impact of initial
institutions (land-revenue, political, economic institutions) from the impact of differential postcolonial policy.
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a few districts of Madras and Uttar Pradesh, BI contend that “yields were in fact lower
in non-landlord areas during this period”. Unfortunately, “given the size of the
sample”, BI concede that “these yield differences may therefore reflect differences in
geography”, turning the argument on its head.
Roy further hammers out this point and gives visibility to a potential oversight. As
he argues, and as I also confirm in Chapter Three, there is no necessity that the same
institutional apparatus behaves the same way in different “environments” (colonial or
post-colonial period). I address Roy’s concerns by using a newly constructed dataset
that incorporates district-wise data from 1900-2015, that is the colonial (1900-1947),
as well as the post-colonial (1947-2015) period. As a result, the study is able to
examine and distinguish between the contemporaneous versus the long-term impact of
colonial institutions, and confirm that the “environment” does indeed change the way
institutions behave (Chapter Seven). The difference, however, is that in Roy’s case the
differences in the ‘environment’ are a result of changes in the “way geography
behaves” at different points in time. In this case, the difference arises from a change in
the political environment, thus resurrecting the original case presented by AJR (2002)
and BI (2005) using the theoretical arguments of Baran (1957).
b) Incorporating Iverson et al’s (2012) Critique
The Iverson et al (2012) critique is premised on two things: a) the non-comparability
of qualitatively distinct institutions, b) the non-conformity of “formal” (zamindari,
mahalwari, ryotwari) and “substantive” institutions. The study extends the latter
critique to Punjab and points to a similar discrepancy between the formal and
substantive institutional forms. As we see in Chapter Five, Punjab that was exposed to
the Mahalwari land-revenue arrangement has been classified as a ‘non-landlord’
institutional formation in the BI paper. In contrast, if landlord areas are understood as
areas where the economic relationship of ‘tenancy’ dominates social relations of
production, so that the cultivators are not simultaneously the owners of their land and
produce, and ‘non-landlord’ areas as ones where the converse is the case, it is simply
not true that the Punjab can be classified as an example of non-landlordist social
structures. For example, the Land Revenue Administration Report of Punjab for the
26

year 1938 shows that 58% of the cultivated land of the province was farmed by tenants
(LRA report, 1938: page 32). This should not come as a surprise since by 1936, over
61% of the cultivated area of the province belonged to just 15% of the owners (Punjab
Board of Economic Inquiry, Rural Publication No.4, page 3).
To account for Iverson’s first critique, which pertains to the non-comparability of
institutions, the study does two things. First, in addition to employing the formal “land
revenue institutional type” (bhaichara, pattidari, zamindari, as in the BI paper) as one
measure I also include two new ‘substantive’ institutional measures of political and
economic power: a) the degree of ‘non-occupant tenancy’ in different districts of
Punjab, which measures the respective bargaining powers of direct producers in
different sub-regions viz. the landlords, b) the percentage of ‘revenue-paid’ (surplus
appropriation’) by the largest landlords in a given district, a measure of ‘economic
power’. The latter is calculated by borrowing a technique developed by Piketty (2014)
who estimates inequality using tax returns. Similarly, I use Land Revenue Reports--which have information about the revenue paid by different classes of owners---to
calculate the actual economic control exhibited by landlords in different districts of
Punjab.
Second, by looking at quantitative variations of institutions within a qualitatively
similar environment---as Iverson wants--- I address issues arising from ‘noncomparability’. Unlike the BI study which compares qualitatively dissimilar
institutions (in Punjab and Bengal, for example) we compare institutions in one
regional economy. I show that even within a qualitatively similar institutional
environment, differences in the quantitative aspects of these institutions---the
distribution of political power, and control over economic surpluses--- have a longterm impact on economic outcomes, albeit the fact, that the nature and magnitude of
the impact depends on the post-colonial state structure and politics, as explained
below.
4. Colonial “Development” and “Institutions”
A fourth contribution lies in providing a new explanation for the emergence and
formation of institutional structures in colonial India. We empirically capture the
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relationship between the colonial state and its investments in particular areas
(infrastructural development) as determinants of the political and economic institutions
that emerged in different areas. Unlike BI (2005), who agree with Guha (1988) in
pointing towards the ‘ideological dispositions of different colonial administrators’ as
shapers of colonial institutions, I connect the formation of these institutions (following
Baran, 1957 and Frank, 1966) with the economic objectives and political constraints on
the power of the capitalist empire rather than individual ‘ideologies’ per se. I show how
the emergence of institutions, as a result of economic crises brought about during the
American Civil War, depended on the state’s investments in a particular area. This stems
from a re-reading of colonial historiography in India as being governed by the conflicting
and contradictory aims of “order and transformation which lay at the heart of the imperial
enterprise” (Talbot, 1987: 3) As I show in Chapter Five political and economic power
was consolidated in the hands of the agrarian elite in places where the state engaged in
greater investment in large-scale infrastructural projects (such as canals). Thus, the study
not only strengthens the case for the ‘colonialism’ camp, it also points to an ironic fact
about the economic history of colonialism in Punjab, and possibly by extension, the rest
of India: the same colonial transformative process that propelled greater productivity
during the colonial period via greater infrastructural development, came at the ‘expense’
of an institutional system that promoted landlord control, and hence long-term
retardation.
Such a reading contributes towards our understanding of the origins of colonial
institutions. It shows that the ‘colonial institutions’ literature, while providing a better
explanation than the ‘geography’ and ‘culture’ camps, nevertheless suffers from a
theoretical blind spot: an absence of ‘the imperial relation of power’ between the
colonizing state---which acts in the interest of metropolis capital--- and the peripheral
state, which is subjected to that logic, by force.
A historical understanding of the ‘motives’ of the colonial state as emanating
from capitalist economic crises in the center is crucial to building a concrete
understanding of the kinds of institutions that emerged in different sub-regions. It is not
sufficient to reduce all kinds of colonial states, as for example AJR (2002) do, to one
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generalized “extractive” state. If one has to understand the variation in different
institutional structures one has to inquire about the purpose and ultimately the object of
extraction; whether for instance the colonial state would be used to extract ‘slaves’ (as in
Sub-Saharan Africa), ‘raw material’, or ‘agricultural surpluses’; or whether the colonized
lands and people would be used to build ‘imperial armies’; all of these questions are
relevant to any discussion of the kinds of ‘institutions’ that emerged to achieve the
specific imperial objectives (Dos Santos, 1977).
An understanding of this also points towards the sheer redundancy of the claim
that comparative development “has something to do with geography” (Diamond, 1997).
Of course it does. It is a truism to state that natural factors matter. But the infinitely more
pertinent question is to ask how ‘human agency’ acts upon ‘natural factors’ and shapes
them in accordance with ‘human’ needs. It immediately follows: Whose agency? Whose
needs? In the case of colonized economies the answer is very simple: the capitalist core,
albeit constrained by the degree of resistance and collaboration on the ground.
The fascinating tales of ‘statistically significant relations’ between ‘geography
and outcomes’ suddenly seem less fascinating once one accounts for historical and
experiential facts, which will tell us stories of how different geographical environments
were molded by imperial states to serve metropolitan ‘capital’. A desert is a desert
regardless of where it is located. But whether the desert is to be converted for strategic
purposes into a mercantilist hub like Dubai or an impenetrably formidable, and hence
underdeveloped barrier against invading armies like large parts of Sindh, depends on the
historical objectives of the colonial state in a particular ‘geographical environment’. It is
uninteresting to discover that ‘geography matters’, without asking ‘why’ (i.e. as a result
of what kinds of human agency and via what social relations) it matters. The latter
question is a historical question and must be answered individually for every concrete
case of colonization.
5. Contribution to Economic Historiography in the Sub-Continent
A final contribution of the study is to the economic historiography of the Indian subcontinent. The study pays close attention to the actual political and economic history of
the region and reopens discussion on some ‘settled’ questions.
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A lively debate on the “mode of production” (MOP) in Indian agriculture took
place in the 1960’s and 1970’s. The MOP debates took place in a series of polemical
papers that were authored by Marxian economists and historians from the Indian subcontinent during the 1960’s, 70’s and early 80’s. These debates sought to understand how
two decades of ‘independent’, post-colonial rule had shaped economic outcomes in India.
The focus of the discussions was on the development of capitalist production in
Indian agriculture. Given its colonial history, it was natural for these theorists to examine
the impact of colonialism in shaping the process of agricultural development in India.
The broad question that these theorists sought to address is: how does one conceptualize
the ‘mode of production’ in Indian agriculture and understand its transition—if any—
from a colonial to a post-colonial economy. In this study, I reopen some of these
discussions and make an attempt to contribute to our understanding of the “mode of
production” in India and Pakistan. Thus, in addition to the overall contribution to the
divergence literature, the study also contributes to an ever-growing and ever-contested
understanding of colonial and post-colonial development in the Sub-Continent.

1.5 Methodology, Data and Plan of Study
1.5.1 Method: Political Economy, History and Econometric Analysis
The analytical method employed in different chapters will vary according to the needs of
the argument. I use a combination of political economy frameworks, as well as historical
and empirical analysis to establish the proposed theoretical relationships using archival
research and datasets. Following recent cliometric approaches which examine historical
questions using econometric techniques, I make an attempt to combine historical analysis
with simple econometric models. Nearly every chapter begins with a brief historical
context which is then used to build hypotheses that are empirically tested using
econometric models.
To establish the proposed relationships I draw upon an ensemble of newly
constructed archival datasets that have information about colonial institutions,
commodity flows, land-revenue, class and power structures, and infrastructure
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development. Some of the most prominent sources for these archival datasets are the
following:
1) District Settlement Reports:
These have information about the ‘formal’ institutional type, e.g. Zamindari, Pattidari,
Bhaichara tenures; these have also been used by Banerjee and Iyyer in their 2005
study. However, their study is an all-India study that excludes districts in India that
were later assigned to Pakistan.
2) Land Revenue Administration Reports
These give more detailed information than the DS reports, especially about the
“substantive” institutions, such as ‘tenancy’ relations, form of holding (joint versus
single), land-revenue payments by ‘class’ of landowner.
3) Census Reports
The British conducted decennial censuses from 1861 to 1941. These give detailed
information about the demographic makeup of India and its various ‘provinces’. The
information includes data on ‘occupations’ and for ‘agriculturalists’ (which are 90% of
the population) there is information about the ‘kind of work’ being performed
(whether as an owner-cultivator, a tenant, or a capitalist farmer).
The census reports also have valuable maps of railway lines and canal irrigation
patterns, as they evolved from 1881 to 1941. I use these to quantify and empirically
analyze the degree of infrastructural development in different districts of Punjab.

4) Season and Crop Reports
To capture the ‘output’ side of the story I constructed a panel dataset of district-wise
agricultural output and area of the three major crops---wheat, rice, and cotton--- from
1900 to 2015. The post-colonial data on agricultural outcomes is all government data
from the two states. There are 43 districts in total, 29 of which are today in Pakistan
and 14 are in India. The colonial data has been tabulated using Season and Crop
reports, which were collected by the colonial government for every year from 1900 to
1947.
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1.5.2 Data construction and issues
Two problems arise in constructing and using the aforementioned datasets. The first
problem arises as a result of the fact that what was once “British Punjab” is today divided
between two countries and four ‘states’/’provinces’. After the partition between India and
Pakistan in 1947, the Indian Punjab was sub-divided in 1967 to form “Punjab” and
“Haryana”, while the state of “Himachal Pradesh” (also a part of British Punjab) was
given union status in 1950 and state status in 1971.
I treat Haryana and Himachal Pradesh as a part of “Indian Punjab” throughout the
study and in doing so run the risk of bypassing any peculiarities that may have arisen as a
result of the aforementioned administrative changes. I try to mitigate these problems by
focusing on subsets of the total dataset (such as border districts15, dummies for Haryana
and Himachal etc.) in later chapters.
A second problem arises due to the fact that new districts have been added to each
Punjab after independence. These ‘additions’ have come about because of one of two
reasons: 1) old districts have been subdivided to form new districts. These ‘new districts’
were previously sub-districts (called tehsils) during the colonial period and have been
granted ‘district status’ after independence. 2) ‘Princely states’ have been added to the
list. These were ‘independent’ states ruled by native princes or rulers during the colonial
period and were never ‘formally’ a part of British Punjab. After partition they were
amalgamated into one or the other country.
If a district has been added because it was previously a princely state---problem
2 above--- I simply drop it from the sample. This is due to concerns of focus as well as
practicality. In this study, I am primarily interested in conducting a sub-regional
comparison with the aim of contrasting between the colonial institutional and postcolonial policy effects in each of the two Punjabs that were directly under British rule.
Any differences that are due to variations in “Native rule” versus “colonial rule” can only

15

Consisting of the pairs Amritsar-Lahore, Firozepur-Kasur and Gurdaspur-Sialkot
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complicate matters. A number of studies including Banerjee and Iyyer (2007) and Iyyer
(2005, 2010) have pointed out that there are major differences between ‘directly ruled’
versus ‘indirectly ruled’ (or princely) states, especially in terms of the provision of public
goods. An inclusion of these ‘districts’ (former princely states), therefore, runs the risk of
obfuscating matters for the present study. By dropping these districts from the sample I
avoid these complications altogether.
If on the other hand, the reason why a ‘new’ district has been added is that an old
sub-district has been given the status of a full district after independence---problem 1
identified above--- I resolved the problem by comparing new maps with old ones. Using
these maps, I first identify the ‘old district’ of which the ‘new district’ was formerly a
tehsil (sub-district). Having made this identification then, I solve the problem through
two ways depending on the situation. If sub-district (or ‘tehsil’) level data is separately
available for the colonial period I treat the tehsil as if it were a district during the colonial
period as well. This is reasonable as long as district-status does not systematically bias
the results in any way.
If tehsil level colonial data is not available, I solve the problem by treating the
“new district” as if it remained a ‘tehsil’ of the old district even in the post-colonial
period. This avoids the data loss that would arise if I simply dropped these districts
altogether since post-colonial data is available. I choose not to do so and adjust its
‘weight’ by the size of a districts area and contribution to production in the district. For
example, the British district of Mianwali has today been sub-divided into three districts,
namely Mianwali, Bhakkar, and Layyah. Tehsil-level data is not available for the latter
two. As a result, the colonial data for Mianwali (which includes the weight of Bhakkar
and Layyah as well) cannot be, strictly speaking, compared with the post-colonial data
for what is today recorded as “Mianwali” (which only includes the weight of one of the
three sub-districts) in the government data. To make them comparable I readjust the value
for that district in the post-colonial period by adding the productions and acreages in
Mianwali, Bhakkar and Layyah to calculate one value for “Mianwali district”. In other
words, when tehsil-level data is missing I treat the district as if it were never partitioned

33

to form new districts. The details for the “tehsils” (that later became new districts), that
were affected have been tabulated in an appendix at the end.
1.5.3 Organization of Study
The study is divided into three sections, sub-divided further into a total of nine chapters.
This section (Section I) consists of three chapters that introduce the various dimensions
of the problem and situates the study in the broader literature. The remaining two sections
are devoted to building an understanding of the ‘colonial’ (Section II) and post-colonial
(Section III) comparative development outcomes across the two Punjabs by examining
the relationship between institutional formations and reform, the evolution of agrarian
structures, and their impact on economic outcomes.
In Chapter Two, I review the relevant theoretical literature16 and develop a
framework that will be used in subsequent chapters. In presenting this theoretical
framework, we make an attempt to synthesize theories from two disparate, and possibly
contradictory sources, the New Institutional and Marxian paradigms of political
economy. Building on the work of Bardhan (2010), the chapter seeks to do four things: 1)
disentangle the vast array of institutions that exist in an economy from the constricted,
exclusive, and analytically limiting emphasis that the idea of “secure of property rights”
enjoys in the recent literature; 2) critically examine the mechanisms via which
‘institutional change’, or the lack of it---institutional ‘persistence’---is posited in the
literature in the context of peripheral economies; 3) point to the necessity of analyzing
institutional structures as serving the purpose of codifying and reproducing dominant
‘social relations’, which are shaped by, what Sen (1981) calls “entitlement systems”, and
4) emphasize the role played by external agency (imperialism) as well as internal
distributive conflict in shaping “political settlements” between competing groups, which
in turn shape ‘institutional structures’ in the third-world.

16

Other literature that is relevant to the economic historiography of India and other issues
is reviewed in subsequent chapters where it is relevant.
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In Chapter Three, I conduct a comparative analysis of the evolution of agricultural
productivity (yield per hectare) of the three major crops---wheat, cotton, and rice—in the
two Punjabs over the course of the colonial (1900-1947) and post-colonial periods (19472015). This helps explain the broad contours of the ‘reversal of fortunes’ conundrum
explained earlier. I compare the crop-wise trends in agricultural productivity, paying
close attention to the decade-wise movements in this comparative performance and its
turning-points, in each of the two periods.
In Chapter Four, I present a historical account of infrastructural development in
colonial Punjab with an emphasis on its objectives and impact on sub-regions. Using
archival maps and data, I show that the main thrust of this development came after the
American Civil War, which threatened the supply chain of raw cotton to British textile
industry. This led to a readjustment, reshaping, and redesigning of the colonial empire,
within which the Punjab region---in particular its Western belt---acquired central
importance in India. This mega infrastructural development led to the development of
highly commercial agrarian zones which produced primarily for the export market
leading to uneven development between the old, settled regions of east Punjab and the
newly irrigated ‘canal’ colonies. Using commodity-chain analysis we show that as a
result of these peculiar patterns of infrastructural development, the two parts became
unevenly articulated with the internal and external markets, over time.
In Chapter Five, we explore the formation of agrarian institutional structures with
an emphasis on understanding how the economic objectives and political constraints of
the process of infrastructural development led to the formation of political and economic
institutions at the village-level, i.e., the ‘site’ of production and appropriation. Using
archival datasets on land revenue records and institutions, we look at the set of ‘land
revenue institutions’, ‘forms of political power’, and assess their impact on ‘internal
distribution’. We show that colonial infrastructural development represented a doubleedged sword: on the one hand, it led to greater investments and productivity in the
affected areas of the agrarian economy; a short-term gain. On the other hand, the
‘political constraints’ imposed by the ‘security’ of high-investment zones and associated
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rents led to the development of extractive institutional structures in areas with high
infrastructural development; a long-term loss.
In Chapter Six, we empirically explore the relationship between colonial
institutional structures and short-run as well as long-run outcomes in the agrarian
economy. Building on the earlier work of Banerjee and Iyyer (2005), and the critiques of
their work in Roy (2013) and Iverson et al (2008) I ask how the set of initial colonial
institutions described in Chapter Five impact agrarian outcomes---specifically yield per
hectare--- in each state in the colonial as well as the post-colonial period. The key
difference with the BI study is the inclusion of contemporaneous impact of institutions
(i.e. the colonial period), crop-specificities, and differences due to post-colonial policy.
As we will see, inclusion of these three dimensions radically alters the way we
understand institutional persistence in India. Unlike the BI study which postulates only a
negative relationship between zamindari during the colonial period and agricultural
outcomes, we show how the nature of this relationship (its magnitude as well as
direction) is in fact totally contingent on other factors and can even be positive in some
cases.
In Chapter Seven, we pick up the story at the eve of independence. We conduct a
comparative analysis of the evolution of post-colonial politics and policy, and assess their
impact on agrarian structures and investments in the two Punjabs since independence. I
make an attempt to demonstrate how differences in three political elements--‘democracy’, ‘strength of peasant movements’, and degree of ‘state autonomy in the
determination of agrarian policy’--- led to major differences in the evolution of the
agrarian structure (land-holding and tenure patterns), and hence incentives for
investments across the two halves. The ‘political coalitions’ that came to dominate each
side at the end of the colonial period varied substantially from one part to the other. On
the Indian side, an alliance of independent and rich capitalist peasants, working under the
Shromani Akali Dal, incorporated challenges from subaltern classes, and demands by the
federal center, within a democratic framework. In contrast on the Pakistani side the
landlords, who made a temporary marriage of convenience at the eve of partition with the
Muslim League to avoid land-reforms promised by the Congress-led center, came to form
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an alliance with the military junta to thwart such movements in the early decade (Asdar
Ali, 2015). This led, in the final analysis, to the creation of different kinds of postcolonial state structures, policy, and hence outcomes in each case.
This paves the way in Chapter Eight for a difference-in-difference experiment that
makes an attempt to present an answer to the most crucial and provocative question of the
study: how would a district that was assigned to one country have performed if it were
assigned, instead, to the other country, given the same initial conditions (geography and
institutions)? In other words, to what extent can the current differences in agrarian
outcomes between the Indian and Pakistani Punjab be seen as being a product of the
conditions that each side inherited versus the independent agency and impact of being
assigned to one or another post-colonial ‘state’, and hence policy environment, after
independence. Thus, in the chapter we are interested in exploring economic development
from the perspective of ‘alternative history’.
Chapter Nine concludes the study by presenting some of its central claims, their
implications, and avenues for further research in the area.
Let us now move on to examine the ‘theoretical framework’ employed by the
study.
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CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 Introduction
In the last chapter we pointed towards a conundrum. We saw how a sharp reversal of
economic fortunes has taken place in the Punjab region of South Asia, between two
halves of what is basically the same region: the eastern half that came to be a part of India
far outcompetes its western twin, which came to be a part of Pakistan in 1947. In this
chapter I review the relevant theoretical literature17 and develop a framework that will be
used to examine this conundrum in subsequent chapters. In presenting this theoretical
framework, we make an attempt to synthesize theories from two disparate, and possibly
contradictory sources, the New Institutional and Marxian paradigms of political
economy. A critique, and synthesis of these two theoretical streams is crucial to the
structure of the arguments that follows in the rest of the study.
In Section 2.2, I spend some time reviewing the central arguments and theoretical
claims of the New Institutional literature and how it posits current institutions as being
endogenous to colonial institutions via the concept of “institutional persistence”. I
examine this literature in the context of the ‘divergence debates’ and how the institutional
camp presents a unique way of understanding long-run differences in comparative
development outcomes between countries. I conclude the section by exploring the two
major theoretical and empirical models that form the point of entry of the present study:
1) the theoretical models for institutional transformation developed by Acemoglu et al
(AJR, 2000, 2002, 2008, 2012), which posit ‘economic institutions’ as being determined
by forms of “de facto” power that exist in an economy at any point in time, and 2) the

17

Other literature that is relevant to the economic historiography of India and other issues
is reviewed in subsequent chapters where it is relevant.
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Banerjee and Iyyer (BI; 2005, 2008) model which examines the long-run impact of landrevenue institutions in colonial India, along with two recent critiques of the BI model, by
Iverson et al (2008) and Roy (2013).
After reviewing the major themes within the recent Institutional literature, along
with their debates with the ‘geography’ and ‘culture’ camps, in Section 2.3 I present a
critique of the New Institutional literature. Building on the powerful critique of new
institutional analysis by Bardhan (2010), I make an attempt to do four things: 1) As
Bardhan calls it, “disentangling the vast array of institutions” that exist in an economy
from the constricted, exclusive, and analytically limiting emphasis that the idea of
“security of property rights” enjoys in the recent literature; 2) critically examine the
mechanisms via which ‘institutional change’, or the lack of it---institutional ‘persistence’--is posited in the literature in the context of peripheral economies; 3) point to the
necessity of analyzing institutional structures as serving the purpose of codifying and
reproducing dominant ‘social relations’, which are shaped by, what Sen (1981) calls
“entitlement systems”; 4) emphasize the role played by external agency (imperialism) as
well as internal distributive conflict in shaping “political settlements” (Olson, 1998)
between competing groups, which in turn shape ‘institutional structures’ in the thirdworld. I conclude Section 2.2 with a discussion of contributions by Marxian scholars
including Baran (1957), Frank (1967), Dos Santos (1971) and other dependency theorists.
This complements the institutional story by making the structure of ‘dependence’---the
historical social relations, within and across countries--- visible. The analytics of ‘class’,
‘imperialism’, and ‘uneven development’ are a core feature of this theory, allowing for a
much richer understanding of institutions in the third-world. In fact, as our reading of the
pioneering work of Paul Baran (1957) suggests, the AJR (2002) model can be interpreted
as a ‘Baran minus imperialism’ framework. This is also somewhat ironic given that any
mention of Baran’s seminal contribution to the theory of ‘settler versus non-settler’
colonialism is conspicuous only by its absence in the prize-winning AJR (2002) paper.
I conclude the chapter in 2.4 by pointing out how the two theoretical paradigms
inform the structure of the arguments that follows in the rest of the study. I derive three
main theoretical conclusions:
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1) The distribution of political power, and the “political settlements” it leads to at any
juncture, determines political institutions which in turn, owing to their impact on the
distribution of economic gains, shape economic institutions (Olson, 1982; Acemoglu et
al, 1999; Baran, 1954)
2) The political settlements that give birth to colonial institutional structures, despite their
heterogeneity across countries, share the common feature of being shaped by the
combined effect of two sets of forces: a) the economic objectives of, and political
constraints on, the imperialist state (Austin, 2010; Mamdani, 2012; Frank, 1966) and the
set of “entitlement systems” that the colonial state creates in any economy (Sen, 1981); b)
internal distributive conflict and forms of power in the periphery, during and after the
post-colonial period (Acemoglu et al, 2000; Olson, 1982)
3) The critical juncture of ‘independence’ is crucial for subsequent post-colonial
development, as it determines the complex array of political coalitions that contest state
power once ‘Native-rule’ has begun, and sets the tone for the future policy directions that
may emerge. These determine the degree to which ‘democratic’ institutions may or may
not develop in a country, the degree to which power contestations from subaltern and
poor classes are tolerated within a ‘democratic’ framework, and also the degree to which
power is devolved to denominations within a state (such as provinces, districts, villages,
and councils) (Olson, 1982; Mahmood Hassan Khan, 2004; Acemoglu et al, 2014)

2.2 New Institutional Literature: A Review
2.2.1 New Divergence Debates
The ‘reversal of fortunes in Punjab’ conundrum can be situated within a broader
theoretical question: why do comparative economic fortunes ever diverge between two or
more countries? The question is central to economic theory and practice. But like most
crucial questions, economists have been unable to develop a consensus, and there is a
lively debate on the issue. These debates have been summed up in what are known as the
‘divergence’ debates.

40

As Acemoglu (2002) points out, the ‘divergence debate’ revolves around three
inter-related questions: 1) what explains differences in economic outcomes between
countries? 2) What are the constraints that keep some countries poor while allowing
others to prosper? 3) Is poverty and lack of development generally, at least in some
countries, inevitable and immutable, or can it be eradicated? (Acemoglu, 2002). He
rightly argues, that, in traditional neoclassical frameworks, answers to these questions are
typically sought in factors such as ‘factor accumulation, ‘technology, ‘human capital
accumulation’, and ‘innovation’ (Solow, 1956; Cass, 1965; Koopman, 1965; Romer,
1990). While these models may describe the ‘mechanics’ of growth, they do not address
the question itself. To quote the institutional economists North and Thomas: “the factors
we had listed (innovation, economies of scale, education, capital accumulation) are not
causes of growth; they are growth” (North and Thomas, 1999; p. 2, emphasis in original)
As a result, in recent years, the emphasis within the discipline has shifted away
from these ‘proximal causes’ to the identification of more “fundamental” causes (North
and Thomas, 1999; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2002; Acemoglu, 2005). The
original question has been rephrased as such: if it is true that the mechanics of growth can
be explained via one or more of the aforementioned proximal factors that lead to
‘accumulation’, what are the deeper, ‘fundamental causes’ that explain the variations in
these proximal causes between countries in the first place? (Olson, 1984; North and
Thomas, 1999; Acemoglu, 1999). As Acemoglu (2002) rightly points out, it is this
distinction--- between the proximal and fundamental ‘causes’ of growth--- has given birth
to the New Divergence Debates.
Following Acemoglu (2002), one can understand the recent scholarship as
offering three contending, “fundamental” explanations for differences in comparative
development outcomes between countries: 1) Colonial Institutions, 2) Geography, and 3)
Culture. As Roy (2013) rightly points out, while a greater part of the debate focuses on
explaining disparities between the European and non-European world, a part of the recent
scholarship also examines “the heterogeneity of developmental experiences within the
periphery” (Acemoglu, 2014; Banerjee and Iyyer, 2005; Iyyer, 2008; Roy, 2013; Iverson
et al, 2011).
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The first explanation posits differences in development outcomes as being
attributable to good or bad ‘institutions’: good institutions promote productivity by
shaping the incentives and constraints of economic actors. Since the gains from economic
development are unevenly distributed within a society there is a conflict over the choice
of institutions. This conflict is resolved in the favor of groups with greater political power
(Olson, 1986; Acemoglu, 2002). Hence, economic growth is encouraged when “political
institutions allocate power to groups with interests in broad-based property rights
enforcement, when they create effective constraints on power-holders, and when there are
relatively few rents to be captured by power-holders.” (Acemoglu, Johnson and
Robinson, 2012, p.387).
But why do rich countries have better institutions than others? The answer cannot
be ‘because they are rich’ since that would lead to a circular line of reasoning: this is
known as the ‘endogeneity problem of institutions’ within the divergence debate. The
Institutional literature responds to it by pointing towards the long-term impact of
European colonialism, which is seen as an “agent of institutional change”, and is claimed
to have produced “varied legacies on property rights and public goods” (Easterly and
Levine, 2012; Engerman and Sokoloff, 2000; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2002;
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 2008; Austin, 2008; Banerjee and Iyyer, 2005 and
2008; Roy, 2013). This differential legacy is then used as a source of ‘exogenous’ change
to explain current institutions and hence, economic outcomes.
While Institutional theories underscore the significance of man-made factors, a
second set of explanations is pivoted on the role of “nature”. This consists of “geographic
factors with direct economic consequences not mediated by institutions” (Diamond
2012). There are three channels through which the natural environment is claimed to have
produced differential outcomes: a) climate, which can have an impact on ‘work effort’
and hence productivity (Montesquieu, 1748) ;b) choice of technology which is affected
by the ecological and topographic characteristics of the natural environment. This can be
seen in the development of military technologies that explain the conquest of the rest of
the world by Europe (Diamond, 1997, p.358) or, in agriculture, by the fact that
“temperate-zone technologies were more productive than tropical-zone technologies…”
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at the beginning of the “modern era of growth” (Sachs, 2001, p.2), and c) disease burden,
and the greater preponderance of infectious diseases in the tropics. Two representative
studies in the geography camp claim that the high malaria prevalence in Sub-Saharan
African countries leads to a yearly growth deficit in these economies of 1.3 percent every
year (Sachs, 2000; Bloom and Sachs, 1998).
The third explanation for differences in economic outcomes has been sought in
‘cultural’ differences. ‘Culture’, it is argued, shapes beliefs, values and norms towards
economic growth. Following Weber (1930), who emphasized the relationship between
Protestantism and industrialization in Europe, recent theorists have also pointed towards
differences in religious beliefs as influencing people’s attitudes towards “human
endeavor” (Landes, 1998). A part of the literature has also presented empirical evidence
in support of the hypothesis that the prevalence of religious beliefs is correlated with
lower economic growth (Barro and McClearly, 2003; Campante & Drott, 2014). In a
recent study, Easterly and Levine (2012) argue that the “share of European population” in
a country has a positive impact on development; Europeans are seen as bringing with
them a ‘culture’ of progress, which leads to a more prosperous economy. The
Institutionalist camp responds to culture-theorists by arguing that culture is a subset of
the institutional framework within a society and “can be thought to influence equilibrium
outcomes for any given set of economic institutions” (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson,
2005).
2.2.2 Colonialism and Institutional Persistence: Four Channels
There has been a growing consensus in the Institutional literature in the last decade
regarding the origins of institutional differences in colonial history. For these economists,
colonialism represents a point of institutional departure, which can be used to derive the
economic divergence between the developing and the developed world. Colonialism, it is
argued, created certain permanent institutional features that continue to persist long after
colonialism was officially replaced by the formal independence of these economies from
colonial rule.
But why do colonial institutions themselves vary across countries? Four major
classes of answers have been provided:
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1-“Settler Mortality”
Acemoglu et al (2000) argue that European colonizers established two different types of
colonial regimes in the world depending on the ease of settlements. In places where
Europeans could settle they introduced European-styled property rights and institutions.
Thus, “Neo-Europe’s”, like the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand
inherited better and more secure property rights whereas “extractive states” were
established in regions where Europeans faced higher mortality rates. Using settler
mortality rates as an instrument for early institutions they show that the current economic
differentials between countries can be accounted for via these early institutions. The
source of institutional persistence is sought in the fact that the creation of institutions
represents ‘a sunk cost’ that makes it undesirable for native elites to change them even
after independence. I return to this model in greater detail, later.
2- Initial Endowments
Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) argue that factor endowments shaped early colonial
institutions in North America and South American countries differently. They argue that
Brazil’s geographic terrain was more amenable for sugar production, which required
slave labor. As a result, the institutional arrangements that emerged from such a colonial
economy led to a more unequal social structure as compared to North America. Thus,
‘initial endowments’ shaped the kinds of colonial institutions that emerged in the two
Americas, leading to long-run disparity between the two.
3- Identity of Colonial Master
In another set of contributions, La Porta et al (2000, 2008) argue that the identity of the
colonial master mattered for subsequent financial, and hence economic growth. They
start from a proposition, standard in corporate law (e.g. Clark 1986) and emphasized by
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) that “legal protection of outside investors limits the extent of
expropriation of such investors by corporate insiders, and thereby promotes financial
development.” (La Porta et al, 2008, p.286). From this, they extract two conclusions: 1)
“legal rules governing investor protection can be measured and coded for many countries
using national commercial (primarily corporate and bankruptcy) laws.” (Ibid). Using data
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from forty-nine countries, they code rules for “both the protection of outside
shareholders, and the protection of outside senior creditors” (Ibid). 2) “legal rules
protecting investors vary systematically among legal traditions or origins, with the laws
of common law countries (originating in English law) being more protective of outside
investors than the laws of civil law (originating in Roman law) and particularly French
civil law countries.” (Ibid) Since “legal traditions were typically introduced into various
countries through conquest and colonization and, as such, were largely exogenous”, La
Porta then utilize “legal origins of commercial laws” as an instrument for legal rules in a
two stage procedure, where the second stage explained financial development. The
evidence showed that legal investor protection is a strong predictor of financial
development.” (La Porta et al, 2008; p. 286-288)
4-“Ideology of colonial administration”, and “timing of colonization”
In a seminal contribution Banerjee and Iyyer (2005, 2008) examine the impact of
historically constituted colonial land revenue systems on differences in economic
outcomes between Indian states today. The British colonial apparatus established tax
liabilities on agrarian produce in different parts of India. In some areas the tax liability
rested with the individual cultivator (Raiyatwari system), in others it rested with the
landlord (Zamindari system). In other parts the revenue responsibility was placed on the
village under the joint-tenancy system (Mahalwari system). This gave birth to divergent
institutional arrangements and those early institutions set these areas on different paths of
future economic development owing to differences in post-colonial investments. Using
historical land-revenue data from British land settlement reports they argue that areas
corresponding to landlord systems underperform the areas that were initially constituted
under non-landlordist institutional arrangements in terms of agricultural productivity. But
what determined the “choice of land revenue institutions” in different regions? Banerjee
and Iyyer argue that the variation can be explained by “ideological” influences of
administrators (as in Guha, 1963; and Stokes, 1959, 1978a), the “timing of colonization”,
or the “pre-existing social structure”. We return to the Banerjee and Iyyer model and its
two critiques (Iverson et al, 2008 and Roy, 2013) in greater detail later as it marks a
major point of entry for the present study.
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2.2.3 De Facto and De Jure Power: The AJR Model
Acemoglu (2000, 2002a) provides a general theoretical framework following Olson
(1988) to examine the emergence and divergence, of political and economic institutions
around the world. It is vital to understand this theoretical framework as it is then used in a
number of studies by AJR (2002, 2005a, 2008, 2012, 2015) as well as Banerjee and Iyyer
(2005, 2008) to examine concrete case studies.
The theoretical framework works in four steps, described by Acemoglu (2002a), as
follows:
Step One: “Economic institutions matter for long-run growth because they
shape the incentives of key economic actors in society, in particular, they
influence investments in physical and human capital and technology, and the
organization of production” (AJR, 2005).
Thus, economic institutions determine the growth potential as well as the future
distribution of resources; that is, “they influence not only the size of the aggregate pie,
but how this pie is divided among different groups and individuals in society” (Ibid). This
can be summarized schematically as:
𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡
𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 => {
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑡+1
Step Two: As a result of their impact on distribution, various groups within
society contest these economic institutions. Institutions have their winners and losers,
with the former usually being the ones who command political power in society.
Efficiency, as an abstract ideal, has little or nothing to do with the choice of institutions,
as power is the ‘ultimate arbiter’. Thus, the economic institutions at any given point in
time are endogenous to the kind of political power that exists in society. Hence, the
second building block of the framework is:
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑡 => 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡
Step Three: Political power is itself endogenous. AJR distinguish between de jure
and de facto political power. The former refers to power that emanates from the “political
institutions” in society and determines the constraints on and the incentives of the key
actors in the political sphere while the latter is shaped by the distribution of resources.
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(Ibid, p. 391) Groups in society, even if they do not have ‘legal’ power, can nonetheless
revolt and impose their will by force. Their ability to do so depends, AJR argue, on two
things. Firstly, it depends ‘on the ability of the group in question to solve its collective
action problem’, as in Olson (1986). 18Secondly, the ‘de facto power of a group depends
on its economic resources, which determines both their ability to use (or misuse) existing
political institutions and also their option to hire and use force against different groups’.
De jure and de facto political power are the two dynamic variables in the AJR framework
that explain everything else (Ibid). Thus:
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 => 𝑑𝑒 𝑗𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑡
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑡 => 𝑑𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑡
Step Four: The dynamics of the system are largely determined by the evolution of
these two variables. This evolution is sluggish because political institutions and resource
distribution show enormous inertial tendencies. The framework therefore “introduces a
natural concept of a hierarchy of institutions, with political institutions influencing
equilibrium economic institutions, which then determine economic outcomes” (Ibid,
p.24). But where do political institutions come from? AJR argue that they are endogenous
to political power. Thus, the balance of de facto political power at a given point in time
determines the political institutions at any point in time. The chain of causality in the
AJR framework runs from political institutions and distribution of resources at any given
point in time, t, to the contemporaneous economic institutions and the future political
institutions at t + 1, to the economic performance and distribution of resources at t + 1.
Institutional persistence arises because of two reasons; firstly, because political
institutions are durable and secondly, because wealth and resource inequalities--measures of de facto power--- lead to further changes in political and economic
institutions that benefit the wealthy.

18

This will be used to explain the political control of the military in Pakistan in Chapter

Six.
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As we can see, colonialism does not explicitly figure into the theoretical
framework. It only enters into the empirical analysis as an instrument that captures
exogenous institutional change in their applicative studies. For example, in their seminal
paper, as discussed earlier, AJR (2002) solve the endogeneity problem between
institutions and economic outcomes by taking recourse to an instrumental variable: ‘early
settler mortality’. They argue that colonizers faced different kinds of disease
environments in different parts of the world. This determined the probability of ‘settling’
in a particular country. In ‘settler colonies’, where Europeans faced a lower mortality
rate, they created Neo-European, ‘inclusive’ institutions, by which they mean “security of
private property rights”. In other places they created extractive states because the
environment was not suitable for settlement. Thus, “geography mattered once upon a
time, but now it does not” (AJR, 2002; 1164-65).
Given this model, it is intriguing that the agency, or “de facto power”, held by the
conquering state does not explicitly enter the AJR analysis. This is somewhat ironic given
the fact that the “extractive” state (the noun) is a meaningless concept unless it is actively
engaged in extraction (the verb). The set of institutions that promote extraction---the
structure of ‘dependence’---is completely absent from the framework. This may be
crucial to the story of comparative development as the ‘historical relationship of
dependence’ that this creates lasts well into the post-colonial period (Frank, 1966; Baran,
1954) with “native elites” working in alliance with the metropolitan elite to maximize
their individual gains, often at the expense of the vast majority.
This is a theoretical, as well as an empirical problem for the AJR model. As
Albuoy (2006) points out in his rebuttal of the AJR (2002) paper, the settler mortality
data for at least half of the countries in their sample is not actually “settler-mortality”
data. Rather, most data points are the mortality rates of soldiers. Although Albuoy does
not extend the empirical argument to its theoretical implications, it follows that ‘soldiermortality’ is an instrument for conflict and the degree of resistance offered by the native
population, rather than a measure of ‘disease environment’ as is assumed by AJR (2002).
The question of ‘conquest’ and the set of institutions that emerge as a
consequence of imperialist expansion is absolutely central to any discussion of peripheral
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institutions. We return to this problem in the next section to see how an introduction of
imperialist agency radically alters our understanding of institutional structures in the
periphery.
2.2.4 Colonial History and Institutions in India: The BI Model
In their seminal study, Banerjee and Iyyer (BI, 2005) present a radically new way of
looking at the economic history of India by empirically showing how its colonial past
continues to shape real outcomes in the agricultural sector, even today. What is even
more striking is the fact that institutions that were formally replaced after independence
continue to have an impact on productive outcomes today.
They present a framework to examine divergence in economic outcomes between
regions in India. The key insight in their analysis is to show that inter-regional inequality
in post-colonial India can be explained by the differences in colonial land revenue
institutions that were setup by the British nearly two hundred years ago. Using empirical
estimates of these institutions, BI then estimate the relationship between early colonial
land revenue institutions and economic development in different regions, today.
BI start with a historical fact: the British colonial regime setup three broad
variants of land revenue institutions in India: 1) Zamindari System, under which landrevenue liabilities were placed with the landlords. This was the system of assignment in
Bengal and Bihar; 2) Ryotwari system, which was the system followed in Madras, in
which the individual peasant cultivator (the ryot) was responsible for paying the revenue;
3) Mahalwari system, which was followed in the North Western Provinces and Punjab,
was a village based (Mahal-based) system in which a collective appointed by the regime
at the village level was held responsible for paying the revenue.
Using this historical fact BI then use land-settlement archives and the voluminous
Badin-Powell “Land systems of British India”, to calculate what they term the “nonlandlord proportion” for every district of India. They show that the non-landlord
proportion---after controlling for geographic variables such as rain, soil condition and
latitude---explains up to 30% of the variation in yields per acre in agriculture across
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districts, with zamindari areas lagging behind, even after seven decades of sovereign
economic development.
But why do these colonial institutions continue to have an impact on current
development outcomes? BI offer three possible channels through which a persistent
impact of colonial institutions (operationalized as the ‘non-landlord’ proportion in their
study) on current agricultural outcomes can be explained: 1) ‘land and wealth
distribution’, 2) ‘the nature of political power’, and 3) ‘the relationship with the colonial
state’.
The first channel is fairly self-explanatory and implies that landlord areas may lag
behind non-landlord areas because landlords would appropriate any gains from
improvements in productivity in the form of rents rather than allowing them to be
reinvested in agrarian production.
The second channel proposes that in landlord areas there is a disincentive to make
investments in improving land productivity due to the high risk of expropriation that
arises from the asymmetry of power between landlords and tenants. As productivity
increases, the rental value of the land increases, making it more lucrative for the powerful
elite to expropriate the weaker peasants.
The third channel proposes that the colonial state was more incentivized to
provide public goods (such as irrigation, railways, schools and infrastructure) in nonlandlord areas because it was ‘easier for the state to raise rents in these areas’. BI do not
explain why that may be the case but nevertheless conclude from this that non-landlord
areas would be expected to have better public goods during the colonial period and that
these initial advantages may still persist today (Ibid).
For BI, the major part of the story comes from the second channel: the
‘differences in the political environment’ of the two kinds of areas, after independence.
In the post-independence period, they claim, when “landlord areas were busy carrying out
land-reform the non-landlord states started focusing on development”. (Ibid) They
dismiss an explanation based on differences in land and wealth distribution---channel
one--- as “there is no significant difference in the proportion of extremely large land
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holdings (between districts that inherited more or less non-landlord institutions) today”.
This conclusion follows from their data which “does not suggest any relationship
between initial land-revenue institutions and the kinds of land distributions that exist in
different regions today’ (ibid). They also dismiss an explanation via channel three, even
demoting it below in importance, to reason one. They argue, “Of the three classes of
explanations discussed earlier, the explanation based on differential investment by the
colonial state is probably the least compelling”. They provide an empirical reason for this
dismissal, in that “dropping the ‘non-landlord districts’ (many in Punjab)---that benefitted
from colonial infrastructural development the most---from the sample has the result of
increasing the effect of the non-landlord proportion on current yields.19
Is it not somewhat surprising that an inclusion of the districts classified and coded
as having the greatest ‘non-landlord proportion’ in the sample have the effect of reducing
the proposed positive theoretical effect of initial non-landlord institutions on economic
outcomes? If anything, an ‘inclusion’ of these districts---assumed to be ‘non-landlord’
districts because they happened to be “classified” as such---should have improved the
predictability of the model (rather than weakening it).
While this should have raised alarm bells--- perhaps being suggestive of possibly
intriguing theoretical effects specific to some states given the diversity of colonial
experience in India--- BI (2005) do not take the issue up further and hence offer no
explanation for this curious result. What explains it?
2.2.5 Critiques of BI Model
Two recent studies present critiques of the BI study that can possibly present an answer
to this question. The first critique of the BI study is by Iverson et al, (2012) which states
that the “formal institutional type” described by a land-revenue institution may not
correspond with the “substantive institutional” form in a region. Iverson et al show for
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Footnote number 28 on page 1209 of the BI paper.
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the Central Provinces (C.P) that the ‘substantive’ institutional type there was neither
zamindari nor mahalwari or ryotwari---the only three kinds in BI’s analysis---but a
fourth type, malguzari, which is a “mixed landlord/non-landlord” institutional structure.20
Recoding these districts to conform to the historical evidence, Iverson et al find that the
BI study “rests on fragile historical and statistical foundations”. (Iverson et al, 2012; p. 4)
At the heart of Iverson’s argument is the idea of ‘non-comparability’ of land
revenue institutions across different regions of India: these institutions were not just
quantitatively different but were also qualitatively so, thus rendering inter-institutional
empirical comparisons essentially invalid.
Take the example of the term “zamindari” which has been translated as
“landlord” in the BI paper. As many scholars know, while this translation may be correct
for the case of Bengal, the term means something radically different in other contexts. It
could refer for instance to an independent, or family farmer who works on his own land
in North-West India. We devote an entire section to this problem in Chapter Five.
The second critique, by Roy (2013) challenges the BI (2005) study and argues
that they systematically “understate” the effect of geography over economic outcomes by
failing to account for the contemporaneous ‘impact’ of institutions during the “colonial
period itself”. Roy’s critique is valid since the question ‘how colonial institutions impact
long-term outcomes’ should be preceded by the question ‘how colonial institutions
impact outcomes during the colonial period itself’. It is entirely possible, as Roy argues,
that different institutions or geographies behave differently in the two qualitatively
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As we will see in Chapter Five the critique is also valid for Punjab, where the
‘substantive’ institutional structure cannot be called a “non-landlord” structure if one understands
‘landlordism’---as a social relation--- to correspond with ‘tenancy relations’. Punjab may have
been ‘formally’ classified as a ‘mahalwari’ (or as BI call it a ‘non-landlord’) region, in substantial
terms, ‘tenancy’ relations accounted for 67% of the farm area in 1938. This can be confirmed by
looking at Table 5.3 (Appendix) (Land Revenue Administration Report, LRA, 1938)
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distinct time periods. Roy includes the colonial period in his analysis to show that the
main explanatory variable----the non-landlord proportion---loses in magnitude as well as
significance for the colonial period.21
Many of the problems in the AJR (2002) and BI (2005) model can be seen as a
general and systemic flaw in the New Institutionalist analysis. Let us now turn to these
broader issues and see how we can resolve them by incorporating ideas from Marxian
frameworks.

2.3 A Critique of New Institutional Frameworks
2.3.1 Whither ‘old’ Institutional economics?
In his critique of New Institutional Economics, Bardhan (2010) starts with an interesting
and somewhat quizzical fact: It has become customary in recent years to start any review
of ‘Institutional’ economics with North (1990) or at best, Olson (1988). The discussion
then swiftly moves on to the implications of these ideas to comparative development
across the world. The latter jump is usually performed by pointing towards the crosscountry comparative framework of AJR (2002) that was encountered earlier, hailing it as
being the first such contribution in the field (as two representative examples of such
reviews see Acemoglu, 1999; or Brousseau and Glachant, 2008).
The problem with this approach is that it ignores the extensive legacy of
institutional approaches that predate ‘New’ institutionalism by a couple of hundred years
by contributions that go as far back as the Historicist German School in the 19th century
(Bardhan, 2010; p. 2). The new approaches are also oblivious to the Marxian and postMarxian contributions to the discussion which also examine how ‘economic’ outcomes
are shaped by political institutional structures: forms of power and social relations,
internally and externally. ‘Class’ analysis, its contested meanings, and its implications
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We take care of this argument and extend it by including the colonial period in our
analysis in Chapter Five and Eight.
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for poor countries is a central concern in these themes. (Resnick and Wolff, 1988; Baran,
1957; Bowles and Gintis, 2004). In addition to the Marxian tradition, any discussion of
the pioneering work of Veblen is also curiously absent in most of the recent literature.
This is somewhat quizzical as North (1990) was preceded by “at least two
decades of vigorous economic analysis of institutional arrangements in developing
countries….(which) started with the literature on sharecropping, followed by a
proliferation of analysis of institutions in rural land, labor, credit, insurance, and some
general inter-linked markets.” (Bardhan, 2010; p. 3) Bardhan (2010) points out that two
major contributions that preceded North (1990) are The Economic Theory of Agrarian
Institutions, by Bardhan ed. (1989), and The Economics of Rural Organization, by Hoff,
Braverman and Stiglitz eds. (1993). These examine agrarian institutions in third-world
economies. In a third collection of essays, The New Institutional Economics and
Development, Nabli and Nugent eds. (1989), apply ‘transaction cost analyses’ to
development issues in Tunisia (Ibid). Unfortunately, any engagement with these
contributions is completely missing from the recent discussions.
Bardhan (2010) speculates that the reason for this oblivion may lie in the fact that
“while the earlier literature was to a large extent theoretical, the recent dominant trend is
in the empirical direction in development economics (as in all of Economics)” (Bardhan,
2010; p. 4). But this too does not seem to be the reason as many aspects of the earlier
work had cross-country as well as single country empirical models, with attempts to
quantify ‘institutions’ as well as ‘institutional impact’. There are many examples of such
empirical studies, from multiple countries. For example, Bell (1977), Shaban (1987), and
Bardhan (1984) are empirical attempts to test different models of sharecropping, and
explore the impact of land tenure on farm productivity. Morooka et al (1989) used farmlevel village data from Java; Matoussi and Nugent (1989) used Tunisian household-level
data; Roumasset (1984) uses micro data from the Philippines to examine contractual
terms, differences in forms, and extent of tenancy. Feder and Onchan (1987) studied the
impact of ‘ownership security’ on investment with farm-level data from Thailand; MigotAdholla, Hazell, and Place (1991) used farm-level data from sub-Saharan Africa to
examine the “impact of indigenous land rights on agricultural productivity”; and Udry
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(1990) explored the role of credit arrangements in risk-pooling with household data from
Northern Nigeria (Reviewed in Bardhan, 2010).
It is impossible to speculate about the reasons for the neglect that these important
contributions face in the New Institutional literature. What is certain is that the net impact
of this exclusion has been detrimental to the Institutional case for reasons discussed
below.
2.3.2 Security of Property Rights
One of the central themes in the recent literature is the essentialist commitment to the
idea of “security of property” rights. The argument runs as follows: ‘security of property
rights’ boosts investment and innovations because they create the ‘right incentives’ for
entrepreneurial activity (Acemoglu, 1999, 2002, 2012; North, 1990). As long as one gets
the “right institutions”, by which is understood getting the “rule of law that protects
property rights”, markets will magically get everything else right (Ibid, p.5).
The exclusivity of analytical focus on ‘property rights’ is extremely problematic,
especially for issues concerning economic development. First, as Bardhan (2010) points
out, “different social groups may be interested in different types of property rights”
(Bardhan, 2010; p. 5); for example, the rural poor may be interested in “simple land titles
or relief from the usual harassments by local goons or government inspectors”, while the
“rich investors may care more for protection of their corporate shareholder rights against
insider abuses or for banking regulations”. As a result a “general ‘rule of law’ (or ‘legal
origin’) variable is too crude to capture these differences”. The “incentive structure”
varies with the economic and political status of individuals, as shown by Pande and Udry
(2005), in their case examination of Ghana.
Second, the ‘security of private property rights’ argument seems to be oblivious to
the dialectic of ‘possession’ (for some) and ‘dispossession’ (for others). This operates
within the complex array of what Sen (1981) calls “entitlement” systems. As Marx
(1967) points out, the enclosure movement eliminated traditional entitlement regimes,
leading to a redistribution of land away from the rural poor. Similarly, the establishment
of “secure property rights” in the context of the United States came about as a result of
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“superseding communal tribal rights in land traditionally enjoyed by the Native
Americans” (Bardhan, 2010; Zinn, 1999). Other examples can be drawn from Africa,
where in recent years the “land titling programs have sometimes dispossessed women of
their traditional farming rights” (Bardhan, 2010; p. 7).
Third, the exclusive emphasis on “security of property rights” loses sight of the
broader nexus of social relations within which economic outcomes are ‘produced’. An
influential study by Sen (1981) presents an alternative framework to understand the
institutional causes and symptoms of under-development: ‘poverty and famines’. He uses
case studies from Bengal, Ethiopia, and the Sahel region of Africa to understand the set
of ‘entitlement relations’ which have historically given birth to poverty in these
peripheral economies. ‘Starvation’, Sen argues, “is the characteristic of some people not
having enough food to eat.” ‘It is not’, he continues, “the result of there being not enough
food to eat. While the latter can be a cause of the former, it is but one of many possible
causes.” (Sen 1981, p. 217, emphasis in original). To truly appreciate the problem of
poverty then, Sen continues, “It is necessary to understand the entitlement systems within
which the problem is to be analyzed” (ibid). He distinguishes between “supply
statements” that “say things about a commodity (or a group of commodities) considered
on its own” and “statements of entitlement”, that describe “entitlement relations”, such as
those that emerge out of “exchange”, “production”, “own labor”, and “inheritance”22
(Sen, 1981 p. 217). When applied to entitlement systems pertaining to ‘ownership’ this
simply refers to “a recursive relation and the process of connecting can be repeated”:
“I own this loaf of bread. Why is this ownership accepted? Because I got it by
exchange through paying some money I owned. Why is my ownership of that
money accepted? Because I got it by selling a bamboo umbrella owned by me.
Why is my ownership of the bamboo umbrella accepted? Because I made it with
my own labor using some bamboo from my land. Why is my ownership of the

22

In Chapter Five, I present three examples of entitlement relations that existed in
colonial Punjab and the variations in these relations across the two sub-regions.
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land accepted? Because I inherited it from my father. Why is his ownership of
that land accepted? And so on. Each link in this chain of entitlement relations
'legitimizes' one set of ownership by reference to another” (Sen 1981, ibid)

Thus, neither the system of ‘property-rights’, nor the economic outcomes that it
leads to, can be seen in isolation from these “social relations”, or legitimizing
‘entitlement regimes’. In many instances, therefore, it may be desirable not to enforce
private property rights (Ostrom, 1978; Bowles, 2004). As Seabright (1995) and Bardhan
(2011) point out, with incomplete contracts “attempts to enforce private property rights
may weaken the mechanisms of prior cooperation among resource users” (say, of
previously common or weakly-defined property) (Ibid). This stems from the fact that “a
central characteristic of most private property rights is their tradability, and tradability
(particularly to outsiders) may undermine the reliability of a long-term relationship
among users of a resource” (Ibid, p. 8).
Fourth, as also pointed out by Bardhan (2010), in the recent literature the ‘security
of private property rights’ argument is usually presented as a corollary to the “constraints
on the state” view. This severely limits the richness of institutional structures, which
include, not just ‘constraining’ but also “enabling institutions” which perform a very
different role. For example “social networks, community organizations, network of
government extension services and local experimental stations, a national innovation
system that facilitates training and technology absorption, etc. are a few examples of
many such enabling institutions” (ibid). Ostrom (1978) and Bowles (2004; 2012) give
numerous examples of common-property resources (in fisheries in Southern Italy,
irrigation in Nepal, forests in South America) which enable democratic management and
participation. Many of these are sustained via non-market mechanisms that rely on
‘other-regarding preferences’ such as social trust, mutual reciprocity etc. One fascinating
example of how these reciprocal institutions were sustained is given by Greif (1997) who
shows how Mediterranean trade and commerce was sustained during the medieval period
through the mutual trust of traders. Reducing the vast milieu of institutional structures to
the “security of property-rights” completely loses sight of these ‘enabling’ social
institutions.
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Such a view, when transported into the domain of policy, leads to the obfuscation
of many facts central to economic development in post-colonial countries. For example,
Githinji and Perrings (1993) explaining why policies to alleviate the degradation of
rangelands in Botswana and Kenya have not worked, argue that the reason why
institutional reform has been unsuccessful is that they “took little account of the role of
the institutions they were intended to replace in guaranteeing the social security of
individual resource users” (Githinji and Perrings, 1993; p.110). In contrast, they argue
that ‘institutional initiatives should address the needs satisfied by the structures they
replace, if they are not to provoke conflicting evolutionary responses on the part of those
institutions” (Ibid).
In addition to such ‘enabling’ institutions there are also examples of what
Bardhan (2010) calls “coordinating institutions”. He argues that poor countries “are
beset with coordination failures of various kinds, and alternative coordination
mechanisms -- the state, the market, the community organizations -- all can play different
roles, sometimes conflicting and sometimes complementary, in overcoming these
coordination failures, and these will remain important even if private property rights were
to be made fully secure.” Consequently, to proclaim the “universal superiority of one
coordination mechanism over another is naive, futile and a-historical.” (Ibid, p. 8)
Finally, the New Institutional commitment to the ‘security of private property
rights’ and the mechanisms via which it promises economic development does not seem
to explain the meteoric rise of East Asian economies, particularly China, South Korea,
and Indonesia. As Chang (2010) rightly asks: “What is in fact a ‘good property rights
system”? “That it is not necessarily Western-style private property rights system”, Chang
continues, “is clear from the excellent performance of China over the last two decades,
where such a system simply did not exist” (Chang, 2010; p.31). In contrast, the East
Asian miracle shows that ‘security of property rights’ and ‘formal law’ have often been
had to sidestepped in the favor of creating a suitable state-led macroeconomic framework
for economic growth (Chang, 2001).
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2.3.3 Are Peripheral Economies Prisoners of Birth? The Agency of the Post-Colonial
State
The New Divergence Debates (NDD) discussed earlier offer two contending explanations
for the problem of comparative development, ‘colonial institutions’, and ‘geography’. In
both classes of explanations, however, current economic outcomes are completely
endogenous to an underlying, ‘time-invariant’ factor. This is fairly obvious in the
‘geography’ case, where ‘nature’---seen as ‘destiny’---constrains the abilities of
economies to achieve economic growth. But it only takes a little thought to see that an
explanation premised on ‘colonial institutions’, by taking recourse to ‘history’, in essence
also makes a similar claim: current economic outcomes are pre-determined by institutions
that were setup centuries ago. Since these ‘structural’ forces cannot be undone, peripheral
economies are caught in a web of “bad institutions”. In other words, in both classes of
models, peripheral economies are posited as ‘prisoners’ of birth.
In the Institutional story, this idea stems from an insufficient attention to a third
channel that may very well explain the large differences in comparative development
outcomes between countries: the agency of the post-colonial state. In fact, in a recent
article, Acemoglu (2014) concedes that “much of political economy, including my own
work, has ignored the dynamics of state building….” He argues further that these may be
“as important for the emergence of inclusive political institutions” but “more theoretical
and empirical work, informed by history, is necessary to address these questions”
(Acemoglu, 2014; p.23)
This stems from the inability of the New Institutional analysis to incorporate the
work of heterodox thinkers such as Chang (2011), Woo (2009), Karl O’ Brien (2009),
David and Mach (2010), and Kiiza (2010), who have contributed towards building an
understanding of ‘state’ formation and its implications for institutional formations in
different countries. Let us see why these may be potentially crucial for institutional
development and economic growth:
Chang (2011) sees ‘institutional’ development as being synonymous with
“governance and political reform”. He argues that the lack of importance attributed to the
latter in IMF and World Bank led ‘technocratic reform’ programs explains to a large
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extent why these programs have been “universal failures” (Chang, 2011; p.2). This in
turn, he argues, stems from the fact that “we are still some way away from knowing
exactly which institutions in exactly which forms are necessary, or at least useful, for
economic development in which contexts” (ibid, 23). Such an understanding, he argues,
requires the “need to translate the abstract theoretical notions that underlie many
discussions on the role of institutions in economic development into more practical
terms”; the need to “develop new discourses on what may be called the “technology of
institution building” cannot be ignored. According to Chang, the role of the state is
crucial in developing this ‘technology’.
Following Chang (1995), Woo (2009) examines the case of Malaysia, where postcolonial state building played a crucial role in determining the path of economic
development. She also points to issues pertaining to “compatibility” in examining
“formal” as well as “informal” (that is, non-codified) institutions. She shows that “the
formal legal system cannot determine how decisions are made and conflicts resolved”;
the state has to play an integral role in mitigating conflicts and promoting informal
institutions, often at the expense of “market efficiency”, and the “security of property
rights”. (Woo, 2009, p.114)
Moreover, the state---as an instrument for developing the ‘technology of
institutional reform’---is contested by politics. As Chang (2002b) points out: “All
institutions, including the market (which is often assumed by mainstream economists not
to be an institution) are defined in relation to the structure of the rights and obligations of
the relevant actors. And as the definition of those rights and obligations is ultimately a
political act, no institution, including the market can be seen as being free from politics.”
A number of studies have examined how politics at the level of the state shapes
the agenda of institutional reform and ultimately the economy. Burlamaqui, Pereira de
Souza, and Barbosa Filho (2011) explore multiple instances of institutional and fiscal
reform in Brazil and how these reforms were contested by “distributional struggles
between groups and how the political compromises made in one era critically affected the
way the economy evolved later” (BPB, 2011). David and Mach (2011) explore the
process of institutional formation in Switzerland in the early 20th century and examine
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how political compromises over the ‘state’ and its policy determined the future course of
the economy. In another contribution, O’Brien (2008) examined struggles over fiscal
policy in Britain during the early colonial period to show how the “efficient tax
institutions of Britain fueled its imperialist expansion and repression of lower classes at
home in the name of protecting private property” (Chang, 2011; p. 12)
The key question is this: is state policy determined by ‘structure’ or ‘human
agency’? As Chang (2011) argues, “In mainstream theory of institutional change, there is
no ‘real’ human agency”. Since “material interests”---which result in institutional change
or persistence---are shaped by ‘structural’ factors, “what a rational actor will choose is
already structurally determined” and hence there is “no meaningful choice” (Chang and
Evans, 2005; p. 9).
In contrast, there are many examples (including the East Asian miracle) which
point towards the role of the state. As Kiiza (2011) argues, Botswana managed to
mitigate the effect of being a landlocked country---a “natural” or “geographical”
impediment”---simply because “its political leaders made deliberate political decisions
about the appropriation of diamond rent and its use”. In this particular case,
“developmental nationalism” was the key explanatory variable in the emergence of a
“developmentalist bureaucracy” and not inherited factors such as “colonial institutions”
or “geography” as has been the dominant theme in the New Divergence Debates. 23
Thus, the importance of the agency of the post-colonial state is central to the issue
of institutional reform and change in the periphery. As Chang (2011) argues: “If human
actors are not automata responding to structurally-determined incentives, their ideas--how they perceive their interests, what their moral values are, how they think the world
works, what actions they think are possible and impossible, and so on---matter a great
deal” (Chang, 2011; 256).

23

As we will see in Chapter Six, the differences in political formations and policies in the
two Punjabs are the key to the divergence
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2.3.4 “Whatever happened to Imperialism?”24
In February, 2015 the Greek electorate voted in the Syriza party; a far-left political
tendency, which was elected on an anti-austerity and anti-neoliberalism agenda. Yet,
despite having all the “internal commitment that is required for institutional change”
(Acemoglu, 2000), in practical terms the party ended up having to accept the same terms
of austerity as its predecessors. The reason, as most people agree, had little to do with
“internal” balance of power, or domestic commitment to reform, but rather the external
constraints on the ability of elected representatives to bring about actual institutional
change (Varoufakis, 2016). This recent example is reminiscent of a deeper problem: in
peripheral economies, ‘institutional change’ is not just determined by the distribution of
power domestically but also the global distribution of power, that is, between former
colonies and colonizers. The global inequality in power relations, in turn, stems from the
‘historical’ structures of dependence that poor countries have inherited from their
colonial past (Dos Santos, 1976; Frank, 1967; Baran, 1954).
But these dynamics of global power are completely absent from the New
Institutional frameworks. In addition to focusing almost exclusively on “property-rights”
the recent Institutional literature pays almost no attention to the impact of external power
relations in the determination of domestic institutions in peripheral economies. As
pointed out earlier, while a discussion of the “extractive” state is central to the AJR
(2002) analysis, the process of extraction, and the set of institutions that it gives birth to,
is completely invisible in the analysis. This may be crucial to issues pertaining to
comparative economic development for various reasons:
First, any discussion of the origins of differences in comparative development is
incomplete without a discussion of contemporary global capitalism, which in turn, is
inconceivable without an understanding of colonialism. The contribution of the colonized
lands and the people who inhabit and derive their livelihoods from them to the process of

24

Taking a line from an essay with the same title by Prabhat Patnaik (1993)
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capitalist development and accumulation in the center, cannot be overstated. For
example, it is impossible to explain the meteoric rise of the British economy during the
19th century without accounting for the fact that by 1914 British ownership of foreign
assets was equal ‘to two years of national income or six times the total value of British
farmland’. (Piketty, 2014: 44) This allowed Britain to run trade deficits amounting to 2%
of national income with the rest of the world because the ownership of colonies allowed
them to extract a net income from ‘foreign assets’ that was more than 5% of national
income. (Ibid: 120-121)
While this ownership of foreign assets in the form of colonies was beneficial for
the British state the same cannot be said about its effects on the development of the
colonies whose national income flowed towards the British state and its citizens. India,
for example, produced a quarter of global manufactures in 1750. The ensuing
colonization and subsequent ‘de-industrialization’ reduced that percentage to 2% of
global output: the decline came at the expense of productivity gains for British textiles
(Clinginsmith and Williamson, 2005). It is obvious that the conflicting and mutually
opposing nature of such capitalist development could not be sustained without direct
political control. As Piketty (2014) so powerfully argues in his recent best-selling book:
“It is not an insignificant thing when one country works for another and pays out a substantial
share of its output dividends and rent to foreigners over a long period of time. In many cases,
such a system can survive (to a point) only if sustained by relations of political domination...”
(Piketty 2014: 44, emphasis added)

One would suppose, given its observed significance in shaping the global political
economy, that the concept of imperialism must be central to any serious theoretical
treatment of capitalist development in the last two centuries. Yet, despite its practical
relevance, it is perplexing that the role of imperialist agency in shaping peripheral
institutions has received so little attention in recent theories.
What is even more ironic is the lack of importance attached to the analytic in
recent Marxian discourse. In an appropriately titled essay, ‘Whatever Has Happened to
Imperialism?’ Prabhat Patnaik (1990) points towards a “remarkable transformation that
has taken place” in the last two decades: “hardly anyone talks about imperialism any
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more”. Even more perplexing is the fact that this silence is not the result of any
theoretical challenge that may have been posed to the concept or its central premises.
Contemporary oblivion for imperialism in the Marxian political economic tradition is
“not a theoretically self-conscious silence” (Ibid). In contrast the process seems to have
been the result of a gradual, perplexing and mysterious onset of theoretical amnesia.
To address these problems it is vital to turn our attention to the earlier Marxian
and Dependency tradition of political economy. The framework allows for a much deeper
understanding of institutions as it allows for a discussion of “social relations”,
“imperialism”, and “class structures”.
2.3.5 The Structure of Dependence
The dependency school of development presents a unique framework to understand the
colonial economy and its articulation within the global capitalist framework. This vast
body of literature is far from a monolithic set of ideas but rather an analytical framework
that gives centrality to the historical relationship between the advanced capitalist
economies and the newly independent states that emerged after World War II. It is this
aspect that sets dependency theory apart from the various paradigms that have sprung up
in the mainstream economics literature. The necessity of bringing back the dependency
framework emerges as a result of the mainstream paradigms failure to address three key
aspects: 1) Historical developmental experience and the divergence in economic fortunes;
2) Power relations latent in the relationship between advanced capitalist economies and
developing economies; and 3) Eurocentric grand narratives that are premised on the
circular logic that developing countries are underdeveloped because they are not mirror
images of Western capitalist economies. These failures are directly attributable to the
implicit assumption that development occurs on a linear teleological path that all
countries must follow irrespective of the historical relations of power.
The dependency framework can be sub-divided into three main classes: 1) The
Development of Under-Development School (DUS) that initially arose with a seminal
contribution from Frank (1966) and its various expositions by Pizarro (1971) and Amin
(1973, 1974, 1976); 2) A reformulation of the DUS hypothesis by Dos Santos (1971)
that refers to the evolution of the ‘structure of dependence’; and 3) A ‘concrete situation
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of dependency’ (CSD) framework developed by Faletto (1970) and more fully by
Cardoso and Faletto (1979) that zooms-in on the ‘coincidental’ nature of dependence.
The idea that colonial institutions had a long-term impact on economic outcomes
is not a new one. The Marxian literature had long ago pointed towards the impact of
colonialism on long-term development in the third world. Baran (1954, 1957) for instance
proposes in a seminal account on the Political Economy of Growth, the idea that the
variation in colonial institutions across “settler” and “non-settler” colonies provides “the
key to understanding differences in comparative development across countries” (Baran,
1954; p. 144). Yet, Baran’s contribution is so severely understated that it may even come
as a surprise to those not familiar with this literature that the source of variation in Paul
Baran’s (1957) explanation is exactly the same as the one reiterated fifty years later by
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson in 2002: settler mortality. It is curious then that Baran
is conspicuous only by his absence in the latter’s prize-winning study.
Frank (1971) is a seminal exposition of the DUS School of development theory
that argues that under-development, far from being an original condition, is produced by
capitalist development in the center. Using the concrete case of Chile and Brazil, Frank
points towards the qualitative difference in the nature of economic development in the
central and peripheral economies respectively via the ‘metropolis’ and ‘satellite’
distinction. He argues, “in contrast to the development of the world metropolis which is
no one's satellite, the development of the national and other subordinate metropolises is
limited by their satellite status.” (Frank, 1970: 23)
Frank’s idea is simple and provocative: development is fettered by the structural
embedment of dependent countries in a system in which domestic elites act as “satellites”
in peripheral countries and serve the interests of the ‘metropolis’, instead of the
indigenous economy. As a result of the parasitic nature of these domestic elites capitalist
development produces underdevelopment for the majority of the people living in these
countries. For Frank, therefore, ‘underdevelopment’ is not a natural, intrinsic condition of
existence for developing economies but is rather a product of the dependent nature of
these economies in the global capitalist system. Thus, for the DUS school ‘under-
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development’ must be examined in its causal connection with the dependent political
character of these economies.
Following Frank, this thesis resonates with two noteworthy contributions from
Dos Santos (1971) and Pizzaro (1971). These two contributions reach the same
conclusion regarding the development of underdevelopment as Frank but via slightly
different entry-points. Dos Santos (1971) finds Frank’s explanation of the problem too
simplistic. Instead, he formulates the problem in terms of the development of certain
‘internal structures’ that are “conditioned by international relations of dependence” (Dos
Santos, 1971; p. 80). These, Santos argues, shape the ‘structure of dependence’ in Latin
American countries and ‘without a qualitative change in these internal structures and
external relations’ development would remain impossible for these economies. (Santos,
1971; p. 232) Thus, it is not the satellite elites per se that lie at the root of the problem but
rather the ‘structure’ of the economy itself: a structure that is rooted in colonial history.
The ‘satellite’ elite is itself a powerless agent in this framework and is subservient to the
diktats of the ‘structure of dependence’.
Santos goes further than Frank’s initial framework and argues that dependency
can take a variety of forms. An appreciation of the differences in these forms is central to
the problem for Dos Santos. He defines dependency as ‘a situation in which the economy
of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy
to which the former is subjected’ and distinguishes between three types of historical
dependency arrangements: 1) “Colonial dependence” by which he understands the
domination of world trade by Europe; 2) “Financial-industrial dependence” that is
characterized by the domination of big capital in the industrial centers”; and a 3) “New
dependence” that arises in the post-war period and is based on “multinational
corporations which began investing in industries geared to the internal market of
underdeveloped countries”. (Ibid)
Thus, as opposed to Frank who focuses on generalizable similarities between
economic structures in a dependent economy, Dos Santos is more concerned with the
dissimilarities within the evolution of unique structures of dependence. In this sense,
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Santos’s contribution marks a break with the mechanical dependency analyses of Frank
in which internal structures are completely determined by external forces.
In contrast to the DUS a slightly different entry-point to dependency analysis can
be found in the works of those who construct the question in terms of the constraints
upon development in concrete situations. This view, most notably expressed by Faletto
(1970) and Cardoso and Faletto (1979) emphasizes the coincidental specificity of a
particular dependency setting.
Cardoso and Faletto (1979) emphasize on the need to situate a given ‘dependency
arrangement’ as a product of the “relationship between external and internal forces” that
are “rooted in coincidences of interests between local dominant classes and international
ones”, and on the other side are challenged by locally dominant groups and classes”
(Cardoso and Faletto, 1979; p. 15)
In this way, dependency analysis via Cardoso and Faletto (1979) acquires a
unique framework that allows us to analyze the evolution of forms of dependency within
an economy. For instance, as Faletto (1979) shows, the trade terms and agreements
between central and peripheral countries were shaped by the degree of development of
indigenous class forces in the peripheral economy. Countries that had a more developed
and well organized national bourgeoisie could much more easily bargain for better
trading agreements so that the terms of trade were better than countries that had less welldeveloped capitalist elites.
In conclusion, as these later dependency analyses showed, colonialism not only
shaped the initial international division of labor but also reproduced itself in the postcolonial era. The degree to which colonial institutions could be reproduced depended on
the manner in which power was reorganized in the post-colonial era. The persistence of
colonial structures of dependence and as a result the outcomes that they produced--although contingent upon colonial history---nevertheless, reproduce themselves today
because they continue to benefit particular social groups both in the peripheral economy
and the center. As a result, these social groups are incentivized to form what Gramsci
(1935) terms ‘historic blocs’ or political coalitions between social groups with seemingly
diverse political and economic interests.
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2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we reviewed the recent Institutional literature and presented a critique of
their central arguments. In their debates with the ‘geography’ and ‘culture’ camps, the
present study concurs with the Institutionalist theorists. Yet, despite this ‘overall
agreement’ the chapter identified points of theoretical disagreement with the recent
models. We argued that the robustness of these models can be enhanced by including the
work of Marxian scholars into the analytical framework.
By combining these two frameworks to analyze the concrete context of the
colonial economies of Punjab, and possibly by extension to other colonized countries, we
seek to make the following four dimensions visible in the analysis:
1) An examination of the origins, and concrete nature, of the dependence relationship
between Punjab and the global empire. I do this in the light of recent economic
historiography that presents a new understanding of global capitalism by giving
visibility to the reshaping of ‘empire’ that took place in the aftermath of the
American Civil War. As we will see, the patterns of ‘infrastructural development’
that emerged in Punjab after the Civil War, and the political constraints on the state
in carrying out these projects, explain the ‘institutional structures’ that emerged in
each Punjab during the colonial period (Chapter Four and Five).
2) An examination of the colonial institutional apparatus as a “system of rights”
stemming from the “entitlement regime” (Sen, 1981) in colonial Punjab, and ‘landrevenue’ institutional forms as being a concrete exercise of these entitlement
systems. This allows us to focus on the actually existing social relations in the
colonial economy, and explore the role played by institutions in reproducing them by
allocating political and economic power within the society.
3) An investigation of the impact of colonial institutions in each Punjab on economic
outcomes during the colonial as well as the post-colonial period. As we will see, an
inclusion of the contemporaneous impact radically alters the way we look at colonial
institutions and their long-run persistence in peripheral economies.
4) An investigation of what Chang (2011) calls ‘forms of power’ and ‘contestations
over state policy' in each of the two post-colonial states after independence. As we
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will see in Chapter Seven, the radically different economic outcomes between the
two Punjabs can be seen as a result of distinct sets of politics in the two countries
after independence. These differences shaped the degree of “democracy”, ‘the
strength of peasant movements’, and the degree of ‘state autonomy in the
determination of agrarian policy’ in each region, which in turn led differences in
‘land-legislations’, ‘tenure policies’, and ‘support policies’ that were offered by each
state to agrarian producers (Chapter Seven and Eight).
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CHAPTER 3
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY IN THE COLONIAL
AND POST-COLONIAL PERIOD: A COMPARATIVE
EXAMINATION
3.1 Introduction
In Chapter One, we conducted a brief overview of development outcomes across
the two Punjabs, by comparing simple measures of ‘overall’ development such as
‘literacy-rates’, ‘poverty-rates’, ‘life-expectancy’, ‘infant mortality’, and ‘maternal
mortality rates’. This revealed a paradox: while we expected the two sides to have
converged---owing to similarities in historical institutions and agro-climatic conditions--we saw that, in fact, there has been a divergence in economic fortunes.
In this chapter we focus on the agricultural sector and present a comparative
analysis of agrarian yields in the two sub-regions across more than a century of data,
from 1900 to 2015. The chapter shows that the divergence in overall development is a
product of the divergence in agrarian performance. We explore generalizable trends--turning-points, crucial decades, and crop-specificities--- that underpin the problem of
comparative agrarian performance in each period. While this chapter identifies the broad
patterns, it leaves an explanation of the trends, for subsequent chapters.
To do this, we compare the evolution of yields per unit land in the two regions for
the two major food crops (wheat and rice), and the major cash crop (cotton) across the
colonial and post-colonial period. Following a large body of research that has shown that
food productivity is associated with a greater decline in poverty (since a large part of
‘poverty’ is in fact, ‘food poverty’. See Datt and Ravallion, 1994 for a review of this
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literature) as compared to similar improvements in cash-crop productivities, I pay
particular attention to the crop-specificities of relative performance in each part.25
The chapter works in two steps. We first look at the evolution of comparative
yields for the entire sample. This allows us to look at agrarian development from a birdseye view, to see if there are any major differences between the two qualitatively distinct
periods (colonial and post-colonial). On the one hand, we find confirmation for the
earlier work by Blyn (1966, 1971) and the hypotheses of Patnaik (1972) about the
‘retarded’ nature of colonial agrarian development in India. In addition, however, we also
identify that any ‘general’ understanding of colonial agrarian performance cannot be built
without keeping in mind the ‘crop-specificities’ of the problem. Having examined the
problem from a macro perspective, we then zoom-in to specific periods (colonial and
post-colonial), and decades within each, to understand the unique dynamics of
comparative agrarian performance in each period.
To do this, I constructed a dataset which records the acreage and production of the
three major crops from 1900-2015 for every district of Punjab.26 The large size of the
dataset, and the partition of Punjab into India and Pakistan, allows me to setup a pre and
post-partition periodic break at 1947; the year of independence, a ‘critical juncture’ in the
institutional histories of the two agrarian economies. I also look at subsets of the dataset,
specifically border districts, to better control for any confounding geographic factors.
The analysis identifies six important facts about the problem: 1) West Punjab
(later Pakistani Punjab) outperforms the eastern half for a large number of years during
the colonial period in terms of food as well as cotton production; 2) The decades of rising

25

The chapter is complemented with an appendix that examines the empirical
relationships between the poverty rate in a district and the yield per hectare of food versus cotton
crops. The surprising result is that an increase in cotton productivity is associated with a higher
level of poverty in a district; while food productivity tends to reduce it significantly.
26
Data construction and issues are explained in Chapter One
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international commodity prices (leading up to the First World War) significantly favor
the western half, reflecting a greater export-price sensitivity; 3) A radical reversal of
fortunes begins to take place after independence in food production. By 1967, food
productivity in the Indian state of Punjab was already 45% higher on average than
districts in Pakistani Punjab; 4) The divergence is impervious to cotton, which has not
only kept pace, but the Pakistani Punjab has even outstripped its Indian twin for many
years after independence, showing that the reversal cannot be explained as a result of a
permanent shock at the time of independence, for such a shock would have impacted both
kinds of crops (food and cotton) similarly. 5) Unlike the post-colonial period, which is
marked by one-way divergence27 in the favor of Indian Punjab, the differential trend is
more volatile during the colonial period; 6) The divergence begins as early as 1952 but
the year 1967, and the decades that follow, mark a period of intensive divergence, or the
‘long farewell’ that separates the two Punjabs today.
As subsequent chapters will reveal, each of these six facts have a political
economic basis that is rooted in the colonial state and agrarian economy of the two
Punjabs and their institutional transformation, after independence.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: in 3.2, I present a broad overview
of the trends for the whole sample (1900-2015) to capture how, on average, each state has
performed in the two periods in terms of each crop. In 3.3 and 3.4, I zoom-into each of
the two qualitatively distinct periods in isolation, and capture the evolution of the ‘yield
differential’---measured as the difference of yields per hectare in each sub-region for a
crop, in a given year---over the colonial, and post-colonial period, respectively, with an
emphasis on isolating crucial decades and turning-points in each period. I conclude the
chapter with a brief discussion of the ‘implications’ that the analysis has for the overall
problem.
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3.2 Periodic Comparison of Agrarian Performance
The development of Indian agriculture in the colonial period is an important area of
research. The evolution of agrarian productivity during this period has been the major
focus in these studies. Two studies by George Blyn (1964, 1968) were the first to
examine the evolution of agricultural productivities in ‘British India’. The first of these
examined the ‘economic history of India’s agriculture from 1891 to 1947 by looking at
the evolution of yields per acre for the eighteen major crops. Other studies looked at
‘undivided India’, as in Sivasubramonian, (1997, 2000), and confirmed some of the
earlier insights of Blyn. Unfortunately, there are very few studies that include regions in
the Sub-Continent that became a part of Pakistan. Sims (1988) makes an attempt to
compare West Punjab and East Punjab, but only looks at the post-colonial period, and
does not adjust her data for new districts after independence, thus rendering comparisons
between the two qualitatively distinct periods impossible. ‘Inter-periodic’ comparisons
are important, as they reveal facts about the nature of colonial agrarian development and
transition (if any) to the post-colonial period.
In Figure 3.1, panels (a) to (c) I plot the average yearly yield of wheat, rice, and
cotton per hectare from 1900-2015, in each Punjab. The picture provides a bird’s eye
view of the evolution of agrarian performance across the two periods. Four facts
immediately stand out:
First, there has been a significant productivity spurt in both states after they
gained their independence from colonial rule in 1947. As Baran (1957), and Patnaik
(1971) hypothesize, a qualitative institutional shift takes place at independence, as alien
extractions and direct siphoning comes to an end, and a greater proportion of the surplus
appropriated by domestic elites is available28 for productive reinvestments. The graph
also confirms the pioneering results of Blyn (1968), whose overall assessment of the

To what extent this ‘available’ surplus is reinvested in each state, obviously, varies and
this variation (and its causes) is precisely what this study is exploring.
28
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economic history of the colonial period in British India was one of ‘retarded
development’.
Figure 3.1: Average Yield of Wheat, Rice and Cotton in East and West Punjab (Kilograms Per Hectare)

a) Yearly Average Wheat Yield

b) Yearly Average Rice Yield

c) Yearly Average Cotton Yield

The qualitative rupture at independence is so significant---in both countries--- that
yields per hectare during the colonial period optically appear stationary when put into
relief with the post-colonial performance on the same graph, as in figure 3.1. This,
however, as we will see when we zoom-in to each period individually, is merely an
optical illusion. The colonial period appears stationary---and similar across the two subregions---only because the performance, and the differential between the two states,
across the two periods is so radically different.
Second, the graph reveals that the divergence in food productivity (fig. 3.1 panels
a, b) began soon after independence. The Indian Punjab began outpacing its western twin
as early as the 1950’s. As we can see, wheat productivity remained stagnant in the
Pakistani Punjab for the first two decades, and colonial levels persisted till 1966. The
second major food crop, rice, took a dip in the Pakistani Punjab after independence,
falling below even colonial levels during the 1950’s, and rising thereafter. During the
same time there is steady growth in yields per hectare on the Indian side so that the
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divergence during the first two decades (1947-1967) is explained by the continuation of
retarded colonial trends on the Pakistani side and an expansion on the Indian side.
Although yields begin to rise on the Pakistani side after 1966, the divergence becomes
accentuated since the rate of growth in the Indian Punjab leaps upwards after 1967: the
start of the Green Revolution in India, which was launched from the state of Punjab.
Third, the graphs point to the peculiarity of cotton production. Unlike the food
crops---that display retarded performance--the productivity of cotton was secularly rising,
on both sides, even during the colonial period. The yields of cotton produced per hectare
increased by 56% from 1900 to 1947. Thus, while ‘retarded’ development and stagnation
were the norm for food crops, the same principles do not seem to apply to cotton
production.
The graphs also reveal that the productivity of cotton in the Pakistani Punjab has-- somewhat curiously--- managed to maintain parity with its Indian counterpart, despite
the divergence in food performance. In fact, yields of cotton in Pakistani Punjab have
even outstripped Indian Punjab for some decades after independence (as we will see
below). This makes any explanation for the divergence premised on ‘plain bad luck’
impossible. It cannot be argued for instance, that a set of ‘permanent’ factors, such as a
supply shock (for example an unequal ‘water distribution’, weak ‘state capacity’ etc.)
may have arisen at the time of partition that systematically disadvantaged or privileged
either side.29 Such factors would not show ‘crop specificities’. They would not be
innocent, as they are in this case, to the production of the latter while singularly retarding
the productivity of the former. The fact that we see a retardation in food productivity at
the same time as we see an expansion in cotton productivity reveals a deeper, political
and policy matter, rendering a purely “technical” explanation simply impossible.

29

This has been the narrative of nationalist historians on the Pakistani side who argue that
an ‘unfair division of assets’ and ‘water resources’ explains the downfall of the Pakistani side.
See Rabbani (1977)
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The trends in Figure 3.1 are complemented by Table 3.1, where we present a
simple pre and post-partition comparison of average yields per hectare obtained in east
and west Punjab for each crop, in each period. The table reports the average productivity
for the two regions as a whole in rows 1 and 2, respectively. The last two rows report the
average values for the six border districts that consist of the three pairs Amritsar-Lahore,
Firozepur-Kasur, and Gurdaspur-Sialkot. Lying on either side of the fence, these districts
replicate identical geographic/agro-climatic conditions. In columns (7), (8) and (9) I
report the ratio of average productivity in East Punjab to the corresponding value in West
Punjab. A value greater than one reflects an advantage for East Punjab.

Table 3.1: Pre and Post-Partition Comparison of Average Yield Per Hectare in East and West Punjab
East Punjab (Indian
Punjab)

West Punjab (Pakistani
Punjab)

Ratio of East Punjab to
West Punjab

Region
Wheat
(1)
751.04

Cotton
(2)
135.34

Rice
(3)
1085.9

Wheat
(4)
839.05

Cotton
(5)
121.2

Rice
(6)
1326.8

Wheat
(7)
0.89

Cotton
(8)
1.21

Rice
(9)
0.81

Average Yield/H of Crop
(1900-1947)
Average Yield/H of Crop
2513.2
330.62
2113.6
1524.1
304.9
1753.3
1.69
1.08
1.68
(1947-2015)
Average Yield/H Border
1042
144.41
1394
1050
141.17
1440
1
0.97
1.25
Districts (1900-1947)
Average Yield/H of Border
3892
268.19
2527
2003
276
1790
1.94
1.02
2.12
Districts (1947-2015)
Sources: Dataset on Production and Acreage of Crops 1900-2015 constructed by author from Government sources.
Note: Yields are in Kilograms Per Hectare.

The table confirms that the average productivity is about equal for cotton while it is
higher for food crops (wheat and rice) in West Punjab during the colonial period. The
differences in food productivity imply that districts in the west produced approximately
88 kg per hectare more wheat and 240 kg’s more rice than the ones in east Punjab during
the colonial period (on average).
Now compare the same ratios in the post-colonial period. As we can see, the
tables have radically turned: the Indian Punjab produced, on average, approximately 1.7
times more wheat and rice per hectare in this period. The differentials are not minor; they
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imply that a hectare of land in the Indian Punjab produced in an average year,
approximately 1000 more kilograms of wheat and rice in the post-colonial period than its
Pakistani twin. Assuming that an average adult consumes half a kilogram of wheat every
day, this means that a hectare of land in the Indian Punjab has managed to sustain two
thousand more individuals, or approximately five hundred more families every year, in
the post-colonial period.
We can also see that the average yields per hectares are about equal for the border
districts in terms of wheat and cotton production and slightly higher for rice in East
Punjab during the colonial period. In the post-colonial period, the border districts in
Indian Punjab produce approximately twice the wheat and rice per hectare. This is a
remarkable transformation by any measure. Thus, restricting the analysis to ‘borderdistricts’ increases our measure of the magnitude of the divergence in agrarian
performance.
Finally, the same trends are confirmed if we look at the problem from the
perspective of periodic ‘growth’. The yield of wheat, rice and cotton increased by 206%,
95%, and 110%, respectively in Indian Punjab from 1947 to the present. In Pakistani
Punjab, the corresponding increase for wheat and cotton productivity is 82% and 108%,
respectively, while rice yields have just improved by 16% in seven decades. Comparing
border districts, we find that the average yield growth for wheat, rice, and cotton was
273%, 81.7%, and 86% in the border districts assigned to India while it was 138%, 17.4%
and 95% for the ones assigned to Pakistan, from the colonial to the post-colonial period,
respectively. Thus, growth comparisons also reveal, in relative terms, a food-bias in the
Indian Punjab and a cotton-bias in the Pakistani Punjab. While the Indian Punjab has an
absolute advantage in terms of all three commodities this advantage is more pronounced
for the food crops as compared to cotton.
Let us now zoom-in to each of the two periods, separately.
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3.3 Comparative Agrarian Performance in the Colonial Period
(1900-1947)
While the picture presented above gives an overall comparison of the broad trends, there
is nevertheless a lot of loss of information because we have simply averaged out the
entire colonial (47 years) and the post-colonial (67 years) period in the dataset. Yearly
and decade-wise variations, which capture crucial junctures, turning points, volatility, and
important decades are lost. Let us now look at these more carefully: a zooming-in to the
colonial (Figure 3.2) and post-colonial periods (Figure 3.3) individually and examining
the decade-wise moving averages (Table 3.2) will enable us to map out the specificities
and peculiarities of agrarian productivity in each period (colonial and post-colonial) more
concretely.
In Figure 3.2, panels (a) to (c) I plot the value of the “yield differential’ for each
crop from 1900-1947. For every year, the ‘yield differential’ is defined simply as the
difference between the yield per hectare for each crop in East and West Punjab. It
provides a convenient way of capturing what we are interested in: comparative agrarian
performance. The value of the yield-differential-trend for any given year t and
commodity i, is given by:
𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 = 𝑌𝑡𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡 , for crop i at time t.
The graphs have been defined so that whenever the trend takes a positive
(negative) value it suggests a comparative advantage for East (West) Punjab in that year.
Beneath each graph I report the mean and standard deviation to capture the volatility of
the trend. The dark line represents the line of equality/convergence since the differential
(by definition) equals zero here. Since the three graphs are not scale parallel this dark
line (as opposed to the axis) will be our reference point as the line of zero differential.
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Figure 3.2: Yearly Yield Differential (Kilograms Per Hectare) During Colonial Period
Note: Dark lines represents point of equality

a) Yearly Average Wheat Yield

b) Yearly Average Rice Yield

c) Yearly Average Cotton Yield

Mean=-18, ST DEV=13.6

Mean=-240, ST DEV=51.8

Mean=14, ST DEV=7.5

The trends reveal that during the colonial period the ‘comparative advantage’ seems to be
oscillating in both directions, despite an overall advantage for West Punjab. This can best
be seen by focusing on the ‘turning-points’ of the trend for each crop. The turning points
are important because they either show that comparative performances are converging
(towards the line of equality), or that an advantage has been turned in the favor of the
opposite side. Let us examine these for each crop:
First, consider the differential trend for the wheat crop (3.2-a). We notice that
while there is complete parity at the beginning (1900) and the end (1947) of the sample
there are many turning points in between. From a point of relative parity in 1900, the
west makes significant gains every year in the first two decades. By 1920, the west has
almost doubled its initial advantage over the east. This is then suddenly reversed in 1920
after which---albeit oscillations from 1920-1923--- first convergence is established and
then the eastern half begins to outperform the west till 1929. Here, the trend reaches its
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maxima, where there is a sudden ‘crash’, recovery, and a cyclical oscillation that
eventually fizzles out by the time of partition (1947) when parity is restored, again.
Similarly, for a large number of years during the colonial period, the west
consistently outperformed the east in terms of rice productivity (Figure 3.2-b), despite
some temporary movements towards convergence in some years. As with the wheat crop,
these advantages were accumulated by the western part during the first two decades of
the century, from 1900-1920.
Finally, focus on the differential in cotton yields. As we can see, the mean
differential (+14) in this case is lower than the other two crops (reflecting, on average
more ‘equality’ between the two regions for this crop) as is the standard deviation
(reflecting a lower ‘volatility’ in this trend). Yet, there are periods of divergence that
merit particular attention. Here too, the two decades from 1900 to 1920 are important as
the west improves its position substantially. As with the food crops, from 1920 till about
1933, the East regains, but loses over the subsequent decade to produce parity by 1947.
To summarize the main findings for the colonial period: 1) The period is one of
multiple turning points, but on the whole advantageous to West Punjab in terms of food
(wheat and rice) productivity; 2) The two decades from 1900-1920 are especially
important, where we see accumulating relative advantages for West Punjab in terms of all
three crops; 3) From 1937-1947, East Punjab manages to significantly reduce the
differential in terms of wheat, and also improves its position in terms of cotton.
The question is: what was going on in the first two decades of the century that
could possibly explain the movements in favor of the west? Why did the advantage begin
to fizzle out after 1920? These issues will be taken up in Chapter Four, where we connect
the story to the peculiar patterns of ‘infrastructural development’ and its impact on
internal and external market articulation in each region, before and after 1921. It will be
shown that the advantage was accrued due to the greater articulation of the western
districts with the export market. In the years leading up to, and during World War I,
commodity prices were rising continuously (as shown by figures 3.3 and 3.4) and the
western half stood better chances of reaping the gains from rising global prices.
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Figure 3.3: Wholesale Wheat Prices in Liverpool ($/bushel)

Source: u-shistory.com
Original dataset: Price Survey Reports

As we can see, the years leading up to 1920 mark a steady increase in wheat and cotton
prices; these reach a global maxima at $2.45 per bushel for wheat in 1920, at which point
they crash, fizzle out, and steadily decline to 1900 levels by 1947 (the year of India’s
independence). Similarly, as figure 3.4 (below) shows, the trend for cotton prices reaches
its maximum value in the same year and follows a similar decline after the crash in 1920.
As we can see, the movements in global prices seem to mirror the ‘yield-differential’
trend in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.4: Cotton Prices in Liverpool
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This can also be confirmed by running a simple bivariate regression of the ‘yield
differential’ on ‘Liverpool prices’. In Appendix Two, we find a statistically significant
‘negative’ relationship, which implies that a one cent increase in international prices led
to a 1.4% improvement in yields in favor of the western half for food, and 1.7% gain for
cotton yields, respectively. It seems therefore, that the ‘yield differential’ during the
colonial period seems to follow the trends in international commodity prices. A rise in
global prices moved the differential in the favor of the west, while a decline brings the
trend back towards convergence.
In subsequent chapters, the changes after 1920 will be explained by the set of
dislocations brought about in the Indian economy after the First World War. As Bose and
Jalal point out:
“The political economy of late colonialism was different in many
respects from the ‘classical patterns’ established during its high noon. After the
end of the First War the colonial state in New Delhi found it increasingly
difficult to service the needs of the metropolis while holding on to vital attributes
of Britain’s political and economic dominance in India. Already, the dislocations
of the war had provided effective, though not formal, protection to India’s cotton
textile industry, an opportunity this industry was quick to seize to the relative
detriment of Lancashire. Import-substitution gathered momentum in India,
displacing many of the traditional privileges enjoyed by British manufactured
products. Lancashire decisively lost out to Bombay and Ahmedabad, whose
cotton production outstripped British imports. In 1929 nearly twelve hundred
million yards of British cloth had been imported into India; ten years later less
than a hundred and fifty million yards of cloth came in.” (Bose and Jalal, 2004;
p. 131).

3.4 Comparative Agrarian Performance in the Post-Colonial Period
Let us now use the same empirical instrument---‘yield differential’--- to compare agrarian
performance in the two Punjabs in the post-colonial period. A crop-wise analysis,
complemented by a mapping of particularly crucial decades will help elucidate this. In
Fig. 3.5 we plot the yearly differential trend from 1947 to 2015. As before, the dark line
represents the point of equality.
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Figure 3.5: Yearly Yield Differential Between Indian and Pakistan Punjab (Kilograms Per Hectare)

a) Yearly Average Wheat Yield
Mean=505, ST DEV=61.4

b) Yearly Average Rice Yield
Mean=143, ST DEV=66

c) Yearly Average Cotton Yield
Mean=7, ST DEV=7

Notice first, an important difference between the ‘yield differential’ trends during
the colonial and post-colonial periods: comparing figure 3.2 and figure 3.3 one can see
that while the former period exhibits multiple ups and downs and movements towards
parity, the latter period shows a clear unidirectional divergence towards the Indian
Punjab. Table 3.2 captures the decade-wise evolution of the divergence.
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Table 3.2: Decade-Wise Evolution of Yield Differential
Decade

Wheat Differential

Rice Differential

Cotton Differential

1900-1907*

-8.76

-75.31

-7.31

1907-1917

-14.18

-88.2

-20

1917-1927

-21

-333.5

+1.29

1927-1937

-7.95

-333.12

+23.58

1937-1947

-22

-306

-15.12

Average
Differential

-18

-240.95

+14.18

1947 PARTITION OF PUNJAB
1947-1957

+178

+304.46

+13.69

1957-1967

+279.9

+357.88

+9.16

1967-1977

+661.812

+143.02

+44.5

1977-1987

+1024.89

+1245.13

-24.2

1987-1997

+1347.36

+1435.4

-167

1997-2007

+1383.013

+1208.17

-45.29

2007-2015

+1626.6

+1099.4

+10.33

Note: Each value in the table represents the average yield/ha in East Punjab (India) minus the yield/ha
for West Punjab (Pakistan) for each decade. A plus sign represents an advantage for Indian Punjab in
that decade.

The difference in post-colonial wheat and rice productivity begins to emerge within a few
years of independence. The major driving force in this is that the productivity of food
crops fell for many years in the Pakistani Punjab after independence while rising
simultaneously in the Indian Punjab. For example, in the first decade between 1947 and
1957, wheat productivity fell by 30% in the Pakistani Punjab while rising by
approximately the same proportion on the Indian side. In fact, wheat productivity in the
Pakistani Punjab only achieved its 1947 levels two decades later in 1967. During the
same two decades, wheat productivity in the Indian Punjab grew by 134% over its value
at partition. Even before the Green Revolution of the 1960’s decade began--- wheat
productivity was already 43% higher in the Indian Punjab as compared to Pakistani
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Punjab, in 1960. Thus, the first wave of divergence begins in 1947 and ends before the
Green Revolution, which was kick-started in 1967.
A second wave of divergence begins during the Green Revolution, which took
place on both sides. This is much more intense than the divergence in the first two
decades. In 1967, the yield/ha for wheat in the Pakistani and Indian Punjab was 1157
kg/ha and 1250 kg/ha, respectively, giving us a differential of 93 kg/ha. The very next
year the two produced 1260 kg/ha and 1492 kg/ha, respectively, increasing the
differential by 150% to 232 kg/ha. In the subsequent year the differential increases by
195% to 686 kg/ha and continuously expands throughout the subsequent decades. While
the Green Revolution is hailed as a period of intensive yield improvements on both sides,
it is clear that it was much more successful in the Indian state as compared to Pakistan.
In contrast, the trend for cotton productivity points to a different story. The lower
mean difference (+7) and standard deviation clearly suggests a lower overall differential
in yields per unit land for the cash crop. Curiously, the post-colonial difference in yields
of cotton are lower than they were during the colonial period (+14). Thus, unlike the food
crops, the differential for cotton oscillates very close to the point of perfect equality,
confirming the fact that cotton productivity was maintaining parity across the two
regions.
The parity, however, displays some interesting ups and downs after 1967. For
slightly more than three decades after this year, the Pakistani Punjab steadily gains in
comparative performance over the Indian Punjab in terms cotton productivity. In the last
decade (2005 till about 2015), there has been a movement back towards convergence in
cotton production, owing primarily to the introduction of the genetically engineered Bt
cotton variety in the region (Sabir, 2011).
To summarize the main insights derived from an analysis of the post-colonial
period: 1) The first wave of divergence in food productivity begins soon after
independence and lasts till 1967, 2) The second wave---a period of intensive divergence--in food production begins in 1967 and lasts till the present 3) Cotton productivities,
while equal on the whole, favor West Punjab during the same period (i.e. after 1967).
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3.5 Implications for the Puzzle
The chapter conducted a comparative examination of agricultural productivities for the
three major crops. It furnished a number of clues to understanding the problem of
comparative agrarian development in the two Punjabs. Five important questions emanate
from the foregoing analysis. Firstly, why was there a reversal of fortunes in food
production? Second, why do rising international prices favor the west during the colonial
period? Third, what accounts for the unidirectional movement in favor of Indian Punjab
after independence? Fourth, why did the divergence begin so soon, within the first decade
of partition? Finally, why is cotton production unhindered by the overall divergence in
agrarian performance?
The next section begins to develop an explanation for the trends identified here.
As we will see, these have to do with two ‘two critical junctures’ in the historical
development of the Punjab economy: 1860, the American Civil War, and 1947, the
independence and formation of two new states. The trends during the colonial period are
explained by the patterns of infrastructural development---canal-irrigation and railwayport connections---that took place in each sub-region after the Civil War. Agrarian
commodity production emanating from the west became relatively more articulated with
(and hence dependent on) demand in the metropolis, and hence global prices. This will
also explain the ‘peculiarity of cotton’, which played an integral role in the British
Empire (Chapter Four).
The second juncture (the post-colonial period), which is examined in Section III
(Chapter Six and Seven) will focus on the political and economic underpinnings of postcolonial agrarian policy, in each Punjab. This will reveal why it was in the interest of
both the landlords and the military to maintain and promote cotton production in Pakistan
(as the major source of ‘export-revenues’ which were used to finance the military
arsenal) as in the colonial period. In contrast, on the Indian side, the demands made on
Punjab by the center included most notably a promotion of ‘food’ production. This was
triggered via a series of reforms pertaining to ‘land-ceilings’, ‘security of tenure’, and
‘consolidation of holdings’ on the Indian side, which led to the greater productivity of
food crops on the Indian side.
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SECTION II
INFRASTRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND
INSTITUTIONAL FORMATIONS IN COLONIAL PUNJAB

CHAPTER 4
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INFRASTRUCTURAL
DEVELOPMENT IN COLONIAL PUNJAB
4.1 Introduction
In the last chapter we compared trends in agricultural productivity from 1900 to 2015 in
the two sub-regions that would later become Indian and Pakistani Punjab. We noticed a
number of peculiarities in these trends, for each period. The colonial period was on the
whole advantageous to the western part of Punjab and these advantages seem to have
been accrued in the years of rising global commodity prices (1900-1920), suggesting a
greater export-sensitive demand in the west as compared to the east. We also saw that
these initial advantages fizzled out after independence, leading to economic divergence
between the two sides, over time. What set of factors account for the patterns in the two
periods?
This chapter begins to build a political economic explanation for these trends by
examining the historical roots, economic objectives, and patterns of infrastructural
development in colonial Punjab from the start of the American Civil War in 1861, till the
end of World War I, in 1919. A historical analysis of infrastructural development is
linked to the overall story for three reasons: First, it reveals how agrarian production in
the two sides became articulated with different destination markets, over time. The
distinction between two kinds of commodity-production regimes---for the internal versus
the export market--- is important as it leads to the emergence of different kinds of native
political and economic interests, during and after the colonial period. Second, the
historical account will also be useful as it explains the differential infrastructural
development between the two sides, which can then explain the differential productivity
between west and east Punjab discussed in the previous chapter, with the former having a
higher level than the latter through most of the colonial period. Third, as we will see in
the next chapter, the political economy of infrastructural development also explains the
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development of institutional forms in agrarian Punjab. This will then motivate the study,
in Section III, to explain how the initial advantage of the west was lost after
independence, as it came at the cost of an extractive and unequal political and economic
‘institutional structure’ that would inhibit the post-colonial development prospects of the
western half, after partition.
Keeping these objectives in mind the chapter does three things: In 4.2, it traces the
historical roots of infrastructural development in colonial Punjab in the light of new
economic history frameworks, presented by Beckert (2014), Austin (1997a, 2000, 2010),
and Cypher (1998). The former examines the early history of capitalism from the
perspective of its central commodity, cotton, and the set of changes brought about in its
supply chain in the aftermath of a global economic shock—the American Civil War. The
latter set of studies examine the broader theoretical aspects of colonial infrastructural
development by comparing various peripheral economies, particularly in Africa. These
frameworks distinguish between ‘infrastructural development’ in “settler-colonies”
versus “peasant-economies”, to show how issues pertaining to the ‘politics’, and
‘financing’ of infrastructural projects varied in each case, and the differential impact that
it had, in turn, on market formations in the colonies.30
Next, given these historical frameworks, we then explain the economic and
political logic of infrastructural development in Punjab, and its variation across the two
halves, in Section 4.3. We see how---as in the African case--- the issues of financing were
resolved through “native-taxation” (an expansion in land revenue), how railways were
preferentially treated at the expense of roads, and how the patterns of railway and canal
development were all geared towards connecting the economy ‘externally’ via ports. We

30

These frameworks therefore provide an alternative explanation to AJR (2002) for why
the “settler” versus “non-settler” distinction may have an impact on comparative development, by
pointing towards a different channel: the differences in the kinds of “infrastructural development”
that was pursued in the two kinds of colonies.
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use colonial archival data and maps to capture the sub-regional variation from one part to
another in terms of railway and canal development.
Finally, in Section 4.4, we explore the impact of the patterns of infrastructural
development on the articulation of agrarian commodity production in the two sub-regions
with internal and external markets, over time. Using archival data on the Internal Trade
of Punjab by River and Rail, we capture the evolution of agrarian commodity-flows in
Punjab. The analysis reveals that the eastern and western sub-regions of Punjab, over
time, became connected with different markets. The western half saw the rise of exportcentric production, while the eastern part gradually became articulated with the home
market, with the embryonic forms of domestic manufacturing in other parts of India. The
impact of the process on institutional formations is explored in the next chapter.

4.2 Historical Background: Global Transformation and the Role of
Punjab
4.2.1 An Empire in Crisis
In a recently published historical account of the rise of global capitalism in the late 19th
century, Beckert (2014) presents a new historical framework to understand the changes in
the European capitalist ‘empire’ before and after the American Civil War of 1861. He
argues that the ‘modern world’ was born out of the set of contradictions that emerged in
the immediate aftermath of the Civil War, as the advanced capitalist economies of Europe
reimagined and reshaped the role of their ‘colonies and possessions’ in the capitalist
empire, while adjusting to the new global political and economic situation.
Beckert’s framework is simple. He argues that the empire and the results of its
interventions can best be understood by focusing on its central commodity, cotton, and
the political economy of its production, appropriation, and transport. This claim follows
from the fact that the empire was literally, in his words, an “empire of cotton”. For nine
hundred years (from 1000 to 1900 AD) cotton manufacturing was the primary capitalist
industry in the world. “20 million people worldwide---one out of every sixty-five people
alive---were involved in the cultivation of cotton or the production of cotton cloth”.
(Beckert, 2014; p. 243) Thus, any changes in the networks of cotton production,
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appropriation, distribution, and consumption, would produce a domino effect everywhere,
leading to massive changes in the global economic order.
The focus on cotton and its “very concrete and often brute development casts
doubt on several explanations (about early capitalist development) that all or many
observers tend to take for granted” (Ibid). These have implications for some of the usual
ideas presented by scholars in the ‘divergence debates’ as well. In traditional narratives,
“Europe’s explosive economic development can be explained by European’s more
rational religious beliefs, their Enlightenment traditions, the climate in which they live,
the continent’s geography, or benign institutions such as the Bank of England or the rule
of law.” (ibid, 25) For example, Acemoglu et al (2002) argue that the secret to the
success of “settler colonies” versus “extractive colonies” lies in the development of
‘European styled property-rights’ in the former; the fact that European styled property
regimes were everywhere, in settler as well as non-settler colonies, installed via bodily
coercion and violence is completely invisible in the analysis.
In contrast to these usual narratives that extol capitalism’s commitment to ‘free
labor’, ‘contracts’, ‘markets’, and ‘well defined property rights’--- Beckert’s historical
study makes institutions pertaining to ‘bodily coercion’, ‘plunder’, and the project of
‘reshaping geographies and societies’ to meet the needs of capitalists in the metropolis,
central to the analysis. He focuses on the role played in colonial state formation by the
metropolitan textile manufacturers (Ibid, pg. 243-245).
While most Institutionalists today (encountered in Chapter Two) privilege
capitalism’s commitment to property-rights, they display a strange amnesia for the
“earlier moment” that “was characterized by massive expropriations” of property and
people across the globe (Ibid, 223). Similarly, the assumption that capitalism rests upon
the rule of law and private enterprise, breaks down when one appreciates the historical
role that was played by colonial “state power to create world-spanning empires”. A focus
on the political economy of cotton---and the violence associated with its procurement--makes these issues central to the discussion: “This fluffy white fiber”, writes Beckert,
“does not make history, but if we listen carefully, it will tell us of people all over the
world who spent their lives with cotton”. (Beckert, 2014: pg. xii)
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The ‘empire of cotton’ was, from day one, cursed by the following dilemma: the
fiber is nowhere to be found or grown on the European continent. Consequently, from its
very inception, British textile industry relied heavily for its supply of raw cotton on other
places. This however was difficult to achieve ‘voluntarily’ for two reasons. Firstly, the
difficulty of the concrete labor of picking cotton made it extremely difficult to make
people do the work ‘voluntarily’. The first solution to this problem was found in slavery.
Throughout much of the pre-War period, for nearly a century, the production and trade of
the key input of raw cotton was secured through slave-trade and plantations from the
American South.
Second, while cotton was traditionally grown in various parts of the world
(including India) for thousands of years, most or all of this production was done for
personal consumption. The networks of transportation that were necessary for commodity
production simply did not exist. While the British had contemplated the use of Punjab as
a feeder of raw-materials as early as the 1850’s, no serious attempts were made. Colonial
administrators deemed the “the costs of execution in infrastructural development” to be
too high, and unreasonable, given the availability of cheaper alternatives via the slaveplantations of the American South. (Logan, 1958: p. 23)
But as early as the 1850’s, cotton interests in Liverpool had been lobbying with
the British state to find “alternatives in the case of a war in the Confederacy” (Liverpool
Mercury Journal, 1853). The British finance minister, Samuel Laing, candidly explained
that “the question of the abolition of slavery over the world, depends probably on the
question whether cotton produced by free labor in India can undersell the cotton produced
by slavery in America” (“The Cotton Question”, Merchants’ Magazine and Commercial
Review; 45; October, 1861)
One representative of the colonial state had to assuage the representatives of the
Manchester Cotton Supply Association by reminding them that “foreign places were
governed by their own political states, which would either be unwilling to voluntarily
concede to our demands”, or would at the very least “demand their own share in the
economic pie”. It would be necessary ‘eventually’, but “inexpedient at this stage” to
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challenge the political sovereignty of these states in order to gain access to the ‘white
gold’ (Cotton Supply Reporter, June 15, 1861)
Thus, the colonial state understood that the only way that peripheral lands could
be made to supply ‘commodified’ cotton was to first negate their political sovereignty,
and then to “reshape” their geographies and societies so they could produce, and
effectively supply raw material to capitalist industry in Europe. The former required
‘war’ while the latter required ‘infrastructural transformation’. Both things would require
active intervention and state expenditures from the Treasury.
Thus, the capitalist empire during the late 19th century was carved through, what
Beckert calls “war capitalism”. This kind of capitalism was forced to operate through one
of two ways and both methods required the “forceful domination” of either: 1) “Masters
over slaves”, or 2) “Frontier capitalists over indigenous inhabitants” (Beckert, 2014; p.
243).
Till the 1860’s the former method prevailed, as the empire was heavily reliant on
the Southern states of the United States. A year before the outbreak of the American Civil
War in 1860 cotton grown in the American South accounted for “77 percent of the 800
million pounds of cotton consumed in Britain”, “90 percent of the 192 million pounds
used in France, and “92 percent of the 102 million pounds manufactured in Russia”(Ibid,
24).
Put simply, at the start of the Civil War the American South was central to the
supply chain of the global cotton empire and as a result, the entire Atlantic world.
Merchants, capitalists, statesmen, everyone seemed to be connected in one or another
with the cotton business.31

Quite aptly, the poet John Greenleaf Whitter described cotton as the “Hashish of the
West” while comparing the hallucinogen ‘of the east’ with the cotton fiber:
31

Such scenes that Eastern plant awakes;
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4.2.2 Reshaping the Empire
The empire received a jolt on April 12, 1861 as the Confederate army launched an attack
on the Fort Summer garrison in South Carolina. The reverberations of this seemingly
localized event were felt all across the world. The Civil War “severed in one stroke the
relationships that had underpinned the worldwide web of cotton production and global
capitalism since the 1780’s” leading to an economic crisis that would prove midwife to
the “birth of the modern world” (Ibid; p. 246).
In the two years from 1860 to 1862, cotton exports had fallen from 3.8 million
bales to zero (Ibid, p. 247). The ensuing crisis, which has been described as the “first raw
materials crisis” in economic history (Isaacman and Roberts, 1995) had catastrophic
effects. As imports from the United States began to fall, textile mills in Britain began
shutting down. Within nine months of the start of the war, six percent of the
manufacturers in Lancashire had shut down their businesses while seventy percent of
them had reduced their working days (Ibid). In two years, i.e. by 1863, “a quarter of the
inhabitants of Lancashire---more than half a million individuals---were out of work”
(Ibid). The effects of the crisis were felt not just by British industry but industrial
interests all across Europe and in each case the European power in question devised a
somewhat similar response. As panic began to set in, textile manufacturing groups, in
cohort with mercantile interests started making frantic appeals to their respective
governments. “What are we to do”, asked the editors of the Liverpool Mercury, “if this
most precarious supply of cotton should fail us?”

But we have one ordained to beat it;
The Haschisch of the West, which makes
Or fool or knave of all who eat it.
The preacher eats, and straight appears
His Bible in a new translation;
Its angels negro overseers,
And Heaven itself a snug plantation!
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The answer was to be found in reshaping each empire. New supply chains had to
be designed, which required new global networks of labor, capital, and state power. “The
reconstruction of the empire of cotton”, at its core, “required the diligent effort of cotton
industrialists, merchants, landowners, and state bureaucrats to sanction legal---and often
illegal---coercion to make rural farmers into the cultivators and eventually consumers of
commodities” (Ibid, 279). Coercive institutional forms were necessary, as “agricultural
wages were too low and too insecure to entice rural cultivators to give up subsistence
production” (Ibid). The colonial authorities ideologically thought of themselves as
“revolutionizing the countryside” (Calvert, 1928; Darling, 1907), “by spreading capitalist
social relations” including credit, private ownership in land, and contract law.
Earlier forms of global trade were premised on an exchange of goods produced in
distinctly non-capitalist ways. But the post-Civil War period saw the emergence of a new
paradigm: “Now the wealth and coercive might of globalizing entrepreneurs and imperial
statement was transforming the production regimes of people around the globe by
commodifying both their labor and their land” (Ibid, 280).
4.2.3 Punjab: A New Economic Frontier
The annexation of Punjab, which started in 1806, was completed in 1849 with the defeat
of the Sikh Confederation. Throughout most of the earlier period, Punjab had been
important to the British state primarily for strategic reasons. Its geographic location
provided a buffer zone between the western frontiers, in particular against threats from
Tsarist Russia, and the rest of British India. It had never been a major source of landrevenue, raw-material, or labor till 1860. The American Civil War was about to change
this role permanently.
Predicting the upcoming ‘cotton panic’ in the years leading up to the War, a
number of surveys were sponsored by textile manufacturers in England to discover new
avenues for securing an input supply chain. Two areas, Egypt (around the Nile delta) and
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Punjab (the alluvial soils of its ‘central’ and ‘western’ belts) immediately emerged as
suitable, potential candidates for this purpose on the colonial map (Logan, 1958: 472).32
As Logan (1958) points out, “India was to become Britain’s substitute for cotton”.
Although the initial impetus to the development of the new colonial policy was driven by
cotton-interests, once the policy was emplaced, it led to the commoditization of other
agricultural goods as well, in particular wheat. Wheat could be sold in Liverpool without
ever looking at it, owing to its neat classification system, which allowed grades to be
given to every batch (Calvert 1928). By the end of 1872, in addition to the export of
cotton, wheat had also acquired a lot of importance for exporters, speculators, and
merchants. In fact, in some years the “export of wheat overtook the value received from
cotton production” and helped defray the costs incurred in the building of mega
infrastructural projects (Ibid). Thus, while the process of converting subsistence-based
agricultural production into export-oriented production was kick-started in the sphere of
cotton production, once institutionalized, it spilled over to other agrarian commodities as
well. We will return to ‘wheat’ when we examine internal and external trade flows and
market formations in Section 4.4.
The initial constraint, however, was that the preexisting economy was simply not
geared towards market-oriented production, let alone, export-oriented production. As a
result, a number of infrastructural transformations were necessary in order to make export
oriented commodity production feasible. The total supply of exportable-commodities had
to be increased which could be done in two ways: 1) Improving the transport mechanisms
for reaching the market, as many agricultural commodities are perishable; 2) Increasing
the cultivable area and ensuring that the increased area is devoted to exportable
commodities.
With these aims in mind the Viceroy declared, in a report addressed to the
government: ‘England is calling aloud for the cotton which India does already produce in
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some degree, and would produce sufficient in quality, and plentiful in quantity if only
there were provided fitting means of conveyance for it’. (GOI, 1863: 115) He continued
that “the main consideration which should determine the selection of the railway network
must be the extent of political and commercial advantages which it is calculated to
afford” (Ibid, emphasis added).
The notable historian, Talbot (1988) explains how the entire process of Punjab’s
infrastructural development was governed by the contradictory aims of economic
“transformation” on the one hand, and the maintenance of “political order” on the other.
He shows how this contradiction displayed itself firstly, in the ownership and transfer of
land, secondly, in agrarian development and social engineering, and thirdly, in the
introduction of ‘customary law’. The British government faced the stiff task of
reconciling the economic objective of maximizing the rents that could be extracted from
places where canals had been built on the one hand, and the political constraint of
‘security’ of rents. The latter was to be achieved by entrusting authority in areas with
infrastructural investments to the “traditional allies”: the agrarian elite. We return to these
contradictions to show how they are connected to the kinds of ‘institutional formations’
and ‘system of rights’ that emerged in colonial Punjab, in the next chapter.

4.3 Patterns of Infrastructural Development in Punjab
4.3.1 Colonial Infrastructural Development: General Theoretical Considerations
A number of scholars have pointed towards the export-centric nature of colonial
infrastructural development and its impact on ‘monoculture’ agricultural systems
throughout the peripheral world. In a series of articles, Austin (1996a, 1997, 2010)
conducts an authoritative examination of the imperatives of colonial infrastructural
development in various parts of Africa. He explores not only the financing of these
projects but also presents a framework to differentiate between success stories and
failures. The distinction between what Austin terms the “peasant economies” versus the
“settler colonies” (like South Africa) is central to his account, as he argues that these
were exposed to infrastructural development, in uniquely different ways.
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Hopkins (1973) and Cypher (2008) examine the question from a slightly different
angle. The former looks at the fiscal perspective and explores the differences between the
financing of projects in ‘settler’ versus ‘non-settler colonies’. The latter shows how “huge
outlays, often supported with forced labor, were necessary to build an infrastructure of
highways, irrigation, control systems, communication systems, and railways in the
colonies” (Cypher, 2008, p. 37). In the context of India, Bagchi (1975) and Debdas
Banerjee (1999)33 are authoritative accounts that examine the process of colonial
infrastructural development and its relationship with dependent trade.
Although there is deep heterogeneity across different regions and countries, some
general considerations can nonetheless be derived from this literature about the project of
infrastructural development in the colonies.
The project was constrained by three distinct set of factors: a) the financing of the
projects, i.e. the fiscal aspect, determines to a great deal the political, legal, and
institutional framework designed in the colony b) the efficient ‘marketing’ and ‘transport’
of the agricultural goods that are produced for the metropolis is key to the patterns of
infrastructural development; while these were different for every region and country, the
general principle seems to have been port connectivity; c) the forms of political control
that would achieve the objectives in the least cost way prevailed in the final analysis. The
manner in which these three concerns were addressed determine the impact of
infrastructural development on the political economy.
Let us briefly review how different scholars have treated the aforementioned
constraints on infrastructural development in other colonies before moving on to explain
the patterns in Punjab:
4.3.2 Colonial Infrastructural Policy in Africa
The classical case, and best-researched, is that of Africa. Like India, there is enormous
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heterogeneity of colonial experiences within Africa. The heterogeneity seems to stem not
only from the geographic differences of the areas, but also the specific alignment of
political and economic interests in the export of agrarian commodities in each case.
Austin (2010) shows that by the “eve of the European partition of the continent, Africa
had already revealed an emerging comparative advantage in export agriculture.” He
examines the case of Ghana, Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, and South Africa to show how
resources were mobilized by the colonial regime in each case to finance the
infrastructural projects and develop transportation networks to expand exports.
In each case the relative success of the process depended on a number of factors:
“In West Africa in particular”, Austin argues, the process was much more successful
since it was in the joint interests of the population, European merchants and the colonial
administrations to further it” (Ibid). In Ghana, Kenya, and South Africa a slightly
different model was implemented. In Ghana for example, “British planters were initially
allowed to enter to grow cocoa beans” to improve the export market. However, they
lacked the “discriminatory support” that their countrymen enjoyed in South Africa and
Kenya, and as a result “failed in commercial competition with African producers”
(Austin, 1996a).
In Ghana and Nigeria, colonial export policy was very successful where colonial
authorities relied on the efforts of “African small capitalists and peasants in the growing
and local marketing of export crops”. These efforts paid off with “more than 20-fold
increases in the real value of foreign trade between 1897 and 1960” from what would
later become Ghana and Nigeria (Austin 2008a, p. 612), “benefiting British commercial
interests as well as (via customs duties) the colonial treasury” (Ibid).
The primary interest of the colonial administration in the “peasant economies” (as
opposed to the “settler-colonies”) was to expand the “exploitation of these economies’
comparative advantage in export agriculture” (Austin, 2010; p. 33). In the settler-colonies
a part of the reason for engaging in infrastructural development was to “support the
protectorates and generating jobs for the local merchants and landlords”, i.e. the
European population. This was achieved through investments in infrastructure, in
particular, “transport” infrastructure (Austin, 2007).
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A second difference between “settler” and “peasant” economies was in the
financing of the projects. In the latter case, colonial infrastructural “development” was
intended to be cheap for taxpayers in Europe. The British state had promised its citizens
that each peasant colony “should be fiscally self-supporting” (Hopkins, 1973). Thus, “any
growth in government expenditure was supposed to be financed from higher revenues”
from within the colony. This was not just restricted to productive infrastructure, like
railways and canals. It was also true for public education and health; as an example,
consider “the case in Ghana in the 1920s when Governor Guggisberg was able to fund the
creation of what became the country’s best-known hospital and school, as well as a new
harbor and more railways and roads, from customs proceeds that had been fueled by the
colony’s increasing exports of cocoa beans.” (Austin, 2012. p. 53).
As Hopkins (1973) shows for the case of West Africa, the French were equally
concerned about “balanced budgets” with the colonies. “In French West Africa too there
was a major program of public works in the 1920s, although, as also in Ghana, within a
few years expenditure had to be curtailed when export prices fell and the growth of
revenue ended” (Hopkins 1973, p. 190). In each case, the investments on public goods
were contingent upon the finding of new avenues of “Native-financing”.
Another contribution, by Cypher (1999) looks at the “logic” of colonial
infrastructural development to explain its patterns. He explains that this “lacked a
developmental rationality for the colonies themselves” since the purpose of “colonial
infrastructure was to facilitate the movement of products to Europe” (Cypher, 1999; p.
89). The most prominent example of this is the privileged development of railways over
roads. Infrastructure was not laid down to “facilitate the internal trade in African
commodities. There were no roads connecting different colonies and different parts of the
same colony in a manner that made sense with regard to Africa’s needs and development.
All roads and railways led down to the sea”. (Ibid)
4.3.2 Colonial Infrastructural Development in Punjab
An analysis of colonial archival records confirms the “peasant-economy” aspects in the
context of Punjab. “Native-financing” of infrastructural projects was the rule. The
projects were financed through increased land-revenue taxation, which would require
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surplus labor extractions from the peasants. Like the African case, the patterns in Punjab
also reflect an export-oriented “colonial logic”, leading to the expansion of railways and
canals at the expense of roads.
In this case, however, the “peasant-economy” was intermediated by the rule of
those classified as “Natives” in ‘customary’ law34. This distinction, and intermediation
would have an impact on the politics of infrastructural development in the region. Indeed,
the British colonial administrator M.R Darling in his magnum opus “The Punjab Peasant
in Prosperity and Debt”, referring to Punjab as “our Prussia”, explained how a class of
“rich capitalist farmers, loyal to the Majesty”, would propel the infrastructural
transformation of the province (Darling, 1901; p. 175).
Table 4.1 gives information on the mileage of railways, canals, and roads, and
also reports the land-revenue collections from Punjab, every year from 1870 to 1922. We
see that in the five decades, railway mileage expanded exponentially, growing by
approximately 1000 percentage points. Similarly, canal infrastructure witnessed nearly a
10-fold increase in mileage during this period. In comparison, the increase in road
mileage was minimal, approximately 180% for the fifty years.
Table 4.1: Infrastructural Development in Punjab: 1872-1922
Year

Railway
Mileage

Canal
Mileage

Roads
Mileage
1036

Cultivated
Area
(Million acres)
18.8

Land
Revenue*
(Lakh Rs.)
201

1872

410

2744

1882

600

4583

1467

29.4

306

1892
1902

1725
2025

12368
16893

2142
2268

36.7
26.8

423
630

1912

4000

16935

2614

29

1060

1922

4441

19664

2938

30

1400

Source: Compiled from Calvin (1924) and Census of India Punjab Report (1931)
*1900 as base year to control for inflation.

34

We take this up in greater detail in the next chapter.
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As in the African case, the development of railways was privileged over roads
because the former improved the connections with the port from where commodities
were shipped to the metropolis, while the latter improved market connectivity with
nascent forms of domestic manufacturing, which were often seen as ‘competing’ with the
former. The colonial logic of infrastructural development produced the paradoxical result
in Punjab, as noted by the colonial administrator Calvert (1924), that in terms of transit
costs, “5000 miles by sea may be less of an impediment to trade than 300 miles within
the country” (Calvert: 1924). Export markets, at least for some producing zones in
Punjab, were cheaper to access than internal markets a few miles away.
In colonial narrative this was justified by making pleas to “farmer interests”. For
example, in a report that explores the causes of famine in a year where productions had
hit a ‘bumper crop’, one colonial servant candidly retorted: “Why does the farmer
produce? To make money. If it is more profitable to sell in Lancashire as compared to the
transport cost to Amritsar, why should he be obliged to bear the weight of the rest of
society?” (Calvert, 1924) The fact that ‘costs’ were functional to the patterns of
infrastructural development, which in turn followed the “colonial logic”, does not enter
the inquiry report.
Table 4.1 also captures the ‘fiscal’ aspect of the equation. The main fiscal
instrument for “Native-financing” in Punjab was land-revenue. Land revenue was a kind
of a tax on land that varied with agricultural yields (defined as ‘net assets’ after defraying
of costs according to the Land Revenue Report, 1931). In Chapter Five, we examine the
associated institutional mechanisms that were used to extract the revenue in greater detail.
It suffices to say over here that an expansion in land-revenue during the period from 1872
to 1922 was central to the financing of the infrastructural development of Punjab. As
table 4.1 shows, the land revenue extracted from the region increased seven-fold, in real
terms, during the fifty years. The cultivated area, during the same period, increased by
60%, reflecting a major increase in the land revenue collected per acre of cultivated area.
Estimates from Calvert (1924) reveal that while there were some projects (particularly in
the eastern belt) that were “unsuccessful” (in the sense that they did not generate enough
revenues through land revenues as well as customs) in general---as the colonial
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administrator triumphantly declared--- “the development of railways and canals has been
very lucrative for us”, with an “average rate of annual return hovering around 45%, even
after accounting for all the losses” (Calvert, 1924; p. 224)
4.3.3 Patterns of Railways in Punjab
Punjab is a completely landlocked region. Prior to British colonization, most of the
international trade of the Sikh Confederation was restricted to Afghanistan and Central
Asia, while the exports to the nearest trade ports, namely Karachi and Bombay, were
practically negligible. (Calvert 1924; p. 52) In order to expand the exports of the region,
the colonial state had to create a spatial network of railway lines to connect the province
with Karachi, the nearest trading-port in Sindh. Railway lines were laid by private
companies at a “guaranteed system” of profits; each company was ‘guaranteed’ a 30%
rate of return, ‘regardless’ of the outcome by the British state.35
Figure 4.1 Punjab Railway System

Source: Census of India, Punjab report 1921

35

This led, on some occasions, to contradictions between these companies and colonial
authorities; some of these debates have been documented by the imperialist historian Sir Moon
Penderel in “The British Dominion and Conquest of India” (republished in 1989)
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The first railway lines were opened in 1861 from Amritsar to Lahore and the ones
connecting Lahore to Multan (North-South) were established in 1865. Multan was
connected to Karachi via boats run by Indus Flotilla, a steamship company established in
1860 that was responsible for the navigation of vessels along the Indus River. The
company was to develop these navigation systems in close connection with the
development of the railways in Punjab. (Census of India, Punjab report, 1921)
The patterns of development of the railroad network (Fig 4.1) took place in the
form of three ‘Main Lines’, with each main line then being connected to a number of
branches and sub-branches.
During the first three decades of their development the spatial network was such
that it connected districts in the eastern half of the province with a main ‘dry port’ in
West Punjab, from where the railway lines go in a southward direction towards the port
in Karachi. To see this, consider the fact that the main line connecting ‘South to Lahore’
in the Western hemisphere was opened in 1870 the branches connecting Punjab with the
rest of India in an East-West direction did not become operational till 1911.
Thus, for a good five decades, the western half of the Punjab province was
primarily connected with the trade port in Karachi and the eastern half was also---albeit
much less so---connected with the same trading port. But as soon as the first lines
connecting the eastern Punjab with the rest of India were opened, the eastern half
increasingly became articulated with the domestic market. We will return to this, shortly.
Figure 4.1 shows the railway lines system of Punjab as it stood in 1921, that is, at
the end of the period of major infrastructural development. The main line enters Punjab
from Karachi (the nearest port) in the South. From here, the network expands in a fanshape to serve the Western hemisphere with a ‘triangle based on Cambellpur (now known
as Attock, Pakistan) and Ferozpur with its apex at Samasata’ in Bahawalpur (a princely
state at the time, now in Pakistan). (Punjab Census Report, 1921, p. 15) There are three
branches, with a number of sub-branches, that connect the apex with various districts in
the Western hemisphere in a North-South direction while there is just one that expands
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out from the apex towards the Eastern hemisphere that later became a part of Indian
Punjab. The distribution of railway lines, especially in the Western hemisphere, clearly
shows the North-South bias inherent in its development, and completely ‘lacks railway
communication in the transverse direction’. (Ibid)
The only West-East rail that connected the two hemispheres till 1911 ran from
Lahore to Delhi, and that too, had very few ‘branches’. Thus, the implication of the
railway system was that a supplier of agrarian commodities in the eastern hemisphere
who wanted to sell his products in the export market via Karachi port would have to first
transport his goods from his eastern district to Lahore in the western part via roads, and
from there onwards to Karachi port via rail. The bulk of the “external trade of Punjab
passed down the North Western main line to Karachi” (Ibid, 16).
As a result, “farmers in the old (i.e. eastern, explanation not in original) districts
faced, on average, higher costs of selling in the export market” (Calvin, 1928). The only
reason why they continued to sell for export was due to the “lack of alternatives in the
Indian market” (Ibid). This was to change radically after 1911, and the opening up of new
lines which connected eastern Punjab with the rest of the Indian market (i.e. east of
Punjab).
4.3.4 Development of Canal Infrastructure
Another major dimension of infrastructural development in Punjab was the setting up of a
mega canal-irrigation network. This was consolidated in the formerly uncultivated lands
in the central part of Punjab which are known, quite aptly, as the “canal colonies”. Unlike
the rest of the Punjab (to the east and west of the canal colonies), these districts were
actively engineered by the state in the dual sense that: a) labor was imported into these
canal colonies as tenants from all across India, often under the promise that land
ownership titles would be transferred to their descendants after 100 years; b) capitalists
and “landowners” had to be imported from East Punjab; these, the British colonial regime
believed would become the “class of efficient”, “Prussian-styled”, rich “capitalist
farmers” that would be “loyal to the British regime” (Calvert, 1924). Ali (1988) conducts
a detailed investigation into the historical development of the canal colonies in Punjab.
He argues that the process represents the “greatest feat of human engineering” in
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recorded agricultural history, where human agency traversed nature to permanently alter
and mold geography.
What is central to our concern, however, is not their engineering achievements but
rather the spatial distribution of these projects across the two Punjabs. This can be
captured through two ways. First, by looking at the district-wise distribution of canal
irrigation mileage and secondly, by asking which sub-regions saw the greatest expansion
in “cultivated area” as a result of improvements in canal-irrigation. An empirical
investigation via both methods confirms that state sponsored canal infrastructural
development was heavily consolidated in West Punjab; that is, districts from which later
Pakistani Punjab would be carved out in 1947 (table 4.2).
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Table 4.2: Percentage of Matured Crops Irrigated by Source and Location
% of Matured Crops that are Irrigated By
Canals
Wells
Total
97
1
98
Lyallpur
64
23
87
Montgomery
73
14
87
Multan
58
28
86
Jhang
56
22
78
Lahore
53
24
77
Muzaffargarh
55
21
76
Gujranwala
64
11
75
Shahpur
40
30
70
Amritsar
0
54
54
Jullundur
48
5
53
Sialkot
32
14
46
Ferozepur
32
11
43
D.G Khan
9
28
37
Ludhiana
22
14
36
Karnal
21
15
36
Gujrat
11
17
28
Gurdaspur
19
8
27
Rohtak
26
0
26
Kangra
6
11
17
Gurgaon
15
1
16
Hissar
5
7
12
Mianwali
2
9
11
Hoshiarpur
1
8
9
Attock
0
6
6
Ambala
0
5
5
Jhelum
0
2
2
Rawalpindi
Source: Constructed from Land Revenue Report, Punjab, 1928
District

District Location
West Punjab
West Punjab
West Punjab
West Punjab
West Punjab
West Punjab
West Punjab
West Punjab
East Punjab
East Punjab
West Punjab
East Punjab
West Punjab
East Punjab
East Punjab
West Punjab
East Punjab
East Punjab
East Punjab
East Punjab
East Punjab
West Punjab
East Punjab
West Punjab
East Punjab
West Punjab
West Punjab

In table 4.2, we record the distribution of canal irrigation infrastructure in Punjab
by looking at the percentage of ‘matured crops’ in different districts that are irrigated by
canals (which were built by the state) versus wells (which were built privately). The table
shows the district-wise distribution of irrigated versus non-irrigated crops in Punjab in
1920 by the source of irrigation. For ease of understanding the table has been sorted in
descending order by the total percentage of irrigated crops in a district. The table shows
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that of the ten most irrigated districts, eight were located in West Punjab and only two in
the eastern half.
The impact of this unevenness can also be assessed by separating the increase in
cultivated area by the two halves. In Figure 4.2, we plot the total percentage increase in
the cultivated area of Punjab into its sub-regional components from 1850 to 1920. As we
can see, from 1850 to 1880, the total increase in cultivated area was relatively evenly
distributed between the two regions. This pattern changed in the 1880’s with the ‘canal
colonization’ of western Punjab.
Figure 4.2: Percentage increase in cultivated area of Punjab by sub-region
1910-1920
1900-1910
1890-1900
West Punjab

1880-1890

East Punjab

1870-1880
1860-1870
1850-1860
0

20

40

60

80

Source: Constructed from Censuses of Punjab (1881, 1891, 1901 ,1911, 1921 and 1931)

As Figure 4.2 shows, a result of the uneven development of canal infrastructure across
the two halves was that in the decade between 1880 and 1890, over 60% of the increase
in the cultivated area was consolidated in the western half. Similarly, from 1890 to 1900,
over 70% of the increase was attributable to areas in the west and the same trend is
displayed in the next two decades.

108

4.4 Impact on Market Formations
So far in this chapter we have seen four things: 1) that there was a qualitative shift in the
nature of colonial objectives in Punjab after the American Civil War; the new objectives
of export-oriented raw material production led to the infrastructural development of the
region, 2) infrastructural development in Punjab was geared towards the maximization of
exports, particularly cotton and wheat; 3) that the railway lines system was constructed to
connect Punjab with the Karachi port in a North-South direction without transverse
movement till 1911 and 4) that the later, canal infrastructural development was also
heavily consolidated in the western half.
Now, we are interested in exploring the impact of the aforementioned patterns of
development on two qualitatively different kinds of commodity production regimes, 1)
internal, or home market-oriented production, and 2) external, or export-oriented
production, in each of the two halves of Punjab. The distinction between the two kinds of
commodity production regimes is important as it leads to the emergence of different
kinds of native political and economic interests.
To see this, imagine that the total product produced in an origin (a district, a farm,
i.e. any ‘site of production’), say x, can be sold in one of n destination markets and the
share of value realized in any destination i is given by 𝑥𝑖 . Then, we can define a
hierarchy, from the perspective of the origin x, by comparing each 𝑥𝑖 and its importance
for the producing origin by looking at the amount of value realized at each destination
market. The hierarchy is not static and changes in accordance with the development of
infrastructure. Due to these changes, a previously unimportant market may suddenly gain
in importance as costs of transporting commodities to that market change relative to other
destinations, leading to a change in the economic incentives of social groups associated
with the commodity trade (landlords, independent peasants, colonial administrators,
merchants).
To empirically capture this dynamic process, I use data from a relatively less
well-known colonial archive, known as the Internal Trade by River and Rail, which
divides Punjab (and other parts in India) into various “internal blocks”, as shown by the
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map below, and gives information on trade flows between them. The two agricultural
commodities that are covered are ‘cotton’ and ‘wheat’.
Figure 4.3: Internal Trading Blocks in Punjab

Source: Report on Internal Rail and River-borne Trade of the Punjab for 1912-13

Using these reports, one can divide the producing ‘origins’ into two blocks: east
and west Punjab, corresponding roughly to the split in 1947. The only exception to this
rule are the districts Amritsar and Hoshiarpur, which are included in the western block in
the dataset despite the fact that they were later assigned to India. There is, however, little
that can be done to mitigate this problem as ‘district-level’ trade data is not available.
We can examine the percentage of produce from each block that ends up in one of
eight ‘destination blocks’ or markets in the rest of India: 1) Bombay city (to be
distinguished from Bombay port), 2) Sindh and British Baluchistan, 3) United provinces
of Agra and Oudh, 4) Central Provinces and Berar, 5) Rajputana, 6) Bombay port, 7)
Karachi port, and 8) Calcutta port. The first five of these destination markets are the
‘Indian’ or ‘home’ market while the last three capture the production for the overseas
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market as practically all the commodities ending up at the ports left the country for the
metropolis.
Using this scheme I capture the evolution of 𝑥𝑖 ---the amount of crop produced in
each block that is sold in each of the aforementioned eight markets---over the course of
two decades, from 1900 to 1920. The evolution is recorded in Table 4.2 for cotton as well
as wheat. Each entry of the table can be read as representing the percentage of export
produced in an origin-block that is realized in one of the eight destination markets so that
the vertical sum of each column always adds up to 100. For example, 8% and 21% of the
wheat produced in East Punjab was realized in Rajputana in 1900 and 1921, respectively.
Using this table we can see how different sub-regional producing zones within the Punjab
became connected with different destination markets---home and overseas--- over time.
It is clear that the export market via Karachi port occupied primary importance as
a destination for cotton and wheat produced in both regions of Punjab in 1900, as well as
1912. In 1900, 66% of the cotton produced in East Punjab, and 85% of it produced in
West Punjab was exported via the Karachi port. 97% of the wheat of Western Punjab and
85% of the crops’ produce from Eastern Punjab, respectively, ended up at the port of
Karachi, and from there to the metropolis.
This corresponds with the fact mentioned previously, that the railway branches
connecting Punjab with the rest of India in the east had not become fully operational till
1911 and it was therefore much more costly to produce in Punjab and sell in the rest of
India, as opposed to selling in the metropolis. Thus, while some of the produce was still
sold in the internal market, this ‘home market’ (categories 1 through 5) jointly received
less than 2% of the cotton production emanating from both sub-regions till 1912.
Similarly, less than 15% of the wheat produced in East Punjab and barely 3% of the
wheat emanating from West Punjab ended up in the ‘internal or home market’ in 1900
and 1912.
In addition, the Bombay Port seems to have been an important destination for East
Punjab, as it accounted for about 30% of the cotton, and 11% of the wheat, even in 1900.
These patterns begin to change after 1912. We notice first, a gain in importance for the
internal market (categories 1-5) for both sub-regions between 1912 and 1921, although
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the increase is much more pronounced for wheat as it is for cotton. The amount of cotton
produced for the home market increased from less than 2% to about 13%, on average, for
both Punjabs. This is to be expected, as wheat is a staple crop of the Punjabi people,
while cotton was primarily grown for the export market. Thus, for both sides the internal
market gained in importance after the end of the First World War.
Second, the increase in importance of the internal market is much more
pronounced for the eastern districts (i.e. those that would later become a part of India) as
compared to the western districts; the amount of wheat produced in the east that was sold
in the ‘internal market’ rose from 12% in 1900 (and 1912) to 67% in 1921, a five-fold
increase. Similarly, the percentage increased from 3% to 30% for the districts in the
western half. The burgeoning textile mills in Bombay during and after the First World
War may explain the absorption of these commodities in the domestic market. By 1921,
Bombay city (not the port), was receiving 14% of the wheat produced in East Punjab and
5% of the commodity produced in the west. Thus, while the internal market gained in
importance for both blocks, the increase was much more pronounced in the case of the
eastern districts.
Third, for exports to the metropolis---the external market--- Bombay port replaced
Karachi port as the major destination for cotton producers operating in East Punjab. The
share of cotton produced in the east that was sold at the Bombay port expanded from 30%
in 1900 to 62% in 1921. In contrast, the Bombay port barely received 19% of the wheat
exported from western districts. Thus, not only were the two sub-regions articulated
differentially with the internal market, there were also differences in the port via which
they were becoming articulated with the export market as well.

112

Table 4.3: Origin and Destination Map of Wheat and Cotton Produced in Different Parts of Punjab 1900 and 1921
Destination

1) Bombay

Origin of Wheat
Production in 1900
East
West
Punjab
Punjab
2%
0%

Origin of Wheat
Production in 1921
East
West
Punjab
Punjab
14%
5%

Origin of Cotton
Production in 1900
East
West
Punjab
Punjab
0%
0%

Origin of Cotton
Production in 1921
East
West
Punjab
Punjab
4%
6%

2) Sindh and British

2%

2%

3%

4%

0%

1%

0%

1%

0%

0%

11%

14%

2%

0%

10%

5%

4) Central Provinces and Berar

0%

0%

18%

3%

0%

0%

0%

2%

5) Rajputana

8%

1%

21%

4%

0%

0%

2%

0%

Internal Market (Total)

12%

3%

67%

30%

2%

1%

16%

14%

6) Bombay Port

3%

0%

11%

5%

30%

13%

62%

19%

7) Karachi Port

85%

97%

18%

55%

66%

85%

25%

63%

8) Calcutta Port

0%

0%

3%

10%

2%

0%

1%

3%

External Market (Total)

88%

97%

32%

70%

98%

98%

84%

86%

Total Quantity

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

Baluchistan
3) United Provinces of Agra
and Oudh

Source: Compiled from Reports on the Internal Trade of Punjab by Rail and River for the years 1900 and 1921
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The change in the commodity-flows can be explained by the introduction of the North-WestEast Rail connections from Punjab in 1911, as new ‘domestic’ markets became feasible
destinations. Ultimately, the two sub-regions became articulated with different markets: East
Punjab increasingly began to supply the home market while shifting its choice of port of
export from Karachi to Bombay. While the western part also supplied a portion to the home
market after 1911, the internal market never accounted for more than a third of its total
produce.

4.5 Conclusion
The historical analysis presented in the chapter has two major implications for the
trends in agricultural productivity that were discussed in Chapter Three. Firstly, as a result of
the peculiar patterns of infrastructural development, the western side developed an agrarian
economy that was more sensitive to global commodity prices. This explains why the rising
prices of agrarian commodities during and leading up to World War I significantly benefitted
districts in the western half in terms of improvements in yields per hectare as compared to
districts in the east. Second, the west benefitted directly from the greater level of
infrastructural development---and hence superior access to water and markets--- during the
colonial period, which also led to an advantage in yields per hectares for all crops till 1919.
These advantages were gradually depleted as new infrastructural arrangements, combined
with broader dislocations in the colonial economy of India post-World War I, led to the
emergence of an unwanted “import-substitution” to the “relative detriment of Lancashire” as
forms of domestic textile manufacturing began to overtake British imports (Bose and Jalal,
2004; p. 131).
A third implication of infrastructural development will be explored in the next chapter,
where we turn our attention to the deeper impact that the process had on “institutional
structures” in the village economies. The impact of these institutional structures on
agricultural yields, during and after the colonial period via “institutional persistence”, will
then be examined in Chapter Six. As we will see, the variation in infrastructural development
explains the variation in economic and political structures, which in turn can explain to a large
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extent the variation in agricultural outcomes between districts during and after the colonial
period.
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CHAPTER 5
INFRASTRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND
INSTITUTIONAL FORMATIONS IN AGRARIAN PUNJAB
5.1 Introduction
In the last chapter we presented a historical account of the patterns of infrastructural
development in colonial Punjab. We connected the process, and the ensuing state investments
it would require, with the new imperatives of the British capitalist empire in the aftermath of
the American Civil War. The goal in that chapter was to examine this process from a broader,
historical perspective. We abstracted from the ‘microeconomic’ dimension of the process, i.e.
the kinds of ‘institutional’ structures that would be required at the level of village-economies
to achieve these broader aims.
In this chapter we explore the process of institutional formations in the colonial
economy in greater detail. While agreeing with the AJR (2002) understanding of colonial
institutions as extractive institutions, we build a framework that focusses on the set of
institutions emerging from the process of extraction, rather than presenting it as an abstract
noun: the ‘extractive state. This allows for the diversity of colonial experience to be brought
to the fore. Following the work of Sen (1981), we develop such an understanding of the
institutional process as being derived from an ‘entitlement system’, which delineates a
‘system of rights’; for colonized economies, this was based on what Mamdani (2012) has
called a discursive distinction between “Natives” and “Settlers” via a policy of ‘indirect-rule’.
We extend this argument to show how in agrarian Punjab, the “entitlement system” shaped the
internal distribution of political and economic power--- between agrarian producers and
surplus-appropriators--- that would be consistent with the macro objectives and constraints of
the colonial state in infrastructural development.
The chapter argues that the colonial ‘entitlement system’ gave birth to institutional
structures that were designed to facilitate the security of state investments and the rents that
would be derived from infrastructural projects, while serving the dual objective of: a) Native116

financing of the projects, and b) Generating raw materials and export surpluses for the
colonial state. By examining archival debates between colonial administrators, we develop an
understanding of how the ‘native’ versus ‘non-native’ distinction informed the institutional
process. Next, using Land Revenue Administration Reports, and District Settlement Reports,
we construct quantitative measures of political and economic institutions at the level of
districts, and show that state investments in a district led to the creation of extractive political
and economic institutions, leading in turn, to a more unequal distribution of economic gains in
these places.
As a measure of ‘economic’ institutions in the village economy, following Banerjee
and Iyyer (2005), I look at variations in land revenue institutions between districts. Land
revenue---being a tax on ‘land’---had to be appropriated by someone on behalf of the colonial
state, and an institutional apparatus had to be put in place in order to achieve that aim. In
Punjab, this took place via a village-body system (Mahalwari). I derive empirical estimates of
the three major ways in which village-bodies were constituted---zamindari, bhaichara, and
pattidari--- in each district of Punjab at the time of its ‘settlement’.
As a measure of ‘political’ institutions, we focus on the balance of power between the
‘direct producers’---i.e. the cultivating tenants--- and those ‘entitled’ to control these villagebodies. The former’s bargaining-power depended on the ‘system of rights’, which
distinguished between “occupant” and “non-occupant” tenants, which in turn corresponded
with the ‘native’ versus ‘non-native’ dichotomy. Using Land Revenue Administration Reports,
I derive empirical estimates of the degree of ‘non-occupant’ tenancy in a given district. Using
these estimates, we show that districts with greater infrastructural development were more
likely to rely on ‘non-occupant tenancy’, reflecting on average, a lower bargaining power for
the tenants in these areas.
Finally, as our measure of ‘economic distribution’, I use a method deployed by Piketty
(2014) to calculate economic inequality via tax records. Since land-revenue, as a tax on land
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was only imposed on landowners, and after 1929 was fixed at one-fourth of net profits36, one
can work backwards from these revenue records---classified by “class of landowner”--- to
develop measures of economic inequality, in each district of Punjab.
We explore the empirical relationship between infrastructural development and our
measures of institutions and income distribution using cross-sectional OLS regressions The
results indicate that a district with a one percentage higher level of canal-irrigation would
produce: a) A 1.2 percentage higher level of non-occupant tenancy (and hence lower
bargaining power of direct producers) than another district, b) A 15 percentage greater
‘zamindari proportion’, and as a result, c) 23 percentage points greater economic control in
the hands of the large landowners. Put simply, the results confirm that districts with greater
infrastructural development also inherited a more unequal economic, political, and social
fabric, with greater control consolidated in the hands of the “allied” landlords.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 presents an account of the colonial
system of ‘rights’ in the Punjab agrarian economy. Using an understanding of this system,
Section 5.3 examines the land revenue system of Punjab and captures its institutional variation
across districts in the two sub-regions. In 5.4, we run OLS regressions to test the hypothesized
empirical relationships between variations in infrastructural development and political and
economic institutions.

5.2 Entitlement Systems in Colonial Punjab
5.2.1 The Colonial Entitlement System
Every state creates a system of ‘rights’ in order to secure and reproduce peculiar forms of
control and ownership over the conditions of, and distribution of gains from, production. In
each case, the system of ‘rights’ and ‘ownership’ is a product of concrete historical
circumstances (Marx, 1968; Sen, 1981; Guha, 1966). In a pioneering study, Sen (1981)

The word used in colonial records is ‘net assets’ which is a misleading term. I explain this in
greater detail below.
36
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describes the ‘system of rights’ as an ‘entitlement system’ that defines the “set of alternative
commodity bundles that a person can command in a society using the totality of rights and
opportunities that he or she faces” (Sen, 1981; p.487) In every agrarian economy, this system
provides an answer to four important questions: ‘who produces the output?’, ‘who owns the
produce?’, ‘who occupies the land?’, and ‘who controls it (i.e. the land)?’. The entitlement
system not only provides an answer to these questions, it also legitimizes them.
This impacts economic outcomes, directly. Take any outcome, say poverty and
starvation, as Sen (1981). The question why there is poverty or starvation cannot be answered
in isolation from the entitlement system that gives birth to it. “Starvation”, Sen argues, “is the
characteristic of some people not having enough food to eat.” ‘It is not’, he continues, “the
result of there being not enough food to eat. While the latter can be a cause of the former, it is
but one of many possible causes.” (Sen 1981, p. 217, emphasis in original). To truly
appreciate the problem of poverty then, he continues, “it is necessary to understand the
‘entitlement systems’ within which the problem makes an appearance” (ibid).
He distinguishes between ‘supply statements’ that “say things about a commodity (or
a group of commodities) considered on its own” and “statements of entitlement”, that describe
“entitlement relations”, such as those that emerge out of “exchange”, “production”, “own
labor”, and “inheritance”. (Sen, 1981 p. 217). When applied to entitlement systems pertaining
to ‘ownership’ this simply refers to “a recursive relation and the process of connecting can be
repeated”. To quote Sen’s example:
“I own this loaf of bread. Why is this ownership accepted? Because I got it by
exchange through paying some money I owned. Why is my ownership of that
money accepted? Because I got it by selling a bamboo umbrella owned by me.
Why is my ownership of the bamboo umbrella accepted? Because I made it with
my own labor using some bamboo from my land. Why is my ownership of the
land accepted? Because I inherited it from my father. Why is his ownership of
that land accepted? And so on. Each link in this chain of entitlement relations
'legitimizes' one set of ownership by reference to another” (Sen 1981, ibid)

Thus, every ‘right’ within an entitlement system is legitimized, relative to another
right and once the sequence is emplaced, the system of rights furnishes an economic structure
corresponding to it. The question then, is to historically determine how an ‘entitlement
system’ comes to be established in an economy in the first place.
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For most countries the entitlement system has its roots in the colonial experience and
the answer, therefore, depends on the nature of this experience. Marx (1974) presents a
framework in the Grundrisse to understand this. He argues that the forceful conquest of a
people by a conquering society can lead to a number of different scenarios. It is possible, for
example, that “a conquering people imposes a certain distribution and form of property in
land”, making ‘agriculture’ the basis of the entitlement system (Marx, 1974:196). Instead of
redistributing the land, the conquerors could alternatively “enslave the conquered and so make
slave labor the foundation of production” (ibid). A third possibility could be that “a system of
law assigns property in land to certain families in perpetuity or distributes labor as a
hereditary privilege and thus confines it within certain castes”37 (Ibid).
As a result, “in all these cases, and they are all historical, it seems that distribution is
not structured and determined by production, but rather the opposite, production by
distribution”. (Ibid, 197) This ‘distribution’ according to Marx (1974), “before it can be the
distribution of products”, is: 1) the distribution of the conditions of production, such as land,
and water resources in the case of agriculture and 2) the distribution of the members of the
society among the different kinds of production or the “subsumption of individuals under
specific relations of production” (Ibid, 207).
Therefore, it is important to thoroughly historicize and grasp what various “rights”
consist of in a particular colonial social formations--- how they are established, and to achieve
what precise goals--- in order to understand the ‘institutional structures’ that emanated as a
concrete exercise of these ‘rights’.
A new line of research led by Mamdani (1978, 2012) allows for such an
understanding. In Mamdani (1978), he examines the social effects of British colonial
administration on the kinds of entitlement systems that emerged in Uganda and Tanzania. He
argues that the “primary division of the country was not between “ethnic” or “cultural” groups
but between the ‘southern producers’ and the northern ‘non-producers’, who formed a ‘labor
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This was the entitlement system in Punjab, India.
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reserve” (MacGaffey, 1978; Mamdani, 1978). Mamdani shows “how a series of decisions
about who should produce what and who should process and market it…led to the
differentiation of “class” interests among the Baganda (landlords and tenants) and between the
Baganda and others” (MacGaffery, 1978; p. 82, emphasis added)38
In a different set of contributions, Mamdani (2012) points towards the dichotomy
drawn in colonial ideology, post-1857, between ‘native’ and ‘non-native’ as distinct political
entities. This was prompted by a “mid-nineteenth-century crisis of empire”, which “attracted
the attention of British intellectuals and led to a re-conception of the colonial mission, and to
reforms in India, British Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies.” (Mamdani, 2012; p. 14).
Mamdani argues that “the new politics, inspired by Sir Henry Maine, established that natives
were bound by geography and custom, rather than history and law, and made this the basis of
administrative practice.” (Ibid). In Mamdani (1997), he explores the case of Sudan to
demonstrate “how colonial law established tribal identity as the basis for determining access
to land and political power” (Ibid)
In the context of Indian agriculture during the colonial era scholars have pointed
towards the importance of land-revenue institutions that were set up in the village economy in
shaping certain permanent features of the social structure. This emphasis stems from the fact
that by the end of the 19th century ‘land revenue’ was the chief source of all income
appropriated from British India (Douis, 1931). To enable this extraction, the institutional
mechanism was devised to set up a framework of rights and responsibilities between the state,
the direct producers (i.e. cultivators), and the intermediaries over them.
But to conceptualize these institutions and their implications for the social structure we
need to understand, as Mamdani (1978, 2012) points out, the precise manner in which the
different kinds of “rights” were mapped onto the “native” and “settler” dichotomy described
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above. To my knowledge, such an attempt has never been made in the context of any region
of India, i.e. to map the economic correspondence between the ‘native’ and ‘settler’
distinction with the ‘system of rights’ in general, and to present the institutional structure
(land-revenue institutions in particular) as being derived from it.
Let us now look at the system of rights in Punjab more carefully before examining
rights in ‘land-revenue’ (and ‘cultivation’, ‘occupancy’) as a concrete exercise of these rights.
5.2.2 Three Forms of Rights in Colonial Punjab
Much like the rest of the colonized world, the colonial government established a
system of ‘rights’ in agrarian Punjab that was premised on a distinction between “Natives”
and “Non-Natives” after 1857. The British state had begun to champion a new policy of
“indirect-rule”, which was premised on ‘customary law’ and sought to rule the colonies via
“Native” intermediaries. The indigenous population was discursively divided into two broad
groups: the “allied and martial races”, who would rule over the “subordinate and menial”
races (Ibbetson, 1861; Punjab Manual of Castes).
The system of ‘rights’ was premised on creating an internal distribution of political
and economic power that would simultaneously be consistent with the overall economic
objectives of the colonial state. To do this systematically, a jamabandi was prepared for every
village, in every district of Punjab. The jamabandi was a book of records and accounts that
recorded the “rights” of inhabitants in every village. It was updated every four years and
recorded information about the kinds of rights (‘occupancy’, ‘cultivation’, ‘revenue
collecting’, control over water, control over common lands known as shaamilat) each villager
had, and whether these rights were held individually or jointly.
Three features of this system of rights merit our attention: 1) Difference between
cultivating and occupancy rights, 2) Difference between complete/undivided ownership and
incomplete/divided ownership, and 3) Difference between revenue-appropriating versus landownership rights. Let us explore these differences now.
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-Difference between cultivating versus occupancy rights
The colonial government distinguished between five distinct kinds of rights connected to the
land: a) the right to cultivate it, b) the right to occupy it, c) the right to appropriate landrevenues, d) the right to own it, and e) the right to receive a share of its produce. These rights
were always seen as being derived from an exchange of ‘services’ between the natives and the
colonial state.
According to the system ‘different people had different rights and responsibilities’ and
these, it was argued, emanate from their “local customs” (Ibetzon, 1867; Punjab Manual of
Castes). Everyone held some right. Even the provision of ‘labor services’ in the form
agricultural labor constituted a ‘privilege’, a ‘right’, for those who performed it; a right, that
as the Inquiry Report for Disturbance in the Canal Colonies (1907) reminded “could be
rescinded at any time at the will of the Majesty” (IRDCC, 1907; p. 44)
The distinctions between the different kinds of rights emanated directly from the
“native” versus “settler” dichotomy and permeated the “class” distinctions within each class.
In every village some cultivators, known as ‘occupancy-tenants’ were declared to have a
“permanent and heritable right of cultivation”, while others, “non-occupant tenants” enjoyed
no such rights. Thus, while both were, strictly speaking ‘agricultural workers’, the former
enjoyed a greater social, economic, and political status than the latter owing to them being
classified as “one tribe superior” to the rest, in the official manuals.39
As the Land Revenue Administration Report (1938) says, “an occupancy tenant enjoys
a share of the proprietary right” in terms of “cultivating the land subject to his paying an
amount---in cash or kind---equal to the land-revenue due to the state plus a ‘rent’ for the
‘owner’”. This must be set in contradistinction with ‘tenants-at-will’ who “enjoy no such

39

This distinction is still important. In the case of Okara Military Farms in Punjab, Pakistan,
the ‘movement of landless peasants’---“tenants”, or ‘mazareen’ as they are called in the language--was split into two factions: tenants from the “Muslim Arain” caste wanted to distinguish themselves
from the “Christian Kammi” (or low-caste) tenants.
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‘proprietary rights’ to occupy and cultivate the land”. (LRA Report, 1938, Government of
Punjab, p.138).
-Complete versus Divided Proprietary Rights
The second point refers to the fact that all kinds of rights---revenue-appropriating, occupancy,
cultivation, ownership--- could come in two forms: complete/undivided and
incomplete/divided. This simply meant that a ‘right’ could be an individual right or jointly
held by multiple individuals, often within the same ‘tribe’ or ‘caste’. For example, the Land
Alienation Act 1901, precluded the entire group of “non-agricultural castes and tribes” from
the ownership and sale of land. Another example is that of joint revenue appropriating rights.
In many places, the bhaichara system (explained later) corresponded with a system where
“entire tribes (biradari)---considered ‘Settlers’ in the official discourse---had formed a kind of
‘brotherhood’ in the village economy”, and were jointly put in charge of the village bodies.
(Punjab Tenancy Act, 1901, p. xiii) The ‘brotherhood’ was one of joint ‘landlordism’ over
everyone else---i.e. the tenants.40

-Land-Revenue Collection versus Land-Ownership
The third point refers to the difference between ‘rights to collect revenue’ versus ‘ownership
of land’. This distinction needs to be understood in order to correctly appreciate the landrevenue institutional mechanisms that underpinned the colonial, agrarian economy of India in
general and Punjab in particular. Much of the confusion on the question is historically rooted
in debates between colonial administrators who were also attempting to conceptualize these
‘rights’ in the colonized economy, as being analogous to the kinds of rights that existed in

Thus, it is simply not the case, as BI (2005) claim, that ‘zamindari’ represents
landlordism while forms of “non-zamindari”---i.e. bhaichara and pattidari---represent nonlandlorism. If one has to rely on Eurocentric comparisons, one has to accept that both forms
could be “landlordist”, the only difference being whether they were ‘joint’ landlords or
‘individual landlords’. We return to this later.
40
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England. The Punjab Tenancy Act of 1887 refers to these debates explicitly, in the following
words:
“In the time of Lord Cornwallis a very bitter controversy raged as to the rights of
zamindars. The discussion continued in extremes for years. One class of officials
held to the view that the sovereign ruler is the sole virtual proprietor of the soil,
not in the European feudal acceptation of the term implying a fictitious tenure as
lord paramount from whom all lesser holdings are supposed to be derived by all
classes of subjects, but in right and fact the real acting landlord, entitled to, and
receiving from, the ryots or husband men a certain portion of the gross yearly
returns of the country in money or kind; that there is no intermediate class
between the State and the peasant cultivator, and that the so-called zamindar is
nothing more than a mere collector of revenue. Mr. Grant was the chief
exponent of this view. He employed much labor and ingenuity in combating the
prevailing idea that zamindars are proprietors of the land.” (Punjab Tenancy Act
1887, Introduction, emphasis added)

Based on these debates, the Act concludes that the “relation of a zamindar to
Government, and of a ryot to a zamindar is neither that of proprietor nor a vassal, but a
compound of both.” (ibid, p. xiii). As a result, “the former (i.e. Government) performs acts of
authority unconnected with proprietary right, while the latter (zamindar) has rights without
real property. A zamindar does not possess the full rights of an English landlord.” (Punjab
Tenancy Act, 1887, p 2-3, emphasis not in original)
Given this understanding of the colonial system of rights in Punjab, let us now turn our
attention to the formation of land-revenue institutions.

5.3 Land-Revenue Institutions in Colonial Punjab
5.3.1 What is Land Revenue?
In legal terms land-revenue was understood as a “tax upon the land and its produce rather
than a tax on individuals” (Report on Land Revenue Administration, 1938, p. 44). Its
applicability to individuals was premised on the intermediation of other sets of rights and
responsibilities, via the “entitlement system” described earlier.
The best way to understand what ‘land-revenue’ means is to see how it was actually
calculated by the government. In concrete terms, The Land-Revenue Act (LRA, 1901) defined
land revenue as a “percentage of the net-assets” of the landowner. ‘Net-assets’ were defined
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as “the estimated average surplus produce of an estate or group of estates after deduction of
the ordinary expenses of cultivation” (Punjab Land Revenue Act, Section 3(18) Paragraph
68). Put simply, land-revenue was simply a share of the surplus-produce, the “surplus left
after the landlords had taken care of the costs” (LRA, 1938:64). The ‘ordinary expenses’
included the “customary share” of the tenant. The percentage share of the colonial state was
set at 50% of net-assets from 1860-1928 and thereafter it was fixed, by statute, “at one-fourth
of the estimated money value of the net assets”.
In order to determine the ‘amount payable’ by a village, the colonial state had to first
make an estimate of the surplus. The revenue act explains the process in the following words:
“The Settlement Officers (SO) most important duty is to estimate this money
value as correctly as possible. Since half the cultivated area of the land is held by
tenants-at-will, most of whom pay a fixed share of the produce as rent, it is the
practice in Punjab to calculate net assets on the basis of these rents and to check
them by the cash rents prevailing in the circle.” (Ibid, emphasis added)

The empirical estimate made by the Settlement Officer (SO) for the land-revenue
assignment to the village-body was conducted on the basis of an analysis of average yields,
costs of production, and the customary share in that particular area that belonged to the tenant.
The SO would visit a circle---defined as a set of villages within a district--- and would then
make an estimate of the produce in that circle. The land-revenue estimation guidelines advised
SO’s to base their “produce estimate… on a careful estimate of the following factors:

(a) the average acreage of all crops sown and matured on each class of land for which it is
proposed to frame separate assessment rates;
(b) the average yield per acre of each of these crops, unless ordinarily subject to cash rents;
(c) the average prices obtainable in the village for each of the crops referred to in (b)
d) the actual share of the gross produce received by landowners who give their land out on
rent”
(Land Revenue Administration Report of Punjab, 1938, page 37)
From this estimate the SO would then deduct an amount for “ordinary expenses of
cultivation”. “Ordinary expenses of cultivation include payments, if any, which the landowner
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customarily bears whether in kind or in cash either in whole or in part in respect of:
1) water rates
2) maintenance of means of irrigation
3) maintenance of embankments
4) supply of seed,
5) supply of manure
6) improved elements of husbandry
7) concessions with regard to fodder
8) special abatements made for fallows or bad harvests
9) cost of collection of rent
10) allowance for shortage in collection of rent
11) interest charges payable in respect of advances made in cash, free of interest, to tenants for
the purpose of cultivation
12) wages or customary dues paid to artisans or menials whose products of labor are utilized
for the purposes of cultivation”
(Ibid, Page 31)
Thus, the land-revenue institutional mechanism--- by bestowing rights to make revenue
payments to the government---in fact allowed the individuals in command of the village-body
the right to appropriate and distribute the surplus that was produced by the direct producers
(Resnick and Wolff, 1988). The question then is: what determined the constitution of the
village-body itself? There were three main ways of determining the composition of this
village-body, and the answer depended on the “Native” versus “settler” dichotomy.
5.3.2 Land Revenue Institutions: Three Major Types
Throughout India, land revenue institutional mechanisms differed from one another in terms
of who was assigned the ‘rights’ to collect and pay land-revenues to the government. These
were, especially after 1857, natives who would be chosen to rule over everyone else. In the
states of Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, Central Provinces, Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh a system
known as the ‘zamindari’ system was introduced under which a rich or influential individual
was assigned the rights to collect land revenue from the peasants. In Madras, United
Provinces, Assam, and Bombay Presidency, a ‘ryotwari’ system was established in which the
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individual peasant-proprietor directly paid the revenue to the government; this system was
mostly replaced after the War of 1857.
Unlike other parts of India where the colonial state assigned revenue-collecting rights
to individuals (a zamindari landlord in Bengal and Bihar or a peasant-proprietor as in the
ryotwari sytem of Madras and U.P) in Punjab, a third kind of system, known as the mahalwari
system was introduced. Under this system the state, instead of assigning revenue liability on
‘individuals’, recognized a ‘village-body’ that would act as an intermediary between the
colonial state and the direct-producers and be collectively responsible for the collection and
payment of the land-revenue to the government.
The question was: how does one determine which group in a village gets to be on the
village body? The answer again, has to do with which group (biradri or tribe) or individual
came to be defined as a ‘Native” in a particular village. There were three broad variants in
determining the constitution of the village-body. These were the 1) Pattidari 2) Bhaichara
and 3) Zamindari systems.
The first two are sub-variants of joint-ownership of the village-body in a coparcenary
arrangement of members connected by one common male ancestor. This is also why
bhaichara villages are often named after an old ‘patriarch’, a “great ancestor” (Punjab
Tenancy Act, 1901)
In the Zamindari case an individual or a group of individuals within an influential
family is put in charge of the village-body and everyone else is documented as a ‘tenant’ in
the jamabandi (record-keeping book). In the pattidari and bhaichara cases, the village-body
is considered the joint-property of those declared to be in ‘cultivating possession’ at the time
of settlement and everyone else is documented as their tenant.
Tenants could be either ‘occupancy’ tenants or ‘tenants-at-will’ with the former
having, as the name suggests, right to occupancy as long as they paid the revenues while the
latter had no such rights. “Occupancy-tenants” were usually related to the Bhaichara tribe in
some distant way, but had fallen in social rank due to “the inability to follow some custom”,
for example, something as simple as “allowing their widows to remarry” (Ibetson, 1902).
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The difference between pattidari and bhaichara is that of how the revenue liability
and landholding size, respectively, is determined. In the case of pattidari (patti literally means
strip of land) the joint-owners divide their estate into individually operated fragments of land
according to ancestral shares. The revenue liability of a joint-owner is determined by the size
of the patti (that is the strip of land) that he operates. In the bhaichara system the liability set
upon a person in the village-body determines the plot of land he can work with. Thus, in the
former case, the size of the operated landholding (size of patti) determines revenue-liability
while in the latter the liability determines the size of the landholding a joint-owner operates.
What is crucial to understand is that these are both coparcenary arrangements, albeit, with
different ways of determining the relationship between revenue liability and landholding.
5.3.3 Land Revenue Institutions and Control over Land
To add to the complexity of the institutional mechanisms, as explained earlier, ‘rights’ could
be held individually as well as jointly. These differences led to variations in the manner in
which revenue-appropriating rights map into control over the land. For example, ‘joint’
owners of a village-body faced a variety of different choices. They could choose to ‘divide’
the land into individually commanded strips. Alternatively, they could consolidate strips into
some kind of ‘collective’ ownership. As the architect of customary law in India and the rest of
the colonies, Sir Henry Maine pointed out: property rights in colonial Punjab could be
conceptualized as being a “bundle of powers capable of being mentally contemplated” as
collective but “capable of being enjoyed separately” (Henry Maine, 1887).
In the official colonial literature (such as Land Revenue Administration Reports) the
following classification was employed to understand this:

Classification of tenures employed in official literature
(1)

(2)

Zamindari

Pattidari

(a)

Landlord (khalis)

(b)

Communal (mushtaraka)

(a)

Perfect (mukammil)

(b)

Imperfect (na-mukammil)
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(3)

Bhaichara

(a)

Perfect (mukammil).

(b)

Imperfect (na-mukammil)

Zamindari Khalis is the only form in which a sole proprietor possesses full rights and
is thus comparable to an English ‘landlord’. The rest of the tenures are all different forms of
coparcenary arrangements. Zamindari Mushtarka refers to a situation in which the male
descendants of the original sole proprietor (at the time of settlement) are the joint-proprietors
of the estate and collectively manage the land, after his death. In this situation "their rights are
regulated by customary shares in the estate, both as regards the extent of the holdings they are
entitled to cultivate and as regards the distribution of profits, and if the profits from land held
by non-proprietary cultivators are not sufficient to pay the revenue and other charges, the
balance would ordinarily be collected from the proprietors according to the same shares."
(LRA report, 1938)
Similarly, perfect pattidari is a tenure in which the entire land is divided and held
individually by the joint-proprietors of the village-body according to customary shares. Each
person manages only his own strip of land and pays a fixed share in accordance with
customary ancestral shares. However, in the event in which the individual is unable to pay his
revenue-liability the entire village-body is jointly responsible for the deficit. In contrast to
perfect pattidari a situation in which some part of the lands is held individually and another
part held as ‘common’ property is called ‘imperfect’ or ‘incomplete’ pattidari. In this case,
each individual’s strip of land and also his right to access the common lands is a function of
ancestral shares customary to particular clans and castes.
Under perfect bhaichara all the land is held individually. Ancestral shares have
disappeared altogether and the revenue paid by a person is strictly a function of his actual
possession (Land Revenue Report, 1939) An imperfect bhaichara, in contrast, is when a part
of the land is held individually and part as common property and the rights of a person in the
latter are determined as being functional to his actual holding. In both cases, however, the
entire proprietary body is “jointly responsible if any individual share-holder becomes a
defaulter.” (Ibid)
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This means that conceptualizing land-revenue institutions as property rights is not very
simple. We cannot predict, for example, whether a bhaichara or pattidari institutional
arrangement is a “non-landlord” arrangement as the joint-owners could---and did on many
occasions---lease-out the estates under the command of their village-body to tenants and
extract rents as joint “landlords”.
Now that we have examined the system of rights in Punjab and seen how it relates
with the land-revenue institutions that were emplaced in different parts, let us return to the
following question: why did these institutional structures vary from one part to another? The
answer that we provide is connected to the imperatives of the colonial state in the aftermath of
the American Civil War, and the ensuing ‘infrastructural’ developments.

5.4 Infrastructural Development and Institutional Formations: Empirical
Analysis
5.4.1 Colonial State, Investments, and Institutions: A Hypothesis
The political security of the rents associated with state investments in canal infrastructure
shaped the kinds of institutions---political order and class structure--- that were emplaced in
the rural economy, given the system of rights described earlier, in different parts.
In order to achieve the twin goals of minimizing political volatility in high-investment
regions on the one hand, and the economic objective of maximizing the rents that could
possibly be extracted by the state from these areas on the other, led the colonial state to rely
on its traditional allies, namely, the agrarian elite of Punjab which had so loyally stood beside
the British during the War of 1857 (Talbot, 1988; Gandhi, 2012).
The colonial system of rights and revenue institutions described above was utilized to
achieve these twin goals in the following way: firstly, the control over the surplus
appropriating village-bodies was consolidated in the hands of the “settlers”, who eventually
became the agrarian elite, in high-investment zones. These ‘settlers’ were usually brought in
from other parts with guaranteed state support and patronage, and were compared in official
discourse with the Junker’s in Prussia (See Darling, 1902).
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It was argued that in addition to providing political security to the projects, the
agrarian elite, by virtue of its “higher social status” and “higher capital endowments”, stood
the best chance to reap the gains that would result from the improvements in transport
(railways, roads and ports) and productivity (through canal irrigation) that infrastructural
development promised (Calvin, 1924; Metcalf, 1967).
In order to maximize the exploitation of the direct producers---i.e. the tenantcultivators---the state used its power to create an “entitlement system” that ensured a
sufficiently low bargaining power for the tenants in high-investment zones. Consequently, the
state relied more extensively on ‘tenancy-at-will’ instead of granting occupant tenancy in
regions with ‘high-infrastructural’ development. As mentioned earlier, in areas where tenants
had “occupancy” rights they could not be evicted without a process of litigation. Tenants-atwill enjoyed no such rights and consequently had a much lower bargaining power with respect
to the “owners” (i.e. appropriators of land-revenue, not ‘land’) of the village-bodies.
If the aforementioned framework is correct we should expect areas with high
infrastructural development to be associated with: 1) a higher level of tenancy-at-will,
reflecting a lower bargaining power of direct producers; 2) a greater preponderance of
zamindari khalis institutions, as compared to bhaichara and pattidari institutions; and
consequently, 3) a higher level of economic inequality.
5.4.2 Empirical Methodology
To test these relationships empirically I test OLS regressions taking the form:
𝑍𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑋𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖 ,
For every district i, Zi is one of two measures of ’institutional outcomes’: a) Zamindari
proportion, the proportion of zamindari estates in a district; or b) ‘Non-Occupant tenants
ratio’, and a measure of economic distribution: c) ‘Percentage revenue paid/appropriated by
large landlords’; Xi is the set of geography controls such as latitude, longitude, rainfall (mm),
and a dummy for soil quality, in district I, while Cit is our measure of state investments in
district i at time t.
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Given the hypotheses above, we expect a strong positive association between the three kinds
of Zi and Cit.
5.4.3 Data
I use three different colonial reports to construct the variables used to test the model. The
following variables are of interest for this exercise:
1) Ci: Percentage of Matured Crops Irrigated by Canals
Our main independent variable, Ci, proxies for the level of canal infrastructural
investment in a given district. Since we do not have actual monetary values of districtwise expenditures by the state, we proxy for district-wise investments instead by looking
at the ‘outcome’: the ‘percentage of matured crops’ that were irrigated by state canals in a
given district in each of the censuses conducted decennially from 1901 to 1941. In
addition, we have data points for irrigation from Land Revenue Assessment Reports for
the years 1913, 1923, 1927, 1929, 1937, and 1939. The census reports give us
information about the percentage of matured crops in every district under different kinds
of irrigation schemes such as wells and canals. Using this, I calculate for every district,
the percentage of matured crops that are irrigated by state canals. Table 5.1, in the
appendices to the chapter enumerates these values for each district. As we can see from
this table, on average, districts in west Punjab had superior access to state-canals than
districts in the eastern half of the province. The average percentage of matured crops
irrigated by canals is 57% and 18% in the two halves, respectively, reflecting the greater
level of state investments---and hence canal infrastructure----in the western districts.

2) Land Revenue Institutions: Zamindari Proportion
The second variable of interest is the percentage of zamindari land revenue institutions in
a district. This is one of the three Zi’s tested in the model. Following BI (2005), it has
been constructed from District Settlement Reports, for each district from the mid to late
19th century; i.e., the period in the aftermath of the colonization of Punjab. These reports
tell us about the kinds of land-revenue institutional mechanisms that were established in a
district at the time of its original settlement. For each district, we know how many
villages (or estates) were under the bhaichara, pattidari and zamindari tenures,
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respectively. Using this, for each district I calculate the zamindari proportion: the
proportion of estates in a district that were under zamindari systems as opposed to the two
other systems.
The values for this proportion in each district have been tabulated in Table 5.2
(Appendix) along with mean values for east and west Punjab in the last two rows. As we
can see, the mean value of the zamindari proportion in west Punjab is approximately
twice that of east Punjab.

3) Bargaining Power: Non-Occupancy Tenants Ratio
The third variable captures the ‘bargaining power of the direct producers’, i.e. the tenants: a
measure of “substantive” ‘political institutions’. This is our second Zi in the model. It has
been derived from the Land Revenue Reports of Punjab. From these reports, for every
district, we know the total area and number of holdings under owner-cultivation versus
tenancy and also the type of tenancy arrangement (occupancy versus non-occupancy). I use
this data to calculate the extent of tenancy versus owner-cultivation in each district and also
the proportion of non-occupancy tenancy arrangements in terms of holdings and area.

In Table 5.3 (Appendix) I tabulate the district-wise holdings and area of cultivated lands by
‘owner-cultivated’ versus ‘tenant-cultivated’ (regardless of occupant or non-occupant
status) farms using data from the Land Revenue Report of Punjab (1938). The last three
rows of the table show the averages for east, west, and united Punjab respectively. We can
see that for the Punjab as a whole 60% of the holdings commanding 52% of the cultivated
area were ‘tenant’ holdings. Comparing east and west Punjab we see that 56% of the
holdings in the former and 62% of the holdings in the latter were tenant holdings
commanding an area of 45% and 59%, respectively. The percentage of tenant holdings, and
the area cultivated by these holdings, is higher in west Punjab as compared to east Punjab.
In terms of average holding sizes, on average, an owner-cultivated farm was 4.7 acres in
west Punjab and 3.2 acres in east Punjab, while a tenant-cultivated farm was 2 acres and
4.3 acres in the two sub-regions, respectively. Thus, in addition to a higher percentage of
tenant holdings, west Punjab also had a higher average size of tenant holdings.
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In Table 5.4 (Appendix), I tabulate tenant farms by ‘occupancy’ versus ‘non-occupancy’
status of tenants in each district. The table has been sorted on column (3) for ease of
comparison and the last three rows capture sub-regional averages and totals for united
Punjab. As we can see, for the Punjab as a whole, the overwhelming majority of tenancy
arrangements (84% by holdings) were leased-out to ‘non-occupancy’ tenants. There was a
greater preponderance of ‘non-occupant’ tenancy in west Punjab (86% of holdings and
87% of the area) as compared to east Punjab (81% of the holdings and 82% of the area).
The difference in non-occupant tenancy was even more pronounced for the top six districts
in the table. These are all the districts (located in the central belt of west Punjab) that
witnessed high levels of infrastructural activity as discussed in the previous chapter.
4) Economic Distribution: Percentage of Surplus Appropriation by Elite
To calculate empirical estimates of internal inequality I used a method deployed by
Piketty (2014) to calculate incomes from tax records. I used this method by drawing on
data from the Land Revenue Administration Report of 1938. For every district the report
gives information about the total number of revenue payers, the number paying revenues
between different amounts, and the amount of revenue that was paid by each class. The
data classifies revenue payers into various categories, ranging from those that pay an
amount less than 5 rupees to those that pay revenue that exceeds 10,000 rupees. For ease
of analysis I divide these revenue payers into the “small”, “medium” and “large”
categories. I define a ‘small’ revenue payer as someone who pays an amount between 5
and 20 rupees, a medium payer as someone who pays between 20 to 50 rupees and a large
payer as someone who pays greater than 50 rupees. This classification is not altogether
arbitrary as the Land Revenue Administration Report (1938) itself claims that it is safe to
assume that those paying in excess of 50 rupees are ‘large’ revenue payers. Using this
classification I calculate the percentage of the total revenue that is paid by revenue payers
in each category, for every district (Appendix 5-D)

This percentage can be interpreted as follows: Given that land revenue was calculated
simply as a fraction of the surplus (‘net assets’), and was only imposed on those with
‘revenue-appropriating rights’, and ‘included a subtraction for the share of the tenant’, the
amount of revenue paid actually reflects the proportion of the income appropriated by
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small, medium and large landholders in every district.. Since revenue (a tax calculated as
a share of the surplus) was paid after it was appropriated by a revenue-payer, his tax
payment is simply a fraction of his total surplus appropriation. As a proportion, the
revenue-paid to the state by a given class bracket is exactly the same as the fraction of
total surplus produced that it appropriates. In Appendix 5-E I tabulate the incidence of
land-revenue on ‘small’, ‘medium’ and ‘large revenue’ payers in each district.

As the table reveals there was massive income inequality in rural Punjab by the end of
colonial rule. For the Punjab as a whole, 84% of all revenue payers were ‘small’; 87%
and 79% of the revenue payers were small in east and west Punjab, respectively. Despite
their greater preponderance in the total rural revenue-paying population, ‘small’ holders
only accounted for just 35% of the total surplus appropriated. A tiny 6% of revenue
payers appropriated 41% of the total surplus produced in Punjab.
Second, the ‘revenue-appropriation’ of large revenue payers was overwhelmingly higher
in west Punjab as compared to east Punjab. If we focus on column (8)--- which shows
the percentage of total revenue paid by ‘large’ revenue payers--- we find that in every
case in which this number exceeds 40% the district is located in west Punjab. In seven of
these districts, the fraction of surplus appropriated by the ‘large’ landowners exceeds half
(50%) of the total surplus produced and in three cases exceeds 65%.

The trends shown by the descriptive statistics above reveal that there are indeed major
differences between the two sub-regions in terms of institutional variables, rights in
occupancy, and the economic control of the agrarian elite over the surplus. What is the
source of this difference? Is there a relationship between the degree of infrastructural
development of a district and the kinds of elite social, political and economic control that
developed in that district, or can these merely be accounted for by geographic differences
between the two sides? To see this I run a series of OLS regressions.
5.4.4 OLS Regression Results
The results of these regressions have been tabulated in Table 5.6 (Appendix) and confirm the
hypothesized relationships between political and economic institutions, and state-led
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infrastructural development. Districts that experienced higher levels of infrastructural activity
were associated with a more unequal power structure and hence a more unequal economic
distribution.
1) Political Institutions: The greater reliance on non-occupant tenancy
The results indicate a direct correspondence between the degree of state investments in a
given district and the reliance on ‘non-occupant’ tenancy rights in that district. A one
percentage higher level of ‘state canal infrastructure’ (the ‘percentage of matured crops
irrigated by canals’) in a district corresponds with a 1.9 % greater reliance on nonoccupant tenancy.
This confirms that districts that witnessed a greater level of infrastructural
development also witnessed the formation of a political institutional structure which
significantly reduced the bargaining power of the tenants with respect to the owners of the
village-bodies.
2) Economic Institutions: The greater dominance of ‘zamindari khalis’
The results also confirm the greater preponderance of ‘zamindari khalis’ institutions in
high infrastructural districts. Specifically, column (2) shows (after controlling for
geography variables) that greater state investments in canal infrastructure in a district were
associated with a 16 percentage point higher zamindari proportion in that district.
3) Economic Inequality: The greater economic control of large landlords
In the third specification I capture the degree of ‘revenue-incidence on rich farmers’ for a
district, on the degree of infrastructural development. As explained earlier this variable
captures the percentage of total surplus paid as land-revenue in a district that is
appropriated by “large owners” and can therefore be used to proxy for the economic
control of the agrarian elite in every district. The results reveal that a district with a 1%
higher level of canal-irrigated crops also had a 28.4% higher surplus appropriation by elite
as compared to a district with a lower level of state investments.
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5.5 Conclusion
The chapter sought to achieve two objectives: 1) to reopen the discussion on land-revenue
institutions by presenting them as being “entitlement systems” qua Sen (1981), in the light of
recent anthropological work done by Mamdani (1978, 2012); 2) to connect the institutional
process to the political and economic objectives and constraints that were emplaced by the
British colonial regime in Punjab, to execute the project of export-oriented infrastructural
development. We showed, using colonial archival data and OLS regressions that districts that
witnessed greater level of canal development also witnessed the rise of a political and
economic institutional structure that privileged large landlord control. This was done by: a)
significantly minimizing the bargaining power of tenant cultivators, by making non-occupant
tenancy the norm in places with high infrastructural development; b) by giving land-revenue
appropriating rights to zamindars, or large landlords, and hence making everyone else a tenant
under them. Finally, these forms of political and economic control, we saw, led to a highly
unequal distribution of the economic surplus that was produced in the agrarian economies of
‘high-infrastructure’ districts.
This means that colonial state-investments represented a double edged sword: on the
one hand, they came with the promise of “development”; improvements in “technical”
conditions of production, which typically results in an expansion in yields in agricultural
economies. However, and this is the key to the Punjab divergence conundrum, they also came
with an extractive and elitist institutional structure which created ‘structural’ conditions and
forces that would impede the prospects for long-term growth.
To see this, let us now turn our attention to the question: How did the colonial
institutional structures described in this chapter impact agrarian performance during the
colonial (i.e. contemporaneously) and post-colonial (i.e. long-term) period, respectively?
Were there any major transformations in the nature of this impact after partition (i.e. the postcolonial period)? Were there any differences in the nature of this impact across the two states?
We take up these questions in the next chapter.
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Appendices to Chapter 541
Table 5.1: Percentage of Matured Crops Irrigated by Source and Location
District
% of Matured Crops that are Irrigated By District Location
Canals
97
64
73
58
56
53
55
64
40
0
48
32
32
9
22
21

Wells
1
23
14
28
22
24
21
11
30
54
5
14
11
28
14
15

Total
98
87
87
86
78
77
76
75
70
54
53
46
43
37
36
36

West Punjab
West Punjab
West Punjab
West Punjab
West Punjab
West Punjab
West Punjab
West Punjab
East Punjab
East Punjab
West Punjab
East Punjab
West Punjab
East Punjab
East Punjab
West Punjab

Gurdaspur

11

17

28

East Punjab

Rohtak
Kangra

19
26

8
0

27
26

East Punjab
East Punjab

Gurgaon

6

11

17

East Punjab

Hissar
Mianwali

15
5

1
7

16
12

East Punjab
West Punjab

Hoshiarpur
Attock
Ambala
Jhelum
Rawalpindi

2
1
0
0
0

9
8
6
5
2

11
9
6
5
2

East Punjab
West Punjab
East Punjab
West Punjab
West Punjab

Lyallpur
Montgomery
Multan
Jhang
Lahore
Muzaffargarh
Gujranwala
Shahpur
Amritsar
Jullundur
Sialkot
Ferozepur
D.G Khan
Ludhiana
Karnal
Gujrat

Source: Constructed from Land Revenue Report, Punjab, 19

41

For tables 5.1 to 5.5, the percentage of irrigation by source is obtained by averaging
for the census years 1901, 1911, 1921, and 1931.
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Table 5.2 District-Wise Distribution of Land-Revenue Institutions
District

Zamindari Proportion

District Location

Hissar
Rohtak
Gurgaon
Karnal
Ambala
Simla
Kangra
Hoshiarpur
Jullunder
Ludhiana

0.41
0
0.14
0.19
0
0
0
0.15
0
0.04

East
East
East
East
East
East
East
East
East
East

Ferozepore
Lahore
Amritsar
Gurdaspur
Sialkot
Gujranwala
Sheikhupura
Gujrat
Shahpur (Sargodha)
Jhelum
Rawalpindi
Attock
Mianwali
Montgomery
Lyallpur
Jhang
Multan
Muzaffargarh
Dera Ghazi Khan

0.51
0.3
0.073
0
0.33
0.52
0.64
0.05
0.08
0.04
0.05
0.05
0.17
0.59
0.69
0.08
0.62
0.09
0.09

East
West
East
East
West
West
West
West
West
West
West
West
West
West
West
West
West
West
West

East Punjab
West Punjab

0.13
0.25

East
West
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Table 5.3: Owner-Cultivation vs. Tenancy: % Holdings and Area
District

Owner-Cultivators
Holdings

Tenancy

Area

Holdings

Area

Location

Hissar

33.14%

40.72%

67%

59%

East

Rohtak

45.61%

62.50%

54%

38%

East

Gurgaon

46.13%

52.46%

54%

48%

East

Karnal

49.50%

63.75%

51%

36%

East

Ambala

46.59%

56.50%

53%

43%

East

Simla

73.05%

83.68%

27%

16%

East

Kangra

50.32%

64.30%

50%

36%

East

Hoshiarpur

33.05%

45.86%

67%

54%

East

Jullunder

43.66%

54.55%

56%

45%

East

Ludhiana

44.15%

57.31%

56%

43%

East

Ferozepore

37.19%

45.43%

63%

55%

East

Lahore

38.91%

43.16%

61%

57%

West

Amritsar

38.26%

46.44%

62%

54%

East

Gurdaspur

36.76%

47.36%

63%

53%

East

Sialkot

34.90%

45.56%

65%

54%

West

Gujranwala

28.80%

37.26%

71%

63%

West

Sheikhupura

31.26%

35.60%

69%

64%

West

Gujrat

43.22%

53.88%

57%

46%

West

Shahpur (Sargodha)

35.77%

38.32%

64%

62%

West

Jhelum

46.08%

54.51%

54%

45%

West

Rawalpindi

54.60%

60.34%

45%

40%

West

Attock

34.84%

39.69%

65%

60%

West

Mianwali

33.87%

38.55%

66%

61%

West

Montgomery

28.33%

20.14%

72%

80%

West

Lyallpur

43.45%

51.61%

57%

48%

West

Jhang

32.57%

34.50%

67%

66%

West

Multan

31.05%

25.34%

69%

75%

West

Muzaffargarh

44.41%

48.27%

56%

52%

West

Dera Ghazi Khan

34.54%

35.99%

65%

64%

West

East Punjab

44.42%

55.45%

55.58%

44.55%

East

West Punjab

37.29%

41.42%

62.71%

58.58%

West

47.71%

60%

52%

Total

Total
40.48%
Source: Land Revenue Reports Punjab
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Table 5.4: Percentage of Tenants by Occupancy vs. Non-Occupancy Tenancy

District

Occupancy Tenants
Holdings
Area
(1)
(2)

Non-Occupancy Tenants
Holdings
Area
(3)
(4)

Lyallpur (W)

0.11%

0.03%

99.89%

99.97%

Jhang (W)

4.11%

5.32%

95.89%

94.68%

Sheikhupura (W)

5.09%

4.83%

94.91%

95.17%

Multan (W)

5.86%

6.27%

94.14%

93.73%

Gujranwala (W)

7.49%

6.08%

92.51%

93.92%

Montgomery (W)

7.89%

2.21%

92.11%

97.79%

Dera Ghazi Khan (W)

8.86%

6.20%

91.14%

93.80%

Shahpur (W)

9.15%

15.42%

90.85%

84.58%

Ludhiana (E)

9.37%

9.15%

90.63%

90.85%

Kangra (E)

10.88%

13.46%

89.12%

86.54%

Muzaffargarh (W)

11.60%

10.21%

88.40%

89.79%

Karnal (E)

12.03%

11.10%

87.97%

88.90%

Rohtak (E)

13.32%

12.30%

86.68%

87.70%

Gurdaspur (E)

14.73%

14.98%

85.27%

85.02%

Sialkot (W)

15.71%

13.30%

84.29%

86.70%

Amritsar (E)

16.09%

13.33%

83.91%

86.67%

Lahore (W)

16.63%

15.97%

83.37%

84.03%

Ambala (E)

17.43%

16.86%

82.57%

83.14%

Mianwali (W)

18.09%

11.22%

81.91%

88.78%

Jullunder (E)

18.26%

17.67%

81.74%

82.33%

Gujrat (W)

18.66%

12.73%

81.34%

87.27%

Gurgaon (E)

22.01%

21.04%

77.99%

78.96%

Jhelum (W)

25.74%

27.66%

74.26%

72.34%

Ferozepore (E)

29.53%

27.01%

70.47%

72.99%

Hissar (E)

32.96%

31.05%

67.04%

68.95%

Rawalpindi (W)

33.72%

33.74%

66.28%

66.26%

Attock (W)

37.16%

28.94%

62.84%

71.06%

Hoshiarpur (E)

41.59%

39.05%

58.41%

60.95%

East Punjab Average

18.56%

17.54%

81.44%

82.46%

West Punjab Average

14.12%

12.51%

85.88%

87.49%

Total
16.11%
14.93%
83.89%
Source: Land Revenue Administration Report, Government of Punjab

85.07%
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Table 5.5: Percentage Surplus Appropriation by Agrarian Elite (District-Wise)
% of Revenue Payers
Small
Medium
Large
(3)
(4)
(5)

% of Revenue Paid
Small
Medium
Large
(6)
(7)
(8)

District (1)

Location
(2)

Hissar

East

95%

6%

2%

43%

19%

38%

Rohtak
Gurgaon

East
East

86%
84%

12%
12%

1%
4%

53%
40%

37%
29%

10%
30%

Karnal

East

89%

8%

2%

50%

27%

23%

Ambala
Simla
Kangra

East
East
East

84%
99%
98%

12%
1%
2%

3%
0%
0%

46%
83%
75%

30%
9%
13%

25%
8%
12%

Hoshiarpur
Jullunder
Ludhiana

East
East
East

88%
73%
78%

9%
10%
10%

3%
2%
2%

47%
46%
48%

27%
32%
34%

27%
21%
18%

Ferozepore
Lahore
Amritsar
Gurdaspur
Sialkot

East
West
East
East
West

87%
84%
85%
90%
84%

10%
10%
11%
13%
9%

3%
4%
3%
4%
3%

40%
34%
49%
36%
48%

26%
25%
32%
31%
29%

33%
42%
19%
34%
22%

Gujranwala
Sheikhupura

West
West

78%
51%

15%
19%

7%
15%

24%
13%

25%
19%

52%
67%

Gujrat

West

89%

8%

3%

42%

23%

34%

Shahpur
Jhelum
Rawalpindi
Attock
Mianwali

West
West
West
West
West

82%
96%
79%
93%
95%

6%
3%
2%
5%
4%

12%
1%
0%
2%
1%

23%
72%
75%
46%
52%

11%
15%
15%
18%
17%

66%
13%
9%
35%
31%

Montgomery
Lyallpur

West
West

59%
38%

26%
32%

15%
30%

17%
8%

27%
23%

57%
69%

Jhang
Multan

West
West

80%
70%

15%
19%

8%
11%

22%
17%

24%
21%

54%
62%

Muzaffargarh

West

94%

5%

2%

47%

18%

34%

Dera Ghazi Khan

West

96%

3%

1%

44%

15%

41%

Total

Total

84%

10%

6%

35%

25%

41%

Source: Land Revenue Administration Report, Government of Punjab
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Table 5.6: OLS Regression Results – Institutions and Canal Expenditures
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Zamindari Proportion, Non-Occupant Tenancy, Surplus
Appropriated by Elite
Zamindari Proportion
% Non-Occupant
% Surplus Large

% Canal Irrigated

Rainfall
Longitude
Latitude
Soil Dummy

Tenancy

Landowners

17.8*

1.717***

31.4**

(2.27)

(4.00)

(3.56)

-0.0292

-0.0404*

-0.00291

(-1.94)

(-3.47)

(-0.17)

0.615

0.569

0.222

(0.92)

(1.00)

(0.36)

2.854

5.505

-0.0386

(0.71)

(1.60)

(-0.01)

0.038*

0.047*

0.027*

(2.19)

(2.12)

(2.28)

t statistics in parentheses
*

p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

144

Figure 5.1: Large Land Ownership and State Investments in Canals by Districts
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CHAPTER 6
IMPACT OF COLONIAL INSTITUTIONS ON AGRARIAN
OUTCOMES
6.1 Introduction
In the last chapter, we examined the relationship between institutional structures and
infrastructural development in colonial Punjab. We saw how districts that witnessed higher
levels of infrastructural development also saw the formation of extractive political and
economic institutions, which in turn, led to a more unequal economic distribution in these
districts.
In this chapter we empirically assess the impact of colonial institutional structures on
agricultural outcomes, in the colonial as well as the post-colonial period. Building on the
earlier work of Banerjee and Iyyer (BI, 2005), and the critiques of their work in Roy (2013)
and Iverson et al (2012)42, I ask how the set of initial colonial institutions described in
Chapter Five impact agrarian outcomes---specifically yield per hectare--- in each state, in
each period. There are four main points of departure from the BI study: 1) the inclusion of
contemporaneous impact of institutions (on outcomes during the colonial period), 2) the
inclusion of ‘formal’ as well as ‘substantive’ institutions; 3) introduction of crop-specific
effects, and 4) an examination of the impact of initial institutions on economic outcomes as
being contingent upon developments in the post-colonial period. An inclusion of these
dimensions alters the way we understand institutional persistence in peripheral agriculture in
four important ways:

42

These were discussed in the literature review in Chapter 2
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First, as Roy (2013) points out in his critique of the BI study, there is no necessity for
the colonial institutional setup to impact outcomes similarly across the two qualitatively
distinct time periods. Any changes in the nature of the impact across the two periods could
point towards other mitigating factors that may have been overlooked. To account for the
possibility of such jumps I run separate regressions of agricultural yields on measures of
colonial institutions in each state, for each of the two periods (colonial and post-colonial).
Second, as Iverson et al (2012) point out, BI assume a correspondence between the
“formal” and the “substantive” institutional types. The former is premised on using one of
the three ‘official classifications’---Zamindari, Ryotwari, and Mahalwari---used to describe
the land-revenue system, and then mapping them onto a ‘landlord’ versus ‘non-landlord’
binary. In contrast, the latter is premised on examining actual social relations, such as the
existence of ‘tenancy’, ‘forms of power’, or the ‘distribution of surplus’ in the land economy.
To take this into account, I use three different measures of institutional structure: one
measure of ‘formal institutions’ (zamindari proportion) and two measures of substantive
institutional type: i) Non-Occupants Tenants Ratio, a measure of political power; and ii)
Surplus appropriated by large landlords, a measure of economic control, for every district.
Third, as argued in Chapter Four, different crops were viewed differently by the
colonial state. By including crop-specific effects, we allow for the possibility that colonial
institutional variables may impact yields of different crops, differently. For example, it is
possible that a zamindari khalis institution may allow landlords to extract greater rents in
cotton production owing to the greater state patronage offered to that commodity.
Finally, by contrasting between the short-run and long-run institutional impact in two
different state environments (India and Pakistan), we can see if the nature of institutional
impact varies not only across time (colonial versus post-colonial) but also space. This can
reveal the intriguing possibility that the long-term impact of a colonial institutional structure
depends not only on the past, but also the present; that is, it depends on how the post-colonial
state reorganizes the initial institutional structure, after independence. Having shown that this
does indeed seem to matter, we focus on the set of political and policy differences that
differentiated the two Punjabs, after independence in the next chapter.
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6.2 Rethinking Institutional Persistence in India
6.2.1 Theoretical Channels for Institutional Persistence
The most striking result in the BI (2005) study is to show that land-revenue institutions that
were formally abolished after independence continue to have a differential impact on
productive outcomes, even today. The question is: Why do such effects continue to persist?
BI offer three possible classes of explanations or channels through which a persistent
impact of colonial institutions (operationalized as the ‘non-landlord’ proportion in their
study) on current agricultural outcomes can be explained: 1) ‘land and wealth distribution’,
2) ‘the nature of political power’ and 3) ‘the relationship with the colonial state’.
The first channel is fairly self-explanatory and implies that landlord areas may lag
behind non-landlord areas because landlords would appropriate any gains from
improvements in productivity in the form of rents rather than allowing them to be reinvested
in agrarian production.
The second channel proposes that in landlord areas there is a disincentive to make
investments in improving land productivity due to the high risk of expropriation that arises
from the asymmetry of power between landlords and tenants in these areas. As productivity
increases, the rental value of the land increases, making it more lucrative for the powerful
elite to expropriate the weaker peasants.
The third channel proposes that the colonial state was more incentivized to provide
public goods (such as irrigation, railways, schools and infrastructure) in non-landlord areas
because it was ‘easier for the state to raise rents in these areas’. BI do not explain why that
may be the case but nevertheless conclude from this that non-landlord areas would be
expected to have better public goods during the colonial period and that these initial
advantages may still persist (Ibid).
For BI, the major part of the story comes from the differences in the political
environment of the two kinds of areas. They contend that the “important difference in the
political environment probably has to do with the nature of collective action in the two
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areas”. In the post-independence period when “landlord areas were busy carrying out landreform the non-landlord states started focusing on development”. (Ibid)
They dismiss an explanation based on differences in land and wealth distribution--channel one--- as “there is no significant difference in the proportion of extremely large land
holdings (between districts that inherited more or less non-landlord institutions) today”. This
conclusion follows from the fact that the data “does not suggest any relationship between
initial land-revenue institutions and the kinds of land distributions that exist in different
regions today’ (ibid).
They also dismiss an explanation via channel three, even demoting it below in
importance, to reason one. “Of the three classes of explanations discussed earlier, the
explanation based on differential investment by the colonial state is probably the least
compelling”. The reason that they offer for their dismissal is premised on the purely
empiricist logic that “dropping the ‘non-landlord districts’ (many in Punjab)---that benefitted
from colonial infrastructural development the most---from the sample has the result of
increasing the effect of the non-landlord proportion on current yields.43
Is it not somewhat surprising that an inclusion of the districts classified and coded as
having the greatest ‘non-landlord proportion’ in the sample have the effect of reducing the
proposed positive theoretical effect of initial non-landlord institutions on economic
outcomes? If anything, an ‘inclusion’ of these districts---assumed to be ‘non-landlord’
districts because they happened to be “classified” as such---should have improved the
predictability of the model (rather than weakening it).
While this should have raised alarm bells--- perhaps being suggestive of possibly
intriguing theoretical effects specific to some states given the diversity of colonial
experience--- BI (2005) do not take the issue up further and hence offer no explanation for
this curious result. What explains it?

43

Footnote number 28 on page 1209 of the paper.
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First, as pointed out by Roy (2013) as well as Iverson et al (2008), it is not clear
whether the areas classified as “non-landlord” areas (based on the land-revenue institutional
mechanism) during the colonial period were actually non-landlord areas in the sense in which
political economy understands the term. For example, Punjab that was exposed to the
Mahalwari land-revenue arrangement has been classified as a ‘non-landlord’ institutional
formation in the BI paper. In contrast, if landlord areas are understood as areas where the
economic relationship of ‘tenancy’ dominates social relations of production, so that the
cultivators are not simultaneously the owners of their land and produce, and ‘non-landlord’
areas as ones where the converse is the case, it is simply not true that the Punjab can be
classified as an example of non-landlordist social structure.
For example, the Land Revenue Administration Report of Punjab for the year 1938
shows that 58% of the cultivated land of the province was farmed by tenants (LRA report,
1938: page 32). This should not come as a surprise since by 1936, over 61% of the cultivated
area of the province belonged to just 15% of the owners (Punjab Board of Economic Inquiry,
Rural Publication No.4, page 3).
Second, and this is also a part of the reason why BI are unable to provide an
explanation is that their theory assumes that the impact of a greater landlord proportion on
agricultural yields must be negative. There is no theoretical possibility, and hence no
explanations are offered in the model, for a situation in which a landlord district may--depending on other conditions--- in fact outperform a non-landlord district. Does such a
theoretical possibility exist and if so, how?
6.2.2 Two Effects of a Zamindari Institutional Structure on Agricultural Productivity
Such a possibility does exist, at least in some conditions. One reason is provided by the
discussion in Chapter Four and Five, where we had drawn a link between the economic
objectives of the colonial state, its impact on state-led investments, and the relationship of the
former with the institutional structure. To reiterate briefly, if the ‘formal’ institutional
structure that was established in a particular district by the colonial administration was
shaped by the level of state investments (canal irrigation) in that district, as we had seen, then
a district with a higher level of state investments was also more likely to inherit a more
landlord-based institutional structure. In addition to a greater proportion of the ‘formal’
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institutional type (zamindari), we also saw that there was also the greater level of substantive
economic and political control in the hands of the landlord class in districts with higher
investments. The reason for this was the security of these mega investments in the hands of
traditional allies, the landlords. Thus, the ‘economic’ objective of maximizing rents, that BI
correctly identify, was weighed against the ‘political’ constraints of security of rents---which
they ignore---and in the final analysis, the latter prevailed over the former (Talbot, 1998)
Given this understanding, what impact should the zamindari proportion---the
percentage of estates within a district that were placed under the zamindari tenure---have on
the variation in the yields per hectare across districts? A little analysis reveals that there should
be two effects, working in opposite directions to one another.
The first impact---a positive one---can be called a ‘technical advantage’. It arises from
the fact that a zamindari district can produce a greater output per hectare than a non-zamindari
district due to the superior access to canal irrigation facilities, and export markets that it enjoys.
The second impact is a ‘structural impact’. For the same level of technical conditions
of production, a district with a more landlord based social structure will have a lower yield per
hectare, owing to the greater level of unproductive ‘rents’ that would have to be paid off. This
can be explained by one of the three reasons already provided by BI (2005) or more simply by
the higher level of tenancy in these areas (and hence the lower incentive to invest).
What is interesting to note, however, is that while the former effect can be resolved
more swiftly---by equalizing access to irrigation facilities via active state intervention---the
impact of the latter effect will be the source of ‘institutional persistence’. The source of this
persistence is the greater consolidation of political, economic, and hence social power in the
hands of landlords. As a result of their superior control over social forms of power, they will
stand better suited to utilize state power post-independence, furthering their own group
interests. We return to this point in Chapter Seven.
Thus, it may be possible that in the colonial period, the advantage accrued to zamindari
districts due to superior canal irrigation (and hence ‘technical’ conditions) outweighs the
negative effect associated with their inherent social structure. In the post-colonial world, the
native elite may---under appropriate political conditions discussed in Chapter Seven--- invest
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in under-developed areas and equalize the former effect. As a result, the negative effect due to
social structure, which is much more persistent to change gradually begins to outweigh the
positive effect.
6.2.3 Differences with the BI theory
Given the contradictory nature of the impact of the zamindari institutional type on
agricultural productivity there are three major reasons why the hypothesized relationships
between an institutional structure and agricultural yields may differ (in magnitude as well as
direction) from the BI study. First, the BI study does not test for the impact of institutional
structures during the colonial period itself. As Roy (2013) points out in his critique, while
the impact of colonial institutions on the real economy is central to the BI thesis, the
contemporaneous impact of these institutions on agricultural outcomes is absent from their
analysis. To address these concerns, we include data for the colonial period as well as the
post-colonial period allowing for a jump (if any) between a contemporaneous impact and a
long-term impact to be empirically tested and captured.
Second, in the BI study, the cross-state comparisons across qualitatively
incomparable institutions (Chapter Two) represses the ‘positive’ effect that landlord
institutions may have due to ‘technical superiority’. ‘Zamindari’, as we had pointed out
earlier, means different things in different parts of India. By regressing agricultural yields on
institutional structures across states, and deriving empirical analysis from these, one is
implicitly assuming that zamindari in Bengal is comparable to zamindari in Punjab and can
hence be compared quantitatively on a continuum (non-landlord “proportion”). In contrast, as
Iverson et al (2008) show in their critique, recoding districts in the Central Provinces (which
had a third kind of system called Malguzari) completely changes the BI results. Here, we
draw comparisons between the qualitatively similar institutional structures of Punjab. The
institutional variance between districts within the same state are quantitative differences and
hence can be reasonably approximated via real numbers as opposed to comparisons between
what are essentially, apples and oranges.
Third, the main outcome variable---crop yields per hectare---cannot be seen in
isolation from the larger social, political, and economic objectives that propelled it during the
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colonial period. Different crops had different colonial objectives attached to them.44 Cotton,
as we know, had a privileged position in the colonial economic system due to historical
reasons discussed in Chapter Four. These crop-specific institutional effects are missing in the
BI analysis which looks at the “yields of crops” in abstraction from the ‘social’ role that
different crops played in the colonial economy and state. Here, we allow these crop-wise
effects to be tested, separately for each state, in each period. As we will see, the interaction
between the ‘institutional structure’ and the ‘crop’ allows for intriguing possibilities.
Finally, there is the interesting possibility (from a theoretical standpoint) that the
long-term impact of a colonial institutional structure depends not only on the past, but also
the present; that is, it depends on how the post-colonial state reorganizes the colonial
institutional structure, after independence. The existence of one region and two state
environments (Pakistan and India) in the post-colonial era allows for this possibility to be
explored.

6.3 Empirical Testing
6.3.1 Hypothesized Relationships and Model
We hypothesize that the effect of the colonial institutional structure on agrarian outcomes
should be contingent on three factors: 1) the period under examination; so that the
contemporaneous impact will differ from long-term impact; 2) crop-specificities; cotton is
expected to behave differently than the food crops owing to its very different political
economic history under colonialism (Chapter Four); and 3) the state environment which
inherited a given institutional structure. The third point will only be treated here in the broad
sense, as an ‘assignment to different state environments’. The dynamics of the political
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It is the same in colonized countries from other continents, such as Africa, where
monocultural agrarian regimes were installed: tea from Kenya, rubber from Liberia, cocoa in the Gold
Coast, palm produce from Dahomey and South Nigeria, cotton from Sudan and Uganda, and
groundnuts from Senegal and Gambia. For a detailed discussion see Rodney (1972), “How Europe
Under-Developed Africa”
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transition at independence and the causes and impact of differential post-colonial state policy
in each case will be the object of our investigation in the next two chapters.
To test these hypotheses, we will compare agricultural productivity across districts for
each state, and each crop, in each period, respectively, by running regressions of the form:
𝑌𝑐𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 𝑍𝑖 + 𝛽1 (𝑍𝑖 ∗ 𝐷1𝑖𝑠) + 𝛽2 (𝑍𝑖 ∗ 𝐷2𝑡) + 𝛽3 (𝑍𝑖 ∗ 𝐷1𝑡 ∗ 𝐷2𝑡) + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝐶𝑠 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (1),

where Yit is the yield per hectare of crop C in year t, Zi is one of three institutional variables
used in alternative specifications (zamindari proportion, landlord economic control, landlord
political control). D1is and D2t are dummy variables that identify the state and time period
under consideration, respectively, with the following values: D1is=0 if district i is in Indian
Punjab after partition, and D1is=1 if it is in Pakistani Punjab. The dummy D2 takes a value
of 0 if the year is before partition, and 1 if it refers to the period after partition (1947). Cs and
𝛿𝑡 are state and period fixed effects, and Xist is the vector of geographic control variables.
The model in (1) with the double interactions is a flexible specification to estimate the
effect of Z on Y and also to see how the effect varies by state and period. We could also run
four regressions separately to test the impact of institutions on yields in each period and each
state, but this would reduce the sample size drastically. Instead, the model specified above
allows for a much larger sample size. Evaluating this expression for the relevant values of D1
and D2 will provide estimates of interest. There are four possible combinations:
1) Effect of Institutions (Z) on Yields (Y) in districts in East Punjab Before Partition: for
this case D1=0 and D2=0; hence, the relevant effect is 𝛽0
2) Effect of Institutions on Yields in districts in Indian Punjab after partition: for this
case D1=0 and D2=1; hence the relevant effect is 𝛽0 + 𝛽2
3) Effect of Institutions on Yields in districts in West Punjab before partition: for this
case, D1=1 and D2=0; hence, the relevant effect is 𝛽0 + 𝛽1
4) Effect of Institutions on Yields in districts in Pakistani Punjab after partition: for this
case D1=1 and D2=1; hence, the relevant effect is 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 + 𝛽3
I use three alternative specifications for the institutional variables. In addition to the
‘formal institutional type’ (‘zamindari proportion’), I also use the measures of landlord
economic control (i.e. the percentage of surplus appropriated by large landlords in a district)
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and political control (i.e. the percentage of non-occupant tenancy in a district) that were
described in the previous chapter. As controls on geography, I use latitude, longitude, rainfall,
and a dummy for soil quality.
6.3.2 Results
In Table 6.1 below, the coefficients on the institutional variable and its interactions with the
state (where country code=1 refers to Pakistani Punjab/ Western Punjab) and period (where
T=1 refers to the post-partition period) are reported in the three institutional specifications.
As we can see, the coefficient on the institutional variable varies across all three dimensions
discussed above: it shows crop-specificities, periodic-specificities, as well as statespecificities.
Let us start by looking at the first specification of the model, with the Zamindari
Proportion in a district as our institutional variable. Comparing and adding relevant
coefficients, we find that for the colonial period, the variation in yields between zamindari and
non-zamindari districts is relatively similar across the two halves (east and west Punjab).
Adding the coefficients for the institutional variable (Z) and the interaction terms we find that
a zamindari district was associated with a 31% and 38% greater yield per hectare of wheat
than a non-zamindari district, in the Indian and Pakistani Punjab, respectively. As expected,
the superior ‘technical’ conditions resulted in greater yields, despite a regressive social
structure.
But the nature of this impact changes radically in the post-colonial period. Even more
interestingly, the nature of this change itself varies across the two states, reflecting a change in
magnitude but also a change in the direction of the impact. For example, for the post-colonial
period, a district that inherited a zamindari institutional structure is associated with a 16%
lower yield per hectare of wheat on the Indian side; in contrast, a zamindari district on the
Pakistani side was still associated with a higher yield of wheat than a non-zamindari district,
albeit the fact that the magnitude of this impact has fallen---from 38% to 22%. The fact that
the colonial structure continues to impact districts in the Pakistani Punjab the same way in the
post-colonial period as it did in the earlier period reflects the greater level of institutional
persistence on the Pakistani side.
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In contrast to wheat, rice yields do not seem to be as sensitive to the institutional
structure. But here too we find a jump in the direction of the impact from the colonial to the
post-colonial period. For example, a zamindari district had a 9% and 13% higher yield per
hectare in the Indian and Pakistani Punjab respectively during the colonial period for rice.
While the direction of this impact becomes negative for the Indian Punjab after independence,
the coefficient loses significance as well as magnitude for the post-colonial sample. The effect,
while insignificant statistically, remains positive for the Pakistani Punjab.
Finally, cotton behaves differently than both of the food crops. Here the direction of
the impact is similar across the two states and the two time periods. The difference lies in the
magnitude of the impact. A zamindari district was associated with a 48% and 56% higher yield
during the colonial period in the Indian and Pakistani Punjab, respectively. The magnitude of
this impact falls sharply for the Indian Punjab, to 17%. In contrast, the coefficient falls only
slightly for the Pakistani Punjab to 41%, reflecting once again, the greater level of colonial
institutional persistence on the Pakistani side.
The results show similar trends with alternative specifications for the choice of the
institutional variable, which reflects robustness of results. Using the “percentage of surplus
appropriated by large landlords”---what Table 6.1 calls ‘landlord economic control’---the
coefficient for wheat suggests that a district with a 1% greater landlord economic control
during the colonial period is associated with a 1.3% and 1.4% higher contemporaneous yield
of wheat per hectare in the Indian and Pakistani Punjab, respectively. As was the case with the
‘zamindari proportion’, however, the magnitude and direction of the coefficient reverses for
the Indian Punjab during the post-colonial period, so that a district with a 1% higher landlord
economic control is now associated with a 1.8 % lower yield. In contrast, on the Pakistani
side, a district with a 1% higher landlord economic control continues to be associated with a
0.7% higher yield per hectare.
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Table 6.1 Regression: Impact of Colonial Institution on Agricultural Outcomes
Dependent Variable: Log Yield Per Hectare
Log Wheat Yield
Log Rice Yield
Specification 1: Zamindari Proportion
Z
0.31***
0.09**
(5.13)
(2.48)
Z X CountryCode
0.07***
0.04*
(7.83)
(1.85)
Z X Time
-0.47***
-0.15
(-4.66)
(-0.34)
Z X CountryCode X Time
0.13**
0.06
(3.13)
(0.13)
Specification 2: %Surplus Appropriated by Elite
Z
0.0137***
0.004*
(7.53)
(1.53)
Z X CountryCode
0.0012***
0.003*
(8.44)
(1.47)
Z X Time
-0.0287***
-0.007
(11.44)
(-0.14)
Z X CountryCode X Time
0.0218***
0.027
(7.66)
(0.11)
Specification 3: %Non-Occupant Tenancy
Z
0.0142***
0.006*
(8.19)
(1.39)
Z X CountryCode
0.0008***
0.001
(7.61)
(0.64)
Z X Time
-0.0471***
-0.009*
(9.05)
(1.73)
Z X CountryCode X Time
0.036***
0.0014
(7.13)
(0.08)
Country Code=1 for West Punjab/ Pakistani Punjab
Time= 1 for period >1947
t statistic in brackets; ***=significance at 1% level; N=86

Log Cotton Yield
0.48***
(7.04)
0.08***
(6.25)
-0.31***
(-5.15)
0.16***
(4.61)
0.026***
(11.42)
0.007***
(9.38)
0.044***
(7.54)
-0.06***
(8.51)
0.046***
(9.26)
0.006***
(8.22)
-0.029*
(1.46)
0.005***
(6.81)

6.4 Conclusion
This chapter concludes our discussion in Section II on ‘infrastructural development’, its
impact on ‘institutional formations’, and their impact in turn on real agricultural outcomes
via contemporaneous effects and ‘institutional persistence’. The chapter showed three things:
1) It confirmed some aspects of the Banerjee and Iyyer (2005) framework, specifically by
showing that historical colonial institutions still impact real agrarian outcomes, even today.
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We showed that for both countries, the impact of the initial institutional variable, was
significant: both statistically and in terms of magnitude.
2) It also pointed out the inadequacy of the BI framework that does not distinguish between
the short-run and long-run impact of institutions owing to the qualitative shift that takes place
at the time of independence. We empirically verified that such effects were very important in
the context of Punjab, and possibly by extension, the rest of India. However, this needs to be
explored further and nothing short of an all-India study that looks at the impact of landrevenue institutions on agricultural outcomes during the colonial period itself can answer the
question, satisfactorily.
3) It showed how important it is to develop a state-specific and crop-specific understanding
of the problem of institutional persistence. The first thing one notices when looking at the
results of the regression reported in Table 6.1 is the relatively similar impact of institutional
structures on agricultural outcomes across both Punjabs during the colonial period. But what
accounts for the sharp reversal of the institutional impact on the Indian side? Why didn’t a
similar change take place on the Pakistani side of Punjab?
We return to these questions in the next chapter. Picking up the story at the eve of
partition, we show how the forms of economic and political power inherited from the
colonial period interacted with federal (or center level) politics to create different forms of
controls over the state in each Punjab, and how it is these, newly formed, post-colonial
political structures that explain the large differences in the content of the agrarian policies
that were pursued in each case.
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SECTION III
THE LONG DIVERGENCE

CHAPTER 7
POLITICS, POLICY, AND AGRARIAN STRUCTURES IN
POST-COLONIAL PUNJAB
7.1 Introduction
Up until now our journey has focused on the ‘colonial’ aspect of the problem. In the last
section, we examined the form of infrastructural development in each Punjab, and the
corresponding political and economic institutions that emerged as a result of that
development. In this section, which consists of two chapters, we turn our attention to the
second part of the story: politics and policy differences in the two Punjabs after
independence, and how these interacted with the former to produce the ‘long divergence’
between the two sides. I examine the set of historical factors at the eve of the partition of
Punjab, the transition of power to different economic coalitions at this juncture, the
relationship of the newly found ‘states’ to the central government in each case, the
contestations over political structures, the formation of agrarian policies, and their impact
on the evolution of agrarian structures after independence, in each Punjab.
In this chapter we conduct a comparative analysis of the evolution of postcolonial politics and policy, and assess their impact on agrarian structures, in turn. I argue
that differences in three distinct, yet interrelated political conditions---‘the degree of
democracy’, ‘strength of peasant movements’, and ‘state-center relations, in particular,
the former’s autonomy in determination of agrarian policy--- led to major differences in
the kinds of agrarian policies that were pursued in each case, and explain how these in
turn, impacted the evolution of the agrarian structure that emerged in each case.
I start in Section 7.2, by conducting a historical analysis of political contestations
at the eve of partition in Punjab. We show how late colonial politics led to the formation
of peculiar kinds of political settlements and coalitions during this period. On the
Pakistani side, an alliance of ‘salariat’, ‘landlord’, and ‘civil-military bureaucracy’ came
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to dominate the state structure, while a coalition of rich and middle peasants in the Indian
state of Punjab, captured state power and abolished landlordism (often popular with the
subaltern classes) in alliance with a center committed to ‘industrialization’.
In 7.3, we examine how these differences in forms of class control over the state
led to differences in agrarian policy. I examine four dimensions of agrarian policy: 1)
Land legislations, in particular ceilings and abolition of intermediaries; 2) Tenancy
reforms, in particular occupancy rights for landless tenants; 3) Support policies, in
particular credit and pricing policies, and 4) Food versus Cotton policy. As we will see,
the content and scope of these policies was radically different in the two states.
In 7.4, we capture the impact of these policy differences on the evolution of the
agrarian structure in each case. I examine the evolution of landownership patterns, as
well as the structure of tenures over the past seven decades. As expected, the patterns
reveal a greater level of inequality in terms of land ownership on the Pakistani side, and
also a higher reliance on ‘tenancy’ (which has been practically wiped out from the Indian
state).

7.2 Political Power and Consolidation after Independence
Every economic system is embedded within a broader political system that both defines
and constrains its possibilities. Political institutions matter. They are contested by
different groups in a society because of their impact on economic distribution within a
society (Acemoglu, 1999; Marx, 1867; Baran, 1954). They impact the latter because
political power leads to legislations, policies, and other kinds of institutional changes in a
society.
Following Poulantzas (1976) the state can be understood as being contested by
competing groups and factions, each vying for political power which could then be used
to further individual group interests within a capitalist state. As a number of studies have
shown, every arena of public policy is impacted by the balance of power. Scholars have
examined the impact of power relations on educational policy (Levinson, 2009; Bowles
and Gintis, 1976), health policy (Maynard, 1995; Bossert and Mitchell, 2010), and
exchange-rate formation (Kettell, 2012).
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The case of the two Punjabs is an archetypical example of how differences in
political structures can impact agrarian policies. As discussed in the last section, there
were major differences in the political and economic institutional structures that were
inherited by each side from colonial rule. In the post-colonial period, these initial
structures interacted with new political and economic coalitions, to produce major
differences in three key areas: 1) The relative strength of democratic institutions, 2) The
relative strength of subaltern peasant movements, and 3) The relative degree of state
autonomy in determining agrarian policy.
To understand how differences in these areas came about in the first place we
must begin by looking at late colonial politics in Punjab at the eve of partition, before
moving on to examine the set of differences that make the politics of each Punjab distinct
from one another, after independence.
7.2.1 Political Economy of Late Colonialism in India
The years leading up to and right after the First World War witnessed major changes in
colonial policy towards India. The War had brought about “severe dislocations in India’s
economy and society” setting the stage for “mass nationalist movements in the early
1920’s” (Bose and Jalal, 2004; p. 126). As a result, Bose and Jalal argue, “some of the
old axioms underlying the organization of the colonial state and economy since 1857 had
to be abandoned on account of wartime exigencies” (Ibid).
The rise of the revolutionary nationalist movement had “persuaded the British that
some initiative had to be taken to assuage public opinion” (Ibid, p. 129). Thus, “while
continuing to take repressive measures against groups wedded to revolutionary violence,
the British offered something to moderate nationalists”. In 1917, the secretary of state for
India, Edward Montagu, declared that the ‘progressive realization of responsible
government’ would be the goal of British rule in India” (Ibid). These were partially
realized in the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms of 1919, which led to the introduction of
“representative institutions”. However, “while broadening the basis of Indian political
activity, the British retained the earlier policy of 1909, of balancing interests by creating
separate categories for Muslims, landlords, and the Depressed Classes” (ibid).
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Even the moderate nationalists were not satisfied by the scope of the reforms. As
Bose and Jalal (2004) point out, “all that the 1919 reforms intended was to divert Indian
attention away from the center and into provincial arenas. The new franchise, based on
property and educational qualifications, was tilted in favor of the Raj’s friends, not its
critics” (Bose and Jalal, 2004; p. 129). “Despite much song and dance about provincial
autonomy, the center was equipped with all the authority necessary to curb powers in the
provinces” (ibid).
Changes in the political sphere were a result of a broader set of changes that were
taking place in the political economy of colonial India. As Bose and Jalal point out:
“The political economy of late colonialism was different in many respects from the ‘classical
patterns’ established during its high noon. After the end of the First War the colonial state in New
Delhi found it increasingly difficult to service the needs of the metropolis while holding on to
vital attributes of Britain’s political and economic dominance in India. Already, the dislocations
of the war had provided effective, though not formal, protection to India’s cotton textile industry,
an opportunity this industry was quick to seize to the relative detriment of Lancashire. In 1922
London was forced to concede fiscal autonomy to the colonial government of India. This meant
New Delhi could now impose taxes, including import duties, without having to seek permission
from the metropolis. But if the fiscal authority and industrial dominance of Britain were being
sapped during the 1920s, the shock of the Great Depression of the late 1920s and early 1930s
overturned most of the equations of the metropolis–colony relationship. Import-substitution
gathered momentum in India, displacing many of the traditional privileges enjoyed by British
manufactured products. Lancashire decisively lost out to Bombay and Ahmedabad, whose cotton
production outstripped British imports. In 1929 nearly twelve hundred million yards of British
cloth had been imported into India; ten years later less than a hundred and fifty million yards of
cloth came in.” (Bose and Jalal, 2004; p. 131).

7.2.2 Political Formations and Coalitions in Punjab
The changes in the broader dynamics of colonial India shaped the ‘provincial’ politics of
each region. Jalal (1994, 1999) and Gandhi (2012) point out that the nature of colonial
politics in Punjab changed dramatically after the introduction of ‘representative
institutions’ in 1919. As pointed out earlier, the new legislations had made political
representation contingent upon religious identities and electorates. The first provincial
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assembly---virtually handpicked by the British themselves---consisted predominantly of
those who had been fortunate enough to be classified as “Native elites” in the official
Caste and Race Manual of the British Raj. As a result, once these ‘representative’
institutions had been introduced the politics of the region began to be articulated in terms
of ‘religious’ constituencies.
Order was maintained within ‘representative’ institutions via one or two ‘favored
parties’. For example, throughout the mid to latter part of colonial rule, Punjab was
governed by a ‘secular’, feudal party known as the Unionist Party of Punjab. The
Unionist Party was a party that was committed to the joint interests of the landed elite in
the Sikh, Muslim and Hindu communities. The Unionists represented the traditional
power base of British imperialism and remained faithful to colonial authority even at the
peak of the anti-colonial movement (Talbot, 1985)
Meanwhile, the Muslim League (that demanded Pakistan later) had by the early
1940’s emerged in urban localities as a party that represented the interests of the salary
earning classes of the Muslims in minority provinces such as U.P and C.P (Alavi, 1975).
Hamza Alavi describes this class as the ‘salariat’, that is, the class in society that emerged
in relation to the development of the colonial state in India; a class that was necessary for
the functioning and running of the colonial state machinery. Put simply, the salariat was
the class in society that was “responsible for the functioning and running of the colonial
bureaucratic system” (Alavi, 1975).
The Muslim League, which had failed to gather the popular support of the
Muslims in the Muslim majority provinces throughout the colonial period, had won a
significant constituency in the salariat class during the late 1930’s and 40’s (Alavi, 1982)
While it discursively claimed itself to be a party that represented the joint interests of all
Indian Muslims, its message only acquired currency in Muslim minority provinces. Thus,
the irony of the Pakistan movement lies in the fact that the provinces and regions that
ended up becoming a part of the country never had any widespread support for the party
that came to dominate its center later, i.e. the Muslim League, while the provinces where
the demand for Pakistan was the most vociferous ended up in India (Ibid). How then did
the League manage to win support for the idea of Pakistan?
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Alavi explains that this would not have been possible without the crucial alliance
between the Muslim sections of the Unionist party and the Muslim League at the eve of
independence. When the Indian National Congress, led by Nehru, pre-committed itself to
an “uncompensated land reform after independence” in 1946, Muslim landlords in
Punjab, Sindh and Bengal decided to form an alliance with the Muslim league on
Jinnah’s promise that a land reform would never take place in Pakistan (Alavi, 1985: 4648).
Alavi describes this sudden shift in the attitudes of the Muslim sections of the
landlords in the Unionist Party as a ‘temporary marriage of convenience’ between the
Muslim League---the party of the salariat---and the Muslim section of the Punjab
Unionist Party. This marriage of convenience was a result of a fear--- rampant amongst
sections of Muslim landlords in the Unionist Party--- that a Congress-led center would
engage in reforms that would permanently, or at the very least significantly, damage the
power and influence of the landed gentry.
As a result of these fears the Punjab Muslim League incorporated the Muslim
Unionists into their ranks and swept the 1946 elections in Punjab, beefing up the demand
for its partition (Gandhi, 2014). Concurrently, and in the wake of the Second World War
it had become increasingly impossible for the British to sustain such a massive colonial
empire and plans were hastily made for a ‘transition’ to dominion status. Thus, a
partition plan was devised for Punjab and Bengal with Sir Cyril Radcliffe as its head. The
plan was supposed to submit its recommendations in less than two weeks.
Radcliffe had never been to India and had never deeply studied the geographical
or historical aspects of the country. His findings were announced three days after the two
states had already been partitioned, leading to chaos and anarchy in the province. The
Punjab was divided between India and Pakistan in 1947 on a purely religious basis. The
marriage of religious, ethnic, and class identities went far beyond the independence of the
region; the Indian side of Punjab would soon come to be dominated by a self-proclaimed
“Sikh nationalist party” representing the interests of middle and rich peasants known as
the Shiromani Akali Dal. On the Pakistani side the Muslim section of the former Unionist
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Party formed the Punjab Muslim League, which has since entrenched its power in the
political system via the colonial political and bureaucratic system (Jalal, 1999).
The political coalitions that came to dominate each state used their power and
control in different ways, leading to differences in political ‘conditions’ and structures
between the two states, after independence.
7.2.3 Differences in Political Structures after Independence
Three major differences arose, first in the degree of development of democratic
institutions, second, in the relative space that was accorded to independent political
mobilization of the poor peasants, and third, the degree of state autonomy in the
determination of agrarian policy.

Democratic Institutions
When we compare the post-independence political systems of the two Punjabs we see a
major difference in the degree of development of democratic institutions in each case.
A number of studies have pointed towards the positive impact of democratic institutions
on the economy (Rodrik, 1999; Lindert, 2004; Perrson and Tabellini, 2003). At least one
study by Lapp (2004) has also pointed towards a statistically significant relationship
between democracy and land reforms for Latin American countries.
The question is: through what theoretical channels might democracy impact
policy in general, and agrarian policy in particular? Johnson (2011) argues that even with
the same kind of elite power a system premised on representative institutions will be
compelled to cater to the interests of the popular electorate to keep its own narrow groupinterests intact. In a recent paper, Acemoglu (2013) makes the case that regardless of the
form (democratic versus non-democratic), every political group will need to make some
expenditures to sustain its political power. The difference between the two forms arises in
the level of expenditures. In the case of a non-democratic regime, he argues, these
expenditures will be strictly speaking, lower than a democratic regime leading to the
result that non-democratic societies will be more unequal than democratic societies
(Acemoglu, 2013).
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This seems to have been an important factor in the twin states. While the Akali
Dal has ruled Punjab for many decades, and most of its members are typically inducted
from the rich and middle peasantry, it has had to cater to the demands of the poor
peasantry simply because of their sheer numerical strength, which can be crucial in
determining election outcomes. These concerns seem to have been important in years
when the Congress has managed to defeat Akali in the Punjab elections (Bhalla and
Talib, 1976). It also seems to have been an important reason why Akali lost to the
Congress and Aam Aadmi Party in many districts of Punjab in the 2014 Indian general
elections. As Bhalla and Talib point out, electoral competition has meant that the ruling
party has to “respond to the needs of the small peasants to make sure that they also obtain
fertilizers, credit, irrigation and power at the prevailing price” (Bhalla and Talib, 1976;
page 72).
In contrast, the experience of democracy has been much more abysmal on the
Pakistani side. Democratic governments have been in power for barely 24 of the 69 years
since the country gained independence. The roots of dictatorship, according to Jalal
(1999) were sown in the very first decade. The first martial law regime was established
even before the official coup in 1958 which was led by General Ayub Khan. Until then
Pakistan was governed by the civil bureaucracy, which under President Mirza had
explicitly stated that “Pakistan was not ‘ripe for democracy’, and needed a system of
controlled democracy with real power for the head of the state so that if the train went off
the rails somebody could put it back on the track once again” (Jalal, 1999; 197).
Jalal (1999) sees the lack of democracy in Pakistan as being a result of “an
economy of alliance” between landlords in Punjab and the ‘upper echelons of the state
apparatus, both civil and military”. These groups had “strong reservations about a general
election” in Pakistan (Jalal, 1999; 235). “For these architects of state consolidation”, Jalal
points out, ‘a compelling argument against allowing the political process its head” was
the question of “national security” connected with the “precarious condition of the
“national economy” (Ibid).
The question of ‘national security’ and its relationship with the ‘national’
economy seems to have allowed, at least initially, a confluence of the economic interests
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of the Punjabi landlords and the military. The Pakistan army was heavily dependent on
“US technical, military and commodity aid” which in turn required export earnings. As
Jalal points out, “building a state structure largely geared to sustaining a political
economy of defense in a country where agriculture accounted for over 60 percent of the
gross national income was not without attendant political risks”.
This led to a natural alliance between the civil-military bureaucracy on the one
hand and the export-oriented landlords, who as we had seen in Chapter Four, had gained
importance in the colonial state owing to their command over cotton production. The
political coalition has successfully blocked the development of democratic institutions in
Pakistan. The first democratically elected government (led by the Pakistan People’s
Party) came into power in 1971, nearly twenty-five years after independence, with the
promise of an extensive land reform package for the poor peasantry. However, soon after
the second wave of land reform legislations in 1976, the democratically elected
government was overthrown and all legislations quickly reversed.
Strength of Peasant Movement
A second major difference in the political structures of the two Punjabs lies in the relative
strength of subaltern peasant movement, in particular, the formation of agricultural labor
organizations that could articulate the interests of the small peasantry and rural
proletariat, while remaining distinct from peasant organizations representing the interests
of the middle and rich peasantry.
This is related partially with the relative strength of democratic institutions in
each case, but goes beyond it in the sense that the Indian state, unlike its Pakistani
counterpart, was willing to share power (however little) with workers and peasants
movements within a constitutional framework. In India, the two major left parties
(Communist Party of India and Communist Party of India-Marxist) have had an
important role to play in electoral politics in Punjab. In contrast, the Communist Party of
Pakistan was officially banned after the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case in 1951 (For a
detailed discussion see Asdar Ali, 2016).
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Prior to partition, the Punjab region witnessed a number of peasant uprisings
against colonial rule. Peasant militancy was led by groups such as the Kirtis and Akalis
which revolted for the rights of tenants and poor peasants. Peasant groups led important
struggles against the colonial government, rallying around issues of debt and landrevenue cancellation. These movements, in coalition with the communists, became so
popular that in 1938 the British colonial authority had to secede to the demand of debt
cancellation and the replacement of land revenue with an income tax (Bhalla, 1976).
After independence, the Indian Punjab continued to see a vibrant peasant uprising
during the 1960’s and 1970’s. These were led by what was then the united Communist
Party of India (CPI), which later splintered into the CPI and CPI (M). These communist
parties were to form one of the largest peasant organizations in the world, namely the All
India Organization of Agricultural Labor followed by the formation of the Radical
Peasants Union (later the Punjab Naxalite movement).
The importance of the development and relative strength of independent peasant
organizations representing the interests of the small peasantry cannot be overstated. For
example, soon after independence, the issue of agricultural laborers and small
landholdings became important in the light of the land allotment policy for migrants from
both Punjabs (Punjab Human Development Report, p.21). The central government in
India had transferred ‘evacuee property’ (property left behind by people migrating to
Pakistan) to the Punjab government in 1960 with the intention of transfer to landless
tenants and small farmers. However, the state government of Punjab (led by Akali)
argued for a policy of “open auction”, which obviously led to the elite capture of these
lands and eviction of agricultural tenants and workers (Talib, 1974).
This led to peasant struggles between the agricultural workers and tenants and the
government in Jalandhar, Ludhiana, and Ferozpure. These struggles were led by the Joint
Action Committee of the Kissan Sabha (Peasant Union) and Mazdoor Sabha (Worker’s
Unions) with lower caste Sikhs and Hindus comprising the leadership of these grassroots
movements (Ibid, 23). The struggles coerced the state government to ensure the property
rights of the small farmers.
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In contrast, the experience of peasant struggles on the Pakistani side of Punjab has
been negligible. As a result, little or no security exists for the property rights of small
farmers. With the official banning of the Communist Party of Pakistan in 1951, its grass
roots fronts (Kissan Union, Mazdoor Kissan Union) were also abolished and peasant
leaders were heavily persecuted. Despite the heavy handedness of the state many grass
roots movement have developed, most recently the Anjuman-e-Mazaareen Punjab
(Union of Landless Peasants), which is leading a militant struggle against military farms
in Okara since 1999. Given the lack of a constitutional framework guaranteeing freedom
of association, peasant struggles are met with coercive power and eventually crushed.
State-Center Relations in Determination of Agrarian Policy
A third major difference in the political structures underpinning agrarian institutions in
the two Punjabs has been the greater level of state autonomy in formulating agrarian
policy on the Indian side as compared to the Pakistani side. This was important especially
in the first two decades when ‘rapid industrialization’ had become the central goal of the
two federal governments. State autonomy in agrarian policy meant that if states/provinces
could decide their own agricultural policies, they could achieve some level of autonomy
from the diktats of the central government. This was particularly crucial for states like
Punjab where agriculture was the most pivotal section of the economy.
The Indian constitution guaranteed agriculture to be a ‘state subject’. This meant
that that land legislations would be brought forth by each state, keeping its objective
conditions and constraints in focus. Additionally, other aspects pertaining to agrarian
policy, such as village administration, subsidies for electricity, and the provision of
fertilizers and other inputs, were also handed over to the individual states.
In contrast, Pakistan could not develop a workable constitution for the first
twenty-seven years of its existence. This was partially a result of the inability of
nationalities within the federation (Sindhi, Baluchi, Pashtoon, Punjabi, Bengali) to come
up with a mutually agreeable constitutional apparatus. The Punjab-dominated military
and bureaucratic elite wanted to control the rest of the provinces from the center by
extracting their resources (Alavi, 1979; Rais, 1999) and as a result could not devolve
power to the decentralized provincial units. When a constitution was finally agreed upon,
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in 1973, it promised a greater devolution of power to the provinces. Yet, it was not until
2011 that agricultural policy was finally declared to be a provincial matter via the 18th
Amendment.
Policy makers in India had argued for greater autonomy of states in determination
of agrarian policy because, they argued, in its absence agrarian policy would become
completely subsumed to the interests of the center. This fear to a large extent explains
what happened in Pakistan where the central government (led mostly by the military
elite), led as it was by a policy of “national security”, pursued an export-oriented
agricultural policy that would maximize foreign exchange earnings, which in turn could
be used to fund imports to build the military arsenal. ‘Cotton’ was to play a major role in
this agrarian policy as argued below.

7.3 Differences in Agrarian Policy
The differences in political structures described above led to major differences in the
kinds of agrarian policies that were pursued in each Punjab. The differences in policy
emerge because of the dual impact of the preferences and objectives of the central
governments (‘food security’ in the case of India and ‘national security’ in the case of
Pakistan) on the one hand, and the internal class structure and relations within each
Punjab, on the other.
The combined effect of ‘democratic institutions’, ‘peasant struggles’, and ‘state
autonomy in determination of policy’ can best be seen by examining three arenas of
agrarian policy: 1) Legislations pertaining to land, such as the establishment of land
ceilings, and the prevention of fragmentation and the consolidation of landholdings; 2)
Support Mechanisms, such as the provision of credit, subsidized inputs e.g electricity and
fertilizers, and 3) Cotton policy versus food policy.
As expected one finds major differences in the content as well as the execution of
these reforms, with the Pakistani side showing a clear landlord and ‘national-security’
bias in agrarian policy, while the Indian side privileging the middle and rich peasants of
the state to encourage capitalist farming on the one hand, and ensuring ‘food security’ on
the other.
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7.3.1 Land Redistribution and Tenancy Reforms
One of the major differences in the agrarian policies followed in the two halves was in
the commitment, or the lack of it, to land and tenure reforms. The most striking example
of this lies in the difference in the land ceilings that were established by the last round of
reforms (1972) in the two Punjabs: 17 acres versus 150 acres of irrigated land, and 50
acres versus 300 acres of non-irrigated land, in Indian and Pakistani Punjab, respectively.
How did such a large difference in ceilings come about?
The Indian reforms were to take place as soon as the early 1950’s. As pointed out
earlier, the Constitution of India declared ‘land reforms’ to be a ‘state’ subject; as a
result, there were differences in the execution and effectivity of these reforms across the
various states. There is little doubt, however, that the reforms in India were “the largest
body of land reform legislation ever to have been passed in so short a period in any
country” (Thorner, 1976).
Scholars disagree about the effectivity of these reforms; Bardhan (1970), for
instance, argues that while many different levels of land legislation were introduced, the
lack of ‘seriousness’ with which they were actually implemented significantly
undermined the impact that they could have had on poverty reduction. Using 17th round
of NSS data, he points towards an increase in the percentage of rentier households in the
countryside. In contrast, Besley and Burgess (2000) use panel data from sixteen states
from 1958 to 1992 to show that the reforms had an “appreciable impact on growth and
poverty” (Besley and Burgess, 2000; 389).
Given the ‘‘mahal-based’ (explained in the previous chapter) nature of
landownership in Punjab, land ceilings were quoted in ‘family’ as well as ‘individual’
units. On the Indian side, two major acts were introduced within the first decade of
independence; these were the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 and the Pepsu
Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act, 1955; two further acts were introduced in 1972 and
1973. The first two led to: 1) Abolition of all large estates; 2) Establishment of land
ceilings at 30 acres of irrigated and 60 acres of non-irrigated land; 3) Rights of occupancy
to non-occupant tenants. The subsequent acts of 1972 further reduced the land ceiling for
a family to 17 acres of irrigated and 50 acres of non-irrigated land (Punjab Land Reforms
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Act, 1972). The major impact on the agrarian structure was to come, as we will see in the
next section of this chapter, from the tenancy reforms which completely abolished within
the first three decades tenancy in general and non-occupant tenancy in particular from the
Indian Punjab, resulting in a rapid improvement in the bargaining power of the agrarian
poor.
In comparison, the experience of redistributive reform has been much different
across the border, in Pakistan. The first martial law regime in 1958 sought to ‘modernize’
the country; as expected, given the limited level of state autonomy in the determination of
agricultural policy, the ‘land reforms’ were to be a part of the ‘industrial policy’ of
Pakistan, with the explicit aim of encouraging the extremely large landlords to expand
their investments into the “modern sector”. This would be a part of the Green Revolution
in Pakistan. From the political perspective, any ‘reform’ had to be conducive to the
political elite, which was mostly composed of large landlords. Resultantly, a considerably
favorable land ceiling of 500 acres of irrigated (more than 15 times higher than the Indian
reforms of 1952) and 1000 acres of non-irrigated land was established. Landlords were
compensated for the appropriated lands at the market value of their lands, with these
values being often over-stated by the bureaucracy via the influence of the landlords. In
any case, the extremely generous ceilings ensured that in terms of actual content, they
would have very little to offer (Khan, 1987).
A second wave of land legislations took place in Pakistan under its first elected
government in 1972. The new wave of reforms sought to bring down the land ceiling to
150 acres of irrigated and 300 acres of non-irrigated land. Actual implementation,
however, was scarce as more than half (58%) of the landholdings over the established
limit were never even appropriated (Nasr, 1996). The failure of the democratic regime in
implementing the reforms was attributable to the resistance offered to them by the
powerful landlords.
Given the failure of the first two rounds of land reforms in Pakistan, the elected
government in 1976 announced a third wave of ‘radical reforms’; the aim of these
reforms would have been to bring down the ceilings to 100 acres of irrigated and 200
acres of non-irrigated land. However, within a year of the Act being passed, its
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implementation was preempted via a military coup supported by the landlords and
traditional religious powers, who were organized under the banner of a “Pakistan
National Alliance” (PNA). The PNA took the matter to the Federal Shariat Court, which
would look into the matter of “whether or not land reforms were allowed by Islam”. The
court gave a ‘landmark’ decision with the following judgement permanently vanquishing
all attempts at future land legislation in Pakistan:
“Islam has imposed no quantitative limit (ceiling) on land or any other commodity that can be
owned by a person. If the state imposes a permanent limit on the amount of land which can be
owned by its citizen, and legally prohibits them from acquiring any property beyond that
prescribed limit, then such an imposition of limit is completely prohibited by the Shariah.”
(Federal Shariat Court, Pakistan)

7.3.2 State Support Mechanisms
A second major difference in the agrarian policies of the two states lies in their
commitment to support mechanisms, such as provision of credit and subsidies and
support-prices. Here too, we find major differences in the class content of the agrarian
policies in terms of the beneficiaries of the support mechanisms.
Institutional Support and Credit Mechanisms
A major difference in the content of agrarian policy pursued across the two states lies in
each state’s commitment to the provision of credit. As pointed out by colonial
administrators, the indebtedness of the peasantry was a major problem in agriculture
throughout the colonial period in Punjab. In an influential study, Darling (1911) argued
that the commoditization of land had led to the emergence of a class of rural moneylenders, who had assumed importance in the rural economy by virtue of their dual role as
providers of credit on the one hand and trade intermediaries, on the other (Darling, 1911).
Throughout the colonial period, a large number of agricultural households had become
indebted to this class, and subsequently lost their lands to them. As political rebellions
broke out throughout the Punjab in 1907, the problem had become so severe that the
colonial government had to pass a bill---the Alienation of Land Act, Punjab---which
stipulated that land could only be held by members of ‘agricultural castes’. In addition,
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the colonial government had begun to initiate schemes for ‘cooperative’ borrowing and
lending. These cooperative schemes were to remain the primary source of institutional
credit for farmers throughout the latter half of the colonial period.
Even after partition, till the 1950’s, ‘cooperative credit societies’ were the only
source of institutional credit in both Punjabs. Thus, post-independence credit policy in the
two sides differed in the degree to which existing cooperative institutional mechanisms
were strengthened on the one hand, and other forms of credit for poor farmers were
developed, on the other.
The Indian Punjab offered low-interest loans to a large body of farmers via one of
two mechanisms: 1) Schemes for the establishment of cooperative credit societies, 2)
Land Development Banks (LDB’s). Credit from the former source required membership
by individual households and within the first two decades a large percentage of rural
households were members of a society (Table 7.1). These credit societies were designed
to meet seasonal fluctuations in the demand for variable inputs; this was done to reduce
the volatility associated with agriculture in Punjab where seasonal changes can rapidly
alter the demand for such inputs. These credit societies typically provided farmers with
short-term loans at low interest rates to meet such seasonal fluctuations. In contrast,
LDB’s provided credit for longer term investments, in particular sunk costs, such as the
acquisition of machinery (such as tractors, threshers etc.) and/or the installation of tube
wells and other automated water-delivery mechanisms. As table 7.1 shows, the amount of
credit given by these sources almost doubled within the first two decades on the Indian
side.
In comparison, on the Pakistani side loans provided by credit societies actually
shrank in the first decade of independence, falling from Rs. 17 million in 1949 to Rs. 11
million in 1957 (Review of Agricultural Statistics of Punjab, Pakistan, 1985). While over
93% of the rural households on the Indian side were members of credit cooperatives by
1980, less than a fourth of the households on the Pakistani side were members of
cooperative credit societies.
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The Pakistani government established the Agricultural Development Finance
Corporation45 (later ADBP) in 1957, with the stated aim of ‘modernizing’ agriculture.
The priorities of agricultural loans would be set by the aim of advancing long-term loans,
typically to large owners, for mechanized farming. Barring the exception of the 1970-77
period in which Pakistan was under a democratically elected regime, and loans furnished
to poor farmers saw an increase of 500%, the percentage of rural households with access
to credit from the corporation has traditionally been very low. The failure of the ADBP in
generating credit for poor farmers can be seen from the fact that in 2015, while almost
half the rural households of Punjab were indebted, only a tiny fraction (0.7%) had taken
the loan from ADBP and the overwhelming majority (92%) reported informal sources
(friends, relatives, family) as their primary source of credit (Agricultural Abstract of
Punjab Statistics, 2015).

Input-Support: Fertilizer and Electricity
One major difference in the agrarian policies of the two states lies in the set of
mechanisms pursued for the provision of non-farm inputs to farmers. While the Indian
side focused on ‘provision’ mechanisms in conjunction with its cooperative credit
societies, the Pakistani side focused on ‘pricing’ mechanisms at the general level. In
combination with the cooperative credit societies that were established, the Indian Punjab
also introduced a federation that was designated to meet the supply needs for inputs
(fertilizers) of members of its cooperative societies; by the early 1960’s nearly every rural
household was a member of the federation.
In contrast, the fertilizer policy of Pakistan relied almost exclusively on the
pricing side of the equation. The first fertilizer policy (issued at the central level in 1953)
sought to insure that “fertilizers are provisioned at below import prices” to farmers. This
policy remained effective until 1965, when a second policy was introduced, allowing for

45

Renamed the Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan in 1970
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the gradual establishment of ‘market parity’ with international markets; a third and fourth
policy, was introduced in 1989 and 2001, respectively; the latter policy sought to
deregulate the fertilizer sector completely as to bring domestic fertilizer prices
completely in line with global market prices to allow “free market forces to prevail”
(Khan, 2006)
The impact of differences in fertilizer policies can best be seen by comparing the
per hectare consumption of fertilizer (nitrogen) over time (Table 7.1). As we can see, the
Pakistani Punjab in fact outstrips its Indian twin for the first two and a half decades.
However, starting with the mid 1960’s, fertilizer use per hectare begins to grow
exponentially in the Indian Punjab and the difference has grown substantially over the
years. In 1963 (prior to the second policy), for example, the per hectare consumption of
fertilizer was almost 20% higher on the Pakistani side; by 1969, the tables had
completely turned in the opposite direction, so that the Pakistani side now lagged behind
by 17% in terms of per hectare fertilizer consumption.
Table 7.1 Fertilizer Consumption (Nitrogen Kilograms per Hectares)
Period (Moving Average)
Indian Punjab
Pakistani Punjab
1955-60
1.8
2.8
’60-65

2.1

2.9

’65-70

18.7

15.4

’70-75

32.5

21.7

’75-80

57.4

35.3

’80-85

77.2

46.7

’85-90

93.6

66.1

’90-95

125.1

87.2

’95-2000

157.4

104.5

2000-05

184.1

132.5

194

151

’05-10

Source: Government of Punjab Agricultural Census Reports
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In addition to fertilizer, an important non-farm input is the provision of rural
electrification. Cheaper electricity provides farms with better access to tube wells,
motorized pumping, and allows for the extensive use of threshers.
In 2003 while Pakistan provided no subsidies for electricity consumption in the
agricultural sector, in the Indian Punjab the size of the subsidy stood at 7% of state
expenditures (World Development Report, 2008: 116). The provision of subsidized or
free electricity to farmers was a key component of the set of public policy reforms that
took place in the early 1950’s and 60’s in Indian Punjab. As a result of those set of
reforms the “share of electricity consumption by agriculture with respect to domestic,
industry and commercial uses, increased from 3.9% in 1960, to 10% in 1970, to 18% in
1980, and to 32.2% in 1998” (International Food Policy Research Institute, 2007).
Electrification was negligible in the Punjab region during the colonial period, with
the Indian side having slightly over 0.2 percent and the Pakistani side with slightly over
0.4 percent of villages with electricity.46 As we can see from Table 7.2, however, within
the first two decades nearly half the villages on the Indian side of Punjab had been
‘electrified’ as compared to barely six percent of Pakistani villages. Moreover, while
complete rural electrification had been achieved on the Indian side by 1978, the Pakistani
side has still not been able to deliver electricity to over 27% of villages.

In the data, a village is deemed as being ‘electrified’ if at least 10% of the households
in that village have access to electricity
46
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Table 7.2: Percentage Villages with Electricity*
Period (Moving Averages)

Indian Punjab

Pakistani Punjab

1950-55

0.2

0.5

’55-60

14.5

1.1

’60-65

29.4

3.7

’65-70

47.1

5.7

’70-75

87.3

9.5

’75-80

100

10.6

’80-85

100

14.5

’85-90

100

24.1

’90-95

100

36.8

’95-2000

100

47.8

‘2000-05

100

57.4

’05-10

100

73.4

Source: Agricultural Census Reports
Note: A village is deemed as ‘electrified’ if 10% of the households in that village have access to electricity

The difference in electrification can be potentially crucial for the cost structures of
farmers, especially in terms of the application of farm machinery, leading to differences
in the investments that farmers can make on equipment. As Table 7.3 shows, there is a
wide gap in the use of electric equipment on the two sides, and as external effects, on
other farm machinery. While the use of diesel tube wells is approximately the same, the
Indian Punjab has a far higher number of electric tubewells, tractors, and other farm
equipment. Combined with the fact that the cost of an electricity tube well is about half
the cost of a diesel tube well, one can easily see why the costs of investing in machinery,
per hectare, would be much higher on the western side of Punjab as compared to the east.
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Table 7.3 Utilization of Farm Machinery (per 1000 acres)
Equipment
Electric Tubewells
Diesel Tubewells
Tractors
Threshers
Tillers
Disk Harrow
Seed Driller
Combined Harvesters

Indian Punjab
70
14
33
28
24
25
16.9
0.7

Pakistani Punjab
1.57
14
7
2
5.9
0.3
1.24
0.04

Source: Government of Punjab India Census of Farm Machinery 2012
Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, Census of Farm Equipment 2012

Cotton Policy in Indian and Pakistani Punjab
A final area of agrarian public policy that requires particular mention is the kinds of
‘cotton policies’ that were pursued in each state. As was argued in Chapter Four, one of
the key areas of British imperial policy after the American Civil War was the degree of
importance that was attached to cotton production and exports in Punjab. It would be
interesting to see how this policy was altered after independence, in each case. In
addition, as we seen in Chapter Three, while food production diverged significantly in the
favor of the Indian side, cotton production in Pakistan remained similar and in fact
outstripped the Indian side for many years.
While both countries have historically managed domestic prices to encourage the
sector, the content of cotton policy has varied sharply between the two states. While
India’s cotton policy was geared towards the support of the “handloom sector requiring
that non-vertically integrated spinners supply 50 percent of their yarn output to this
sector”, Pakistan’s policy has been set to promote the direct exports of cotton yarns
(Gillham et al, World Bank Technical Number 27, p. 129)47 Cotton exports (including
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apparel) account for two-thirds of Pakistan’s export earnings. The Indian government, on
the contrary, has institutionalized a tax on yarn; in addition, raw exports are also
restricted via Multi-Fiber Agreements (ibid).
Both countries intervene in the pricing of cotton but with very different aims. On
the Indian side, the policy is directed towards ensuring the three pronged result of 1) low
cotton prices to “encourage value added textile exports instead of cotton exports”, 2)
controlling cloth prices, and 3) keeping yarn prices at low levels” (Ibid, 134).
On the Pakistani side, cotton policy has been connected to export earnings.
Pakistan provides two prices, a Minimum Export Price (MEP) and a Benchmark Price
(BP); the former represents the “cheapest value at which cotton could be bought for by
the international market” while the latter refers to the “maximum internal price paid for
cotton” (ibid, p. 131). The difference between the two prices is used to calculate the
export-duty on cotton, which is the driving force of cotton policy in the country.
One major shift in Pakistan’s cotton policy took place after the installation of the
first democratic regime in 1970. In 1973, the exports of cotton were nationalized with the
formation of a Cotton Export Corporation. This meant that private producers (mostly
large landlords) could not export cotton without the governments’ permission. This
obviously did not sit well, either with the large landlords or the military elite, both of
whom relied heavily on cotton exports: the former, directly as income and the latter,
indirectly as foreign exchange was needed for the purchase of imported military supplies.
Consequently, the martial law regime of Zia ul Haq (1977-1988) once again deregulated
the exports of cotton in 1983.
On the Indian side, the Commission on Agricultural Costs and Prices (established
in 1967) establishes minimum support prices for cotton. The policy seeks, on the one
hand, to sustain the cotton farmer (by setting the price as a markup on production costs),
and encourages the adoption of technology, on the other. Cotton marketing takes place
via the cooperative credit and marketing federations (described above) or the publically
owned Cotton Corporation of India (CCI) (Ibid, p. 133). The Indian Punjab (along with
other states) introduced the Agricultural Markets Produce Acts to regulate pricing and
discouraging “unfair trade practices”; these are managed by a “committee comprising
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elected representatives of growers, buyers, and commission agents”; estimates show that
“80 percent of the seed cotton sales occur in regulated markets” with the CCI accounting
for over 30 percent of the total sales (ibid).

7.4 Impact on Agrarian Structure and Investments
In the last two sections, we made an attempt to demonstrate how after independence,
different political structures came to dominate each state and how this in turn, led to
differences in agrarian policies in the two states. Now, we focus on the impact that these
state policies have had on the evolution of agrarian ‘structures’. By the agrarian structure
here, we mean the structure of land ownership and the tenure arrangement (owner versus
owner-cum-tenant versus pure tenant farming).
To capture this evolution I rely on government statistics from decennial
agricultural censuses that were conducted in the two states. The data represents
operational landholdings and not landownership per se since ownership data is not
readily available. While there is some data available on landownership in the Indian
context it is not reliable because landowners have, in both countries, avoided land
ceilings by transferring titles to relatives.
7.4.1 Structure of Landholdings
In section 7.3, we compared the content and execution of land legislations (ceilings and
consolidation) that were introduced in the two states after they gained independence. In
Table 7.4, I present the evolution of the structure of these landholdings by class size over
the course of 50 years for which decennial census data is available (1960 to 2010). Three
major insights about the comparative evolution of the agrarian structure can be derived.
First, it can be observed that while control over the land is highly unequal on both sides
of the border, as expected the inequality is much greater on the Pakistani side.
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Table 7.4 Evolution of Landownership (Operational Landholdings)
Pakistani
Punjab

Indian Punjab
Size
Groups
(acres)

% of
owners

% Area
owned

% of
owners

% Area
owned

Pakistani
Punjab

Indian Punjab
% of
owners

1960-61

% Area
owned

% of
owners

% Area
owned

Pakistani
Punjab

Indian Punjab
% of
owners

% Area
owned

1972-73

% of
owners

% Area
owned

2010-11

Less than 1

6.6

0.5

3.5

0.2

18.8

1.4

8.5

0.3

6

1

17

1

1-5

34.5

9.4

53.4

6.7

32.7

11.1

37.9

8.2

29

9

56

18

5-12.5

31.4

26.9

19.6

15.6

27.6

26.6

29.2

18.9

43

36

15

29

12.5-25

17.5

30.5

14

16.4

14.3

29.9

13.6

18.6

16

30

8

18

25-50

6.7

23.1

5.8

21.9

5.5

22

6.9

18.2

6

19

3

13

50-100

1.2

9.7

2.7

15.9

1

7.5

2.6

13.9

1

7

0.4

8.7

100-150

0

0

0.5

7.7

0

0

0.7

6.3

0

0

0.2

6.2

150-250

0

0

0.4

4.5

0

0

0.4

6

0

0

0.2

2.1

>250

0

0

0.1

11.2

0

0

0.2

9.5

0

0

0.1

5.3

Source: Agricultural Censuses of Punjab (Government of Punjab, India; Government of Punjab, Pakistan)
Figure 7.1 compares the Lorenz curves. The dashed line represents the Indian
Punjab. As we can see, this is closer to the line of equality than the solid line that
represents ownership patterns in Pakistani Punjab. One way of considering the magnitude
of the difference is by comparing the top 1%. As we can see from Table 7.5, farms
greater than 50 acres represent 1% of the landholdings on the Indian side and account for
7% of the farm area. There are no farms above the size of 100 acres on the Indian side. In
contrast, on the Pakistani side, the 1% (those operating more than 50 acres) controls more
than one-fifth (22.3%) of the operated area; 14% of this is controlled by just the top 0.5%
(who control 100 acres of land or more) while the top 0.1% (who control 250 acres or
more) control 5% of the total farm area.

183

Figure 7.1 Lorenz Curves for Landownership
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Note: Dashed line represents Indian Punjab
Second, notice the greater preponderance of marginal and small landholdings on the
Pakistani side as compared to the Indian side. 35% of all owners are small (those
operating between 1-5 acres) or marginal owners (those who operate less than 1 acre) on
the Indian side and they control 10% of the farm area. In comparison, small and marginal
holdings represent a staggering 73% of all operational landholdings on the Pakistani side,
while controlling less than one-fifth (19%) of all farm area. This is directly attributable to
the Indian state’s active policy of land consolidation and prevention of fragmentation due
to inheritance (discussed earlier).
This can also be confirmed by considering that the percentage of ‘marginal
farmers’---those who own an acre or less---in Pakistani Punjab rose from 3.5% to 17% in
the fifty years from 1960 to 2010. On the Indian side of Punjab, in contrast, the number
of marginal farms fell, especially after the 1972 reforms, from 18% to 6% in 2010.
A third major difference between the two sides lies in the greater strength of the
middle (5-12.5) and rich capitalist (12.5-50 acres) farmers on the Indian side of Punjab.
These are typically the farms best suited to the application of capitalist methods of
production (Kautsky, 1899; Lenin, 1904; Rudra, 1966; Patnaik, 1972). Major differences
in the percentage and area of this category would be reflective of differences in the
degree of capitalist development in farming (especially when seen in conjunction with the
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tenure arrangement discussed later). Rich capitalist farms account for about 22% of all
farmers and own half (49%) the farm area on the Indian side of Punjab. The fraction of
rich capitalist farms within the 25-50 acres category is 16% as compared to 8% on the
Pakistani side; these account for 30% and 18% of farm area, respectively.
Now compare the relative strengths of the middle peasants. As we can see, they
represent 43% of the farms on the Indian side as compared to 15% on the Pakistani side
and they control 36%, and 29% of the farm area in the two sides, respectively, reflecting
that a typical medium farm is slightly larger on the Pakistani side.
Moreover, as a comparison of the 2010 and 1972 data reveals, the percentage and
area operated by middle (5-12.5 acres) farmers on the Indian side has seen an expansion
over the period; the percentage number of such farms increased from 27.6% to 43%
while the area under this category of landholdings increased by 10%. This increase is
attributable to the upward push received by marginal and small farmers after the 1972
reforms, which were implemented between 1972 and 1976. The consolidation and antifragmentation reforms were precipitated by a spike in marginal farms in Indian Punjab
from 6% in 1960 to 18% by 1972.
The consolidation reforms seem to have worked well. As we can see, the number
of marginal farmers (those owning less than an acre) falls from 18% to 6% within the
first decade. Seen in conjunction with the rise in medium farms, this implies that one
implication of the 1972 reform seems to have been an uplift for marginal farms to
medium status. The increased area came from the large landholdings (greater than 50
acres), the area under which more than halved, falling from 16% in 1960 to 7% by 2010.
This seems to be in consonance with the generally accepted assessment amongst
economic historians of the Indian land reforms in Punjab. As Alice and Thorner (1962,
reprint 2005) had predicted in 1962, the reforms benefitted the medium and rich capitalist
farmers at the expense of ‘large landlords’. This explains why as the historian Tariq Ali
(1985) points out ‘they (the rich peasants) happily supported the curtailment of big
landlords” (Ali, 1985: 87)
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Thus, while the Indian land reform broke the large landed estates into smaller--but sufficiently large to be classified as medium---capitalist farms operated by rich
peasants, the lack of a significant land reform in the Pakistani Punjab left the social
constitution of the countryside intact, and a gradual decay of small peasant property via
fragmentation. Despite the limited scope of the Indian land reform (as compared to, say
the Chinese land reform), some land reform proved to be better than no land reform (as in
the Pakistani case).
7.4.2 Structure of Tenures
In Chapter Five, we had seen that a peculiar form of tenancy--- non-occupant tenancy--was a major component of the colonial agrarian structure of Punjab. This was attributable
to the fact that a large percentage of the farm area (67%) was owned by a tiny number of
landlords during the colonial period.
The Indian side of Punjab started legislating for the security of tenures, first in
1953 and then in 1955. The Pakistani side, as we saw earlier, did not even start legislating
before the early 1960’s; it was only after the second round of land reforms led by the first
democratically elected government in 1972 that some work began to be done. As a result,
while we expect to find a decline in tenancy relations on both sides, the rate of decay
should be swifter on the Indian side.
Table 7.5 captures the evolution of tenancy relations, measured as the percentage
of farm area under tenant cultivation from 1955 to 2010.
Table 7.5 Evolution of Tenancy Relations (% of farm area under tenant cultivation)

Pakistani Punjab
Indian Punjab

1955
53.2

1960
47.8

1972
45.3

Year
1980
26

40

29

10

2

1990
22

2000
16

2010
12

0.03

0

0

Source: Agricultural Census for Pakistani Punjab, NSS 8 th, 16th 17th and 18th rounds for Indian Punjab

As we can see, the percentage of farm area under tenancy relations on the Indian side
fell from 40% to 10%, between 1955 and 1972, and pure tenancy arrangements became
practically non-existent thereafter. In contrast, there was just an 8% decline in tenancy
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relations from 1955 to 1972 on the Pakistani side. It was only after the 1972 reforms that
tenancy actually began to decline: it almost halved from 45% in 1972 to 26% by 1980.
Even today, 12% of all farm area continues to remain under pure tenancy arrangements.
A staggering 86% of all tenancy relations take place under sharecropping agreements
(Punjab Statistical Abstract, Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, p. 28), reflecting the
continuing domination of landlordist social relations on the Pakistani side of Punjab.

7.5 Conclusion
This chapter has been an attempt to demonstrate three things: First, that there were major
differences in the kinds of political structures that came to dominate each state after
independence. At the eve of partition, a political alliance took place between the Muslim
sections of the landlords (organized till then under the Punjab Unionist Party) and the
Muslim League-the party that was to inherit the center in Pakistan. On the Indian side,
the predominantly Sikh party---Shiromani Akali Dal--- led by medium and rich capitalist
farmers came to dominate the state politics of Indian Punjab, with the Indian National
Congress at the center.
Three major differences emerged in the subsequent political structures of the two
Punjabs; these were the differences in the development of democratic institutions (which
would lead to more democratic policies in the economic sphere), peasant struggles
(which would pressurize the state to pursue pro-poor legislations), and state autonomy in
agrarian policy-making (which would ensure that agriculture is not completely
subservient to the interests of the center).
Second, the chapter showed that the kinds of agrarian policies that emerged
reflected the differences in these political structures. Agrarian policy was pro-landlord on
the Pakistani side and geared to maximize export earnings for the ‘security state’. On the
Indian side, while the set of policies were on the whole more beneficial to rich capitalist
farmers, they also benefitted (although to a much lower extent) the marginal and small
farmers.
Finally, the impact of these policies can best be observed by examining the
evolution of the agrarian structure in each Punjab. Firstly, as expected, land inequality is
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much worse on the Pakistani side. Second, the lack of ‘consolidation’ policies has meant
that an overwhelming majority of farm area on the Pakistani side consists of marginal
and/or small farms; the small size made it extremely costly to invest in mechanization.
Third, we saw that medium and rich capitalist farming thrives on the Indian side; these
groups of peasants benefitted enormously from the land reforms in Punjab (especially
after 1972). Finally, an analysis of the evolution of tenancy relations showed that while
the Indian side of Punjab had completely eliminated tenancy relations by the late 1970’s,
the Pakistani side still continues to suffer from traditional forms of tenancy
(sharecropping).
The question is: to what extent are the outcomes that we see across the two
Punjabs today a result of these policy differences---attributable to post-colonial politics
and policy--- versus the set of ‘initial conditions’ (colonial institutions, geography) that
the two sides inherited at the eve of independence? How would a district that was
assigned to one country have performed if it were assigned, instead, to the other country,
given the same initial conditions? Let us now conclude our discussion on the two
Punjabs with this crucial and provocative question in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 8
HISTORY OR POLICY:
A DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE EXPERIMENT
8.1 Introduction
In Chapter Six we examined the relationship between colonial institutional structures and
agricultural outcomes in Punjab, during the colonial as well as the post-colonial period.
We showed that initial institutions matter, as they continue to have an impact on real
agrarian outcomes, even today. We noticed, however, that these institutions impacted
each Punjab differently across the two periods, reflecting an intermediating impact of
‘state policy’ on the mechanism through which initial institutional structures impact
agrarian outcomes in the long-run. This led us in Chapter Seven, to explore the
differences in the politics and policy environments that districts assigned to each Punjab
were exposed to, after partition.
Given the understanding of politics, policy, and agrarian structures developed in
the last chapter, in this chapter, I make an attempt to present an answer to the most
crucial and provocative question of the study: how would a district that was assigned to
one country have performed if it were assigned, instead, to the other country, given the
same initial conditions (geography and institutions)? In other words, to what extent can
the current differences in agrarian outcomes between the Indian and Pakistani Punjab be
seen as being a product of the conditions that each side inherited, versus the independent
agency and impact of being assigned to one or another post-colonial ‘state’, and hence
policy environment, after independence. Thus, we are interested in exploring this
question of comparative economic development, from the perspective of ‘alternative
history’.
In the theoretical framework (Chapter Two) we had argued for a
reconceptualization of the ‘New Divergence Debates’ as consisting, on the one hand, of a
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set of factors that a peripheral economy inherits, and thus cannot change---geography and
colonial history---versus the set of factors that the post-colonial state can alter via its
active agency. The former factors can be subsumed under the category “nature” (or
inherited factors) while the latter can be seen as creating a new policy environment (or
‘nurture’).
In the current literature the post-colonial state and policy is completely
endogenous, via ‘institutional persistence’, to ‘colonial history’ and inherited institutional
structures, thus positing third-world countries as ‘prisoners of birth’. The theoretical
framework in Chapter Two argued instead that an examination of the economic history of
partitioned economies using cliometric techniques can reveal fascinating insights about
the active agency of the post-colonial state, and its ability to mitigate (or in some cases,
worsen) the ill-effects of colonial institutional structures.
To do this, I borrow an experimental design and methodology from the empirical
behavioral sciences, which frequently use the tool of ‘twin studies’ to separate the effects
on some outcome variable of inherited factors and nurture, from one another. We discuss
the merits and demerits of using this analogy in 8.1. In the biological sciences, the
mechanism via which ‘nature’ works is fairly clear (DNA); obviously the same cannot be
said for social structures. Nevertheless, one can build an analogy based on historical
reasoning so that in this experiment, the controls on geography and ‘initial institutions’
are seen as being analogous to a set of ‘inherited factors’ while the assignment to
different states captures the effect of being assigned to different ‘policy environments’ (or
‘nurture’). Having presented the case for the two states as approximating a ‘twin study’,
we then use a Difference-in-Difference (DID) Regression as our identification strategy
using the partition of Punjab in 1947 as a pre and post-treatment trial, with one state
acting as a ‘treatment’ while the other acts as a ‘control’ (or to be precise, ‘differential
treatment’ group). The DID approach provides us with an ideal methodological tool to
capture the differential impact of policy, while controlling for the effects of timeinvariant factors (early institutions and geography), thus allowing us to separate the two
effects from one another.
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We use three alternative specifications to test the model: first, we compare
districts assigned to one or the other Punjab. Second, we focus only on the three pairs of
‘border’ districts that lie on either side of the fence and approximate identical
geographical conditions. Third, we use stratified subsamples, carefully chosen so that
‘high-performing’ districts during the colonial period that were assigned to Pakistani
Punjab are compared against ‘low’ and ‘medium’ performing districts that were assigned
to the Indian Punjab; this allows us to assess the intensity of the state effect (the effect of
being assigned to India), that is, to see whether or not, and to what degree, state policy in
the Indian Punjab has managed to uplift the status of areas that inherited worse than
average initial conditions in 1947.
The results confirm that while colonial institutions matter, state policy matters
even more. The two Punjabs were essentially assigned to two different ‘institutional
islands’ at the critical juncture of independence, with assignment being once-and-for-all,
and movement between the two islands, impossible.

8.2 Methodology
8.2.1 Approximating a Twin Study in Economic History
Twin studies have been an integral part of research in the empirical behavioral sciences
since Galton (1875) first used data on identical twins to examine the role of ‘nature’
versus ‘nurture’ in determining ‘intelligence’. Subsequent research has contested many of
Galton’s claims and has applied the methodological design to study intriguing questions
about individual behaviors and traits.
In recent years, sociologists have imported some of these techniques into the
social sciences to empirically assess questions pertaining to ‘returns to education’
(McGue M and Bouchard TJ 1998), ‘political choice’ (Medland, 2009), and other
intriguing questions about social choices (for a survey of these studies see Felson, 2014).
In general, these studies deal with the crucial question of whether a given observed
outcome (or behavior) can be attributed to ‘natural’ or ‘inherited’ factors, or environment
factors. The general theme is to examine ‘individual level data’ of identical or as a
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second-best, non-identical twins, over a long period of time to separate the effect of
‘nature’, from ‘nurture’.
The question is: can we use a similar analogy to examine differential returns to
economic policy? In the empirical behavioral sciences, the set of ‘inherited’ factors as
well as the mechanism through which these inherited factors are passed on is fairly wellknown; it is to be found in the genetic factors that individuals inherit. While the same
cannot be said to apply in questions pertaining to the economic history of countries, there
is, nevertheless, room for an analogy to be drawn.
Going back to our survey of the New Divergence Debates in Chapter Two, we
recall that the terrain of these debates is contested by two ‘fundamental’ channels;
‘colonial institutions’ and ‘geography’, as having the final word in determining
differences in long run comparative development outcomes between countries. In both
cases, an ‘unchangeable initial condition’ is assumed to have the determining effect on
real outcomes. Developing countries inherited these conditions at the time of their birth
and it is these ‘fundamental factors’ (Acemoglu et al, 1999) that determine prospects of
long-term growth. In such an analytical framework, the agency of the post-colonial state,
or the ‘new policy environment’ is completely repressed.
Analogously to the twin-studies design, one can differentiate between the set of
‘inherited factors’ (time-invariant conditions) and the set of policy or ‘environmental’
factors that may influence economic outcomes in developing economies, today. The
question is: to what extent can the state in a post-colonial society mitigate the impact of
inherited factors such as extractive ‘colonial institutions’ or a ‘bad geography’? The best
kind of empirical evidence for such a question can come from partitioned sub-economies,
that is, economies that were divided between two or more political bodies at the time of
their independence. While inheriting similar, or almost identical conditions initially, these
sub-economies would later be exposed to differential treatment and can, as such, be
viewed as ‘twins’ in the broader sense of the term.
There are many examples of such ‘partitioned’ economies. They include countries
in the Middle East that were formerly a part of the Ottoman Empire and were divided
after World War I by the Allied forces. Other examples include the “Scramble for
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Africa”, which led to its partition between 1881 and 1914, the partition of Korea in 1949,
the partition of Bengal in 1905/1947, and Punjab in the Indian sub-continent in 1947.
The case of East and West Punjab is similar to that of fraternal twins. As we have
seen in Section II of this study, they are not complete duplicates in terms of their initial
institutional make-up and are hence not like identical twins, who share the exact same
“genetic” information. But they are not distant cousins either which would be the case if
we tried to capture the impact of post-colonial policy by comparing districts in the
Pakistani Punjab with districts in the Indian state of West Bengal, which would entail
comparability issues since the institutional apparatus not only differed quantitatively but
also qualitatively (as argued in Chapter Five).
The difference between the land-revenue institutions in Pakistani Punjab and
Bengal is a qualitative one: while the former, like its Indian Punjabi twin, inherited the
village-based Mahalwari tenure system the latter inherited the landlord based Zamindari
tenure system. As a result the differences between the colonial land-revenue institutions
of Pakistani and Indian Punjab are not one of quality but quantity, thus making
comparisons a better approximation of a twin-study design.
To control for exogenous factors---the ‘nature’ side of the picture---I control for
historic differences in the colonial institutions in these two Punjabs and also for the
differences in the agro-climatic environment. To control for the former---colonial
historical institutions---I include measures of land-revenue institutions, form of tenancy,
and economic distribution, that were established by the British colonial state in different
districts of Punjab. These were discussed at length in Chapter Five and Six. By
controlling for these initial institutional differences along with geographic variables, I can
focus on the effect of post-colonial state policy.
Thus the main assumption that governs the empirical methodology in this chapter
is that once we control for dissimilarities in colonial institutions, geographic-climatic
factors, the effect of post-colonial policy on the differences in outcomes will become
discernable via the ‘state’ policy estimator (assignment to post-colonial India).
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8.2.2 Identification Strategy: Difference-in-Difference Regression
Given a ‘twin study’ analogy, one can use the ‘difference-in-difference’ (DID) strategy to
extract inference about the ‘nurture’ effect. The DID design is modeled along an
experimental research design that calculates the effect of a treatment on an outcome by
comparing the average change in the ‘treatment’ group with the average change in a
‘control’ group.
Starting off with the pioneering work of Ashenfelter and Card (1985), DID
methods have become widespread in econometrics. The design is setup with some
outcome variable being examined for at least two groups for two qualitatively distinct
time periods. One of the groups is exposed to some differential treatment---a new policy,
a new law---in the second period while both groups are exposed to a similar environment
in the first period. The second group is not exposed to the ‘treatment’ in either period.
Given this setup, the average change in the treatment group is subtracted from the
average change in the control group leading to a mitigation of any biases due to
‘permanent differences’ or biases from “comparisons over time in the treatment group
that could be the result of trends” (Wooldridge, 2007). In this way the approach captures
the evolution of the ‘differences’ in the means over time.
In our case, the goal is to capture the difference in outcomes in agriculture as a
result of differences in post-colonial policy, holding the effect of colonial institutions and
other non-policy related variables such as geography, climate and soil conditions
constant.
8.2.3 Parallel Trends Assumption
A key assumption of the DID strategy is the ‘parallel trends assumption’. In order
to approximate a DID design, one must show that prior to the treatment being induced the
outcome variable to be assessed did indeed follow ‘parallel’ or similar trends in both the
groups. Thus, if the two sides did not follow similar trends prior to being partitioned into
the separate states of Indian and Pakistani Punjab, our entire methodological framework
would produce biased results. In Figure 8.1 (below) I map the evolution of agricultural
productivities for the three crops prior to partition (1947). Additionally, in the
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regressions, I conduct robustness tests by running the DID experiment prior to the
periodic break at 1947 to check if the results are robust.
Figure 8.1: Average Yield of Wheat, Rice and Cotton in East and West Punjab Pre-1947
(Kilograms Per Hectare)

a) Yearly Average Wheat Yield

b) Yearly Average Rice Yield

c) Yearly Average Cotton Yield

As we can confirm from Figure 8.1, agricultural yields per hectare for wheat follow
almost identical trends prior to 1947 across both states. For rice, barring the exception of
the year 1919 (an outlier), the trends across the two states are parallel, with the western
districts enjoying a consistent and constant advantage over the eastern districts. For
cotton, the parallel trends seem to be weaker than the other two commodities. However,
even here we find that barring the exception of the years leading up to 1919, the trends
across the two states seem to follow similar patterns. The divergence leading up to 1919,
as explained in Chapter Three and Four, has to do with the difference in internal and
external connectivity of the two producing zones (east and west) with the external
markets. As argued in Chapter Four, prior to 1919, the difference in international and
domestic prices accounts for the difference in cotton yields as this was the primary export
commodity of agrarian Punjab.
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8.2.4 The Model
State Policy Estimator
We run three specifications of the following regression model to capture the effect of
differential state policy:
𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽4 (𝑇𝑡 . 𝐶𝑖 ) + 𝛿𝑍𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑋𝑖

(1)

0 𝑖𝑓 𝑡 < 1947
𝑇𝑡 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑡 > 1948

where

𝐶𝑖 = {

0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 𝜖 𝑃𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 𝜖 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑎

In equation 1, Log 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is our main outcome variable and it measures the yield per hectares
of a crop in district i at time t; Zi is one of the three measures of ‘initial institutional
structure’ that we use (described below) and 𝑋𝑖 is the matrix of geography variables
(Latitude, Longitude, Rainfall, and a dummy variable for soil quality); the time-dummy T
takes a value of 1 if the period in question is post-partition (t>1948) and 0 if it is from the
colonial period; the country-dummy C switches on for districts assigned to India.
With such a specification, the coefficient 𝛽4 is the ‘difference-in-difference’
estimator of the effect of the “treatment”. In this case, this would be the effect of being
assigned to the post-colonial policies that were adopted in the Indian Punjab but were not
implemented in Pakistani Punjab. The log-linear specification of the model implies that
𝛽4 will capture the percentage effect on the yields per hectare of a crop of being assigned
to India.
8.2.5 Specifications
We use three different subsets of the dataset to specify the model: 1) Whole sample,
divided by districts assigned to Indian or Pakistani Punjab, 2) Border districts, consisting
of the pairs Amritsar-Lahore, Firozepur-Kasur and Gurdaspur-Sialkot, 3) Subsamples,
carefully chosen so that ‘high-performing’ districts during the colonial period that were
assigned to Pakistani Punjab are compared against ‘low’ and ‘medium’ performing
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districts that were assigned to the Indian Punjab; this allows us to assess the intensity of
the state effect (the effect of being assigned to India), that is, to see whether or not and to
what degree, state policy in the Indian Punjab has managed to uplift the status of areas
that inherited worse than average initial conditions in 1947. We assume that a district that
had worse-than-average performance, i.e. below 1.5 standard deviations of the mean,
inherited worse than average initial conditions (institutional structures and agroclimatic
conditions).

8.3 Results
8.3.1 State-Policy Estimation
Table 8.1 shows the results of the regression in the three alternative specifications.
Table 8.1: Regression Results Difference-in-Difference Estimation
Dependent Variable: Log Yield Per Hectare
State Policy Estimator
Whole Sample
N=43

Crop

High* vs. Low
Border

Geography Controls
No

Yes

Wheat

0.53***

0.53***

Rice

0.70***

Cotton

-0.19***

Districts*
N=6

N=12
Geography Controls
No

Yes

0.49***

0.19***

0.14***

0.68***

0.58***

0.22***

0.22***

-0.18***

-0.37***

-0.11***

-0.09***

Notes: 1) High performance districts (X>1.5SD+u) in Pakistani Punjab were: Lyallpur, Jhang,
Sheikhupura, Gujranwala, Montgomery; Low performance districts (X<u-1.5SD) in Indian Punjab
were: Hissar, Karnal, Rohtak, Ferozpore
2) *There is no need to control for geography when looking at border districts

For the whole sample, the state policy estimator reflects profound differences due
to the food-productivity bias on the Indian side of Punjab and the cotton-productivity bias
on the Pakistani side. These stem directly from the policy differences that were discussed
in the last chapter. For the whole sample (column 1), the results indicate that a district
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assigned to the Indian Punjab has a 53% and 70% higher yield per hectare of wheat and
rice, respectively, after controlling for the impact of initial institutions and geography; in
contrast, the opposite seems to be true for cotton where the productivity of the crop in a
district in the Pakistani Punjab outperforms its Indian twin by 19%.
When we restrict our analysis to the set of border districts (column 2), the
coefficient on our state policy estimator falls in all cases, reflecting the mitigation of
cofounding factors from column (1). The set of Indian border districts are associated
with a 49% and 58% higher yield per hectare of wheat and rice than the districts across
the fence along the Pakistani border. Confirming the general trend, border districts on the
Pakistani side outperform Indian districts by 37% in terms of cotton productivity. The
results indicate that if the bordering district of Lahore had been assigned to India at the
time of independence instead of Pakistan, it would be producing 0.53 tons more wheat,
per hectare, than it does.
The most intriguing aspect of the results is their resistance to stratified
comparisons. We compared formerly median-performance and below-par districts
assigned to the state that went on to do better in terms of that crop, with formerly highperformance districts that were assigned to the other state. Thus, for food crops, high
performance districts have been chosen from the Pakistani side and compared against
median-performance districts that were assigned to the Indian state; for cotton, the
converse was done. These subsample comparisons allow us to capture the extent of the
impact of differences in policy. In a sense they capture the ‘reversal of fortunes’ that has
taken place between districts purely by virtue of being assigned to a different policy
environment, despite the fact that they had superior initial conditions. Such comparisons
show that a median-performance district assigned to the Indian Punjab today has a 14%
and 22% higher yield per hectare of wheat and rice, respectively; conversely, a highperformance district on the Indian side has had a 9% lower cotton productivity than a
median-performance district that was assigned to Pakistani Punjab in 1947.
8.3.2 Discussion of the Results
The results presented above capture the impact of state policy on agricultural outcomes,
after controlling for ‘inherited’ institutional structures and agroclimatic conditions. As
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such, the results confirm the hypotheses: crop yields reflect the cumulative effect of the
set of policies that were pursued in each state after independence. The set of land
legislations, support mechanisms, and food-productivity enhancing reforms that took
place on the Indian side have directly resulted in a 53% advantage in food production for
the Indian state while the cotton-centric, landlord-oriented policies of the Pakistani
Punjab have been much more amenable to the production of the main cash crop-cotton,
which is 19% more productive on the Pakistani side on average than the Indian side. The
set of policies, in turn, as we had argued in Chapter Seven, reflect the very different kinds
of state-level and federal politics that emerged in the two sides after independence.
Inherited Factors or Policy?
State policy, or ‘nurture’, seems to matter much more than initial institutions or
geography. The coefficient on two out of three of the geography variables (not reported
in the table)---latitude and longitude--- are insignificant at the 10% level and are also
negligible in magnitude. While rainfall (mm) and soil quality dummies are statistically
significant, the magnitude of their impact seems to be negligible. This is also confirmed
in the table when we focus on the set of border districts, restricting the sample to which,
does not lead to a major reduction in the magnitude of the state policy estimator. Lying
on either side of the fence, these six districts replicate identical geographic conditions
(and institutions), and as the confluence between the results for the whole sample and the
border districts in 8.3 shows, geography variables do not matter as much as the difference
in the policy environment, via its direct impact on the agrarian structure (as argued in
7.4).
Moreover, as the subsample comparisons between historically more productive
districts assigned to the Pakistani Punjab, with below-median productivity districts
assigned to the Indian Punjab reveals, an activist state policy has the ability to ‘reverse’
and ‘mitigate’ the ill-effects of inheriting a worse-than-average initial conditions.
Formerly less productive districts such as Hissar, and Ferozpore (which inherited large
feudal landholdings) that were assigned to the Indian state of Punjab outperform even the
formerly rich canal colonies that were assigned to the Pakistani Punjab such as Lyallpur
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and Montgomery48. While the size of the state policy estimator falls from 53% to 19%,
when we restrict our regressions to such (unfair) comparisons it nevertheless shows, that
despite the worse-than-average initial conditions, such districts were able to gradually
become better solely due to being assigned to a different state.
Thus, third-world countries are not prisoners of birth as the existing literature implicitly
assumes. An activist state policy can mitigate the impact of extractive colonial
institutions and bad geography.

48

Lyallpur is now known as Faisalabad; Montgomery is now known as Sahiwal
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSIONS AND AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This study used the partition of Punjab in 1947 to understand, and distinguish between, the set of
colonial and post-colonial factors that shape long-term economic performance in peripheral
economies. The study sought to contribute to an understanding of the role of colonial and postcolonial institutions in shaping comparative development outcomes.
One major goal of this study was to switch the focus away from ‘unfair’ comparisons--which compare colonizers with colonized--- towards comparative examinations of divergence
within peripheral countries. The former kinds of comparisons run the risk of generating biased
results, as they do not account for the dependent nature of development in the former colonies.
The relationship with the colonial state is central to an understanding of the institutional milieu,
and its evolution across the colonial and post-colonial period. In the case of Punjab, the
relationship with the state was to be found in infrastructural development. This may be different
for another economy, but the essential feature---‘relationship with metropolis state’---remains the
same, and follows from the dependent logic of colonial development.
A second goal of the study was to connect the process of institutional formation in the
colonies to the ‘entitlement’ system that was created by the colonial state. Drawing on the
pioneering work of Mamdani (2012), and Sen (1981), I presented institutional formations in
Punjab as arising out of the colonial “entitlement systems”. In the context of the Punjab, this was
seen to be related to the Native versus Settler dichotomy, which described how political and
economic control were to be distributed within the colonized economy via peculiar institutional
mechanisms. Mapping the ‘entitlement system’ onto the institutional apparatus is key to
understanding the process via which the former impacts economic outcomes in the long-run.
A third goal of the study was to make the agency of the post-colonial state visible. In the
recent debates, post-colonial outcomes are seen as being pre-determined by one or another timeinvariant factor: geography, or colonial history. As Chang (2011) argues, these models negate
human agency by making economic outcomes completely functional to ‘structure’. For
peripheral economies, this leads to the erroneous view that third-world countries are prisoners of
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birth; prisoners, either of the geographic environment, or the colonial institutions that they
inherited. Instead, an emphasis was placed in this study on the ‘enabling’ institutions that were
created by the post-colonial state, and how these mitigated (in some cases) the ill-effects of being
colonized. I argued in particular, for comparative examinations of partitioned economies: subregions that were exposed to the same colonial history but were subsequently partitioned into
independent states at the end of the colonial period. While the evidence for such comparative
examinations can only be built by looking at multiple pairs across time, I chose the Punjab
region as a concrete example of the proposed methodology. As a matter of future research one
can look at other pairs of such partitioned economies. These economies typically share all three
“fundamental features”: a common colonial history, a similar geography, and an identical
culture. A deterministic reading of any of the three strands of the existing theoretical debate
should therefore have implied long-term convergence. Yet, as we saw in the case of the two
Punjabs, there can be significant divergence of economic fortunes due to the effects of postcolonial state structure and politics.
With these goals in mind, I began by inquiring about the historical circumstances facing
global capitalism in the aftermath of the American Civil that led to infrastructural ‘development’
in Punjab. I examined the spatial patterns of infrastructural development across the two subregions from 1860 to the First World War. Using archival colonial data I looked at railway and
canal infrastructural ‘development’ at the sub-regional level and showed that 1) Railway
development was biased in North-South direction whereas Punjab is geographically placed in an
East-West direction, 2) State canal irrigation was concentrated in west Punjab. The spatial
patterns led to the result that by 1921 the two Punjabs became unevenly articulated with the
export versus home market.
In Chapter Three, I used a newly constructed dataset with district-wise information on
output and acreage of the three major crops (wheat, rice, and cotton) and derived three important
conclusions from the analysis and each ‘conclusion’, in turn, pointed to a new question (that is
answered in subsequent sections). First, I identified a ‘food-cotton’ paradox: while food
productivities have diverged significantly over the post-colonial period, cotton productivities
have remained curiously similar across the two Punjabs. Since the former have a greater impact
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on poverty-reduction than the latter, it follows that the divergence in overall living standards is
partially a reflection of the radical divergence in food productivities.
Second, we saw that the western half began to outpace the eastern districts in terms of
agricultural productivity during the first two decades of the colonial period. This was explained
by the price hike in global commodity markets in the years leading up to the First World War.
The western districts gained from these price hikes owing to the greater level of infrastructural
development in these districts, and hence opportunities to access the export market. World War I
brought about severe dislocations in the colonial economy of India, acting as a kind of ‘importsubstitution’, leading to the rise of the nascent textile industry in Bombay and Ahmedabad. As a
result, the eastern districts gradually became articulated with the ‘home market’. The latter
replaced cloth imports from Lancashire, and consequently, the eastern districts of Punjab (that
fed the home market) began to equalize with the western districts.
Third, we see that the post-colonial divergence in food productivities had started long
before the Green Revolution, which has been seen by many as an important period in the
agrarian transformation of the two Punjabs. This is due to the fact that the Indian Punjab
embarked upon a series of land legislations as early as the first decade, while there were no such
reforms in the Pakistani case. What the Green Revolution did was to intensify the divergence that
had already begun.
I devoted Section II to building a historical understanding of the state, the political
economy of colonial ‘development’, and the set of micro institutions dealing with the
organization of ‘surplus’ and ‘power’ that emerged in agrarian Punjab during the colonial period.
Much of the story in this section revolved, directly or indirectly, around state-led infrastructural
development. While I did not focus on the cultural aspects of the problem---as Mamdani (2012)
does for the case of Malaysia---I did examine the ‘system of rights’ that emerged in colonial
Punjab as a result of the peculiar patterns of infrastructural development. We saw that in places
where the state invested heavily in infrastructure, an extractive, pro-elite, landlordist agrarian
structure developed. This is because the colonial state entrusted power----political and economic--into the hands of its traditional allies, the landlords.
In Section III, we saw how this led to peculiar political struggles in late colonial India.
The Muslim landlords of Punjab joined hands with the Muslim League---a party representing the
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interests of Muslim ‘salariat’ classes in minority provinces---to avoid the land reform that had
been promised by the Congress Party in post-independence India. The partition of Punjab was a
result of these political contestations, albeit expressed in ‘communal’ language, as a result of the
introduction of religious electorates in representative institutions by the Montagu-Chelmsford
reforms.
In the post-partition period, while the Congress led center in India engaged in a process
of reform---in land ceilings, tenure, and devolution of power to the provinces/states---the reform
package instituted by the Muslim League-Unionist center in Pakistan was significantly weak and
further strengthened the ruling classes. As a result, on the Pakistani side, ‘democratic’
movements, ‘independent organizations of the peasantry’, and ‘movements for greater state
autonomy in the determination of agrarian policy’ were brutally crushed via an alliance of
landlords and the military. This led, in the final analysis, to a very different set of public policies
in the two Punjabs and ultimately major differences in the agrarian structures.
In Chapter Eight, we conducted a difference-in-difference experiment to capture the
differential impact of state policy on comparative outcomes, while controlling for initial
differences between the two parts. We concluded that the differences between the two states
cannot be reduced to geography or colonial institutions. Colonial history matters indirectly
through its impact on the political contestations that gave birth to peculiar kinds of state power at
the time of independence in each state. The differences in comparative outcomes are explained
by the post-colonial state policies that were pursued on each side. While the results indicate that
geography and initial institutions matter, what matters the most is the post-colonial state structure
and the set of policies that are pursued, after independence. As an ‘alternative history’, if a
district were assigned to the Indian Punjab at the time of independence, with the same geography
and initial institutions, it would produce a greater yield of food crops per hectare that it does right
now.
The main insights of the study are to show, firstly, that while colonial institutions matter,
the channel through which they matter intermediates the concrete mode of dependence
established by the colonizing regime via its hegemony over the state. In the case of Punjab, for
example, what stands out is the infrastructural divergence between the two sides between 1870
and 1920. This directly impacted the degree of internal versus external connectivity of the two
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sides. Most crucially, the degree of colonial state investments in the two regions had a permanent
impact on the political economy of the two regions since the state introduced different forms of
political and economic institutions to secure the extractions from high-investment zones.
Second, the study also showed that the impact of colonial institutions on current
outcomes is completely contingent on post-colonial state policy, which in turn, depends on the
degree of political (and economic) reform introduced. As shown in Chapter Six, while colonial
institutions impact economic outcomes similarly across the two states during the pre-partition
period, the nature and magnitude of the impact alters significantly after partition. Colonial
institutions still matter across both sides, as can be seen from the fact that land revenue
institutions setup by the British more than one hundred years ago continue to have an impact on
agrarian yields. Yet, and this is the surprising element, the manner in which this impact takes
place has changed on the Indian side while it remains relatively similar in the Pakistani case.
This is because while the Indian side was busy ‘decolonizing’---on a relative scale---the
institutional structure it inherited from colonialism, the Pakistani elite was further consolidating
it.
Third, the study also pointed out the centrality of political power to any economic policy
and reform. The greater agrarian development on the Indian side can be attributed to the political
settlement that was made within a few years after partition between the various groups and
classes. This is most reflective in the constitutional and democratic experience of the two
countries. For example, while the Indian federation agreed to establish a new constitutional
framework within the first few years of independence, Pakistan’s experience with
constitutionalism has been extremely volatile, and the state could not agree on a constitution till
1973. Similarly, democracy has had a volatile fate on the Pakistani side, where only one
democratic government in the last seventy years has been able to complete its term. This in turn
is reflective of the fact that the form of political power---inherited from colonial rule---in each
side was radically different. On the Indian side, middle peasants and to a lesser extent rich
capitalist farmers were able to align against large landowners, who were already devastated by
the partition of Punjab in any case; the former then pushed for land reforms that further eroded
the power of the agrarian elite. In contrast, on the Pakistani side, the former Muslim landowners
of West Punjab monopolized not only the agrarian infrastructure, but also most crucially,
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controlled the important policy instrument: the state. The state was then used in the Pakistani
case to further intensify the power of the victors of the colonial period.
The study pointed out the crucial role of political power and its influence on state
formations in post-colonial reform. This has a political as well as an economic component. From
the political perspective, the Indian case shows that a capitalist state can benefit from allowing
independent subaltern movements (peasant unions in this case) and coalitions to coexist within a
democratic framework. As shown in the Indian case, the fact that landless and poor peasants
were allowed to form their own political movements and parties independently, and could also
participate in the democratic process, meant that the parties dominated by well-to-do sections of
society had to cater to the demands of the poorest of the poor; this is reflected in the kinds of
credit policies, subsidies (fuel, electricity, seeds), and final commodity prices that were offered
to poor farmers in the Indian Punjab. In contrast, on the Pakistani side, where independent
subaltern movements were often crushed by brute force, such reforms could never be
implemented.
The study also affirmed that economic institutions, which deal with the distribution of
economic gains, are the result of political institutions, which deal with the distribution of power.
The kinds of land legislations that were passed across the two states; in particular, the importance
that was given to consolidating small landholdings, the tenure reforms introduced to support nonoccupant tenants on the Indian side, have directly resulted in the divergence of economic
fortunes between the two states.
Most crucially, the central claim of the study stands vindicated. The divergence between
Indian and Pakistani Punjab, with the former outperforming the latter, shows that post-colonial
countries are not prisoners of birth; they are not prisoners of the colonial history that they
inherited, nor are they completely constrained by their geographies. An active policy of
decolonization and state-led development can, and indeed does, mitigate the impact of extractive
colonial institutions.
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